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 This dissertation argues that South Asians used international legal discourse both 
for ideological disputation and to mount political challenges to the domination and 
subjugation that accompanied British imperial rule between roughly 1850 and 1920. 
South Asians instigated political and legal disputes in India and Britain, throughout the 
empire, and overseas, and gained promises and partial concessions to Indian opinions and 
demands that limited British options in imperial and international relations. In so doing, 
they compelled the British state to alter the ideology, the policies, and the practices of the 
state, in India and in its relations with other states both within and outside the empire. 
Britain’s power, ultimately, meant that South Asians’ argumentation and actions shaped 
the contours of global order after the First World War. 
 The traditional international-legal framework of treaties, treatises, and states 
provides little insight into South Asians’ contributions to global order and law between 
viii
roughly 1850 and 1920. This situation exists, partly, because of the perceived and 
purported normalcy of the nation-state as the fundamental category of international life. 
Traditional histories of international law argue that international law originated in Europe 
and regulated European states’ relations until colonized states were granted international 
legal recognition at the time of decolonization. Recent revisionist scholarship argues that 
the existence and experience of empire and colonial rule shaped the development of 
international law and global order throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 This dissertation approaches empire in a way that emphasizes the global exchange 
of ideas and the active connections between colonizers and the colonized. Elite, English-
speaking South Asians acted as cultural translators or intermediaries. They engaged in 
debates as public intellectuals, and they carved out spaces for themselves in the social 
and political communities that created public opinion. Consequently, South Asians' ideas 
about relations among different peoples and between states and South Asians' 
mobilization of these ideas throughout the empire and overseas to make political claims 
about the obligations of the imperial state and the rights of imperial subjects shaped ideas 
about global order and the structure of international legal relations. 
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Introduction 
 The British Indian army in Bombay prepared and launched a military expedition 
against Emperor Tewodros II of the Ethiopian empire, or Abyssinia, in 1867 and 1868.  1
Tewodros, known both as King Theodore and Theodorus in the British historical record, 
had written to Queen Victoria in 1862 to request help from a fellow sovereign, in the 
interest of their shared Christian civilization, to fight the alleged expansion of the Muslim 
Ottoman empire into Abyssinian territory. Victoria never responded, for numerous 
possible reasons. One observer noted that Anglo-Ottoman relations were friendly at the 
time.  One government official mentioned persistent diplomatic missteps.  One later 2 3
commentator cited the contingencies of institutional life, wherein Theodore’s “foolish 
letter” had been “tossed into a pigeon-hole by some heedless Foreign Office 
subordinate.”  The reason, whether geopolitical or Victorian burlesque, mattered little. 4
Theodore reacted to the diplomatic snub in 1864 by imprisoning two British missionaries, 
 “Abyssinia Expeditionary Force 1867-1868,” India Office Records (IOR), L/MIL/5/540, The British 1
Library, Asia, Pacific & Africa Collection, London; see, Edward Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign 
Office (London, 1901), 230-244, Chapter XII: “The Abyssinian Question,” for a brief recitation of the 
reasons for the conflict from a Foreign Office official; see, Henry Montague Hozier, The British Expedition 
to Abyssinia (London, 1869), for an account from the Assistant Military Secretary to Robert Napier, who 
led the expedition as the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army.
 See, for Britain being on “very good terms with the Turks,” Charles Villiers to Olga Novikoff, October 11, 2
1867, In W. T. Stead (ed.), The M.P. for Russia: Reminiscences & Correspondence of Madame Olga 
Novikoff, Volume I (London, 1909), 110-111; Charles Villiers was a Russophile and the younger brother of 
George Villiers, Lord Clarendon, who served three times as Foreign Secretary, including during the 
Crimean War and both immediately before and after the Abyssinian expedition. 
 Andrew Lang, Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, First Earl of Iddesleigh, new ed. 3
(Edinburgh, 1891), 190-197; Northcote served in Benjamin Disraeli’s Cabinet as the Secretary of State for 
India during the expedition.
 John Russell Young, “The Chinese Question Again,” The North American Review, 154 (1892), 596-602, 4
at 599; see, also, Nini Rodgers, “The Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-1868: Disraeli’s Imperialism or James 
Murray’s War?,” The Historical Journal, 1984 (27), 129-149.
1
the British consul who attempted to secure their release, and finally, the entire consular 
staff. Subsequent, fruitless diplomatic overtures culminated in August 1867 with Queen 
Victoria’s announcement of a decision for war to rescue the hostages and to punish King 
Theodore. 
 Some critics condemned conquest in Abyssinia as a first step towards the 
occupation of Egypt on behalf of British financiers, but very few observers questioned 
the international legal basis for the expedition.  Stafford Northcote (1818-1887), the 5
Secretary of State for India at the time, explained his support for the expedition by 
proclaiming that “[e]nvoys of the Sovereign of this country should always be under the 
protection of this country in the country to which they are accredited” and added that 
Britain would be “untrue not only to ourselves but to the civilized world if we failed to 
uphold [this principle].”  Public opinion held that Britain had “exhausted every pacific 6
means of obtaining the release of [the envoy] and the other prisoners.”  International 7
legal scholars concurred and retrospectively sanctioned the legality of the expedition.  8
 E.g., Frederic Harrison, Autobiographic Memoirs: Volume I (1831-1870) (London, 1911), 344-346; see, 5
also, Gregory Claeys, Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920 (Cambridge, 2010).
 House of Commons Debates (HC Deb.), November 28, 1867, volume 190, columns 359-407, column 6
371.
 “The Abyssinian War,” The London Review of Politics, Society, Literature, Art, and Science, 15 7
(November 30, 1867), 586-587, at 586.
 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. II, third ed. (London, 1882), 7; James 8
Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political 
Communities, vol. I (Edinburgh, 1883), 250.
2
The House of Commons, on November 28, 1867, approved the government’s proposal 
for war. Support was overwhelming, but not unanimous.  9
 Dissenters opposed the government’s plan to execute the expedition using Indian 
troops and revenues. The proposed use of Indian resources aroused adamant, if limited, 
antipathy, both in Parliament and among public intellectuals, whose attitudes, ideas, and 
judgments constituted nineteenth-century public opinion.  Opponents argued that India 10
possessed no material or foreign-affairs interest in the dispute and that the diversion of 
Indian revenues for a British-imperial war actively harmed South Asians.  The dispute 11
revolved around questions about the status of India in the empire; about imperial legal 
and constitutional order and how the empire was, and was being, systematized and 
structured; and about the relationship “between imperial and municipal structures of 
authority,” especially as these related to questions about foreign or international relations 
and law.  12
 The invocation of Indian interests, separate from those of Britain, surprised 
supporters of the expedition. Most regarded India as an entirely subordinate part of the 
British empire in which the Queen and Parliament sat atop a vertically integrated empire-
 HC Deb., November 28, 1867, vol. 190, col. 407; 198 members voted “aye,” and 23 voted “no.”9
 See, on public intellectuals and public opinion, Stefan Collini, Public Moralists, Political Thought and 10
Intellectual Life in Britain 1850-1930 (Oxford, 1991).
 E.g., the comments, during Parliamentary debate, of Henry Fawcett and of Robert Cecil, Viscount 11
Cranborne and, later, Lord Salisbury, HC Deb., November 28, 1867, vol. 190, col. 380-383 and col. 
404-407, respectively.
 Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 12
1800-1850 (Cambridge MA, 2016), 5.
3
state as the only legitimate, outward-facing representatives. Henry Rawlinson 
(1810-1895), claiming credibility based on his experience as an East India Company 
army officer and diplomat, expressed this theory of political order most starkly, saying, 
“[o]ur system of Government in India [is] essentially for the maintenance of our power, 
and when we [speak] of Indian interests we [mean] our own interest as the ruling power 
of India.”  He justified the elimination of India’s international legal personality and of 13
South Asians’ claims as rights-bearing imperial subjects by averring that Britain was “one 
of the great nations of the world appointed to watch over the interests of civilization.”  14
 Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), in a paper presented to the East India Association 
in London the day after the vote in the Commons, spoke against the proposed war.  15
Naoroji had migrated from Bombay to London in 1855 as a business partner in the first 
Indian-owned trading firm in Britain, and he was a respected public intellectual in both 
countries.  He had co-founded the Association to provide objective information and 16
policy advocacy on Indian interests to the government and the public. He had not known, 
when preparing his paper, that Parliament would approve the government’s proposal 
before his presentation and had hoped to obtain a resolution opposing the use of Indian 
 HC Deb., November 28, 1867, vol. 190, col. 384.13
 HC Deb., November 28, 1867, vol. 190, col. 390.14
 Dadabhai Naoroji, “Expenses of the Abyssinian War,” Journal of the East India Association, vol. II 15
(London, 1868), 46-63.
 See, R. P. Masani, Dadabhai Naoroji: The Grand Old Man of India (London, 1939).16
4
resources for submission to Parliament and the Queen in the name of the Association, the 
South Asian and British members of which were prominent public figures. 
 Naoroji is best known as a moderate nationalist and a political economist, but on 
this particular Friday afternoon, he analyzed the history of inter-polity legal relations 
between various South Asian rulers and the East India Company.  Mutual-defense 17
provisions in the formal treaties that had regulated these relations required the party 
requesting military assistance to pay the full costs of any expedition. Naoroji opined that 
the EIC’s arbitrary and repeated repudiation of its treaty obligations had contributed to 
the violent revolt against Company rule in India in 1857. He noted that Queen Victoria, 
after the reimposition of British control in India in 1858, had promised to respect these 
treaties and that Parliament, by Article 55 of the Government of India Act of 1858, had 
precluded the use of Indian revenues for British military actions except under unexpected 
and exigent circumstances, a condition obviously unmet in the long-running dispute with 
King Theodore. 
 Naoroji called upon the Secretary of State for India, “when English and Indian 
relations [were] to be adjusted, to act as if he were an independent Power, representing 
Indian interests, and [to] negotiate with the Foreign Secretary on terms fair and equitable 
 Lauren Benton and Adam Clulow, “Empires and Protection: Making Interpolity Law in the Early Modern 17
World,” Journal of Global History, 12 (2017), 74-92. Benton and Clulow use inter-polity law as a broader, 
pluralistic category of law that encompasses not only relations between states but also the inter-
civilizational relations that characterized the era of imperial expansion and the variety of non-state actors, 
e.g., trading companies, empires, subsidiary states, or port cities, that engaged in treaty-making or 
contractual relations.
5
to both parties.”  His ideas about politico-legal and constitutional order, about authority 18
and legitimacy, and about India’s place in the imperial and global systems differed 
sharply from those of most contemporary political theorists, statesmen, and colonial 
administrators. Naoroji’s international legal discourse created the political-theoretical 
foundation for an empire-as-commonwealth almost two decades before scholars identify 
an expanding interest in commonwealth ideas among theorists of either a racialized, 
Anglo-Saxon global order or imperial federation, and more than 30 years before the term 
entered the popular lexicon during the South African, or Boer, war.  Naoroji's 19
commonwealth was a singular politico-legal and constitutional entity comprising discrete 
states with equal claims to particular local, imperial, and global interests and was only 
partly hierarchical with respect to concentric and competing local, imperial, and global 
spaces. It was also a capacious inter-national entity that could accommodate varied ethnic 
and religious communities and histories. 
 Most British political theorists, statesmen, and colonial administrators in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries agreed with Henry Rawlinson’s opinion about 
Britain’s Indian empire. If we accept this dominant strain of British political thought at 
face value, and if we believe that British politicians and administrators completely 
subjugated and successfully erased particular peoples from global life, then South Asians 
 Naoroji, “Expenses of the Abyssinian War,” 50.18
 Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 19
1840-1960 (Cambridge, 1965), 182-187, 233; James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution 
and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford, 2009); Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: 
Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 2007); S. R. Mehrotra, India and the 
Commonwealth, 1885-1929 (New York, 1965).
6
like Naoroji and others should have been unable to affect the ideas and practices related 
to global order or international relations and law. South Asians, though, did not simply go 
gentle into that good night of colonial erasure. 
 They used international legal discourse for the work of ideological disputation 
and to mount political challenges to the domination and subjugation that accompanied 
imperial rule. International legal discourse facilitated Britain’s attempted erasure of South 
Asians from international legal life after the revolt in 1857. Yet clear evidence of South 
Asians’ subsequent ideological and political work appeared in 1919, when colonial 
India’s anomalous position as both a colonial dependency and a founding member-state 
of the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization (ILO) attracted 
worldwide attention. The disjuncture in status between India’s international and imperial 
conditions, described in the 1920s as “quasi-independence,” continued to shape the 
ideological and the institutional practices associated with empire and international law 
and relations up to the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and South Asian 
independence in 1947.  20
 This dissertation traces South Asians’ use of international legal disputation to 
argue that they reconfigured the ideologies and practices related to global order, as 
expressed in international political thought, law, and institutions between roughly 1850 
 See the Memorandum on the “International Status of India,” In the Simon Commission Report on India 20
(Indian Statutory Commission): Part II, Volume V, Memoranda Submitted by The Government of India and 
The India Office to The Indian Statutory Commission (London, 1930), 1631-1650, at 1632; see, also, Arthur 
Berriedale Keith, The Sovereignty of the British Dominions (London, 1929), 327-330; William Edward 
Hall, A Treatise on International Law, eighth ed. (Oxford, 1924), 35; Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: 
A Treatise, Volume I (New York, 1928), 195.
7
and 1920. South Asian legal experts, scholars, and activists persistently and repeatedly 
provoked politico-legal disputes in India and Britain, throughout the empire, and 
overseas, often extracting partial concessions to Indian opinions and demands, but, more 
importantly, limiting British options in imperial and international relations, including 
Britain’s freedom to control the political agenda. These disputes challenged and altered 
the ideology, the policies, and the practices of the British imperial state, in India and in its 
relations with other states both within and outside the empire. The worldwide reach of 
British power allowed South Asians’ argumentation and actions to shape the contours of 
global order after the First World War by forcing intellectuals, statesmen, and imperial 
agents to abandon the nineteenth-century version of international law that created order 
through subjugation. 
 This story locates the origins of modern international law in British imperial 
efforts to order and re-order relations among peoples through imperial thought, 
administration, and law. Attention to South Asians illuminates how international law 
developed not within a system of relations among equal states but because of both 
asymmetric relations among peoples and the justifications for imperial subjugation. 
Focusing on South Asians’ international political and legal thought and advocacy during 
the British imperial era undermines narratives that imagine national states, empires, and 
international space as politico-legal matryoshka dolls or non-overlapping concentric 
circles. This approach provides guidance for examining the political, economic, and legal 
8
inequalities that still shape global affairs and the patterns of hierarchical relations that 
endure to the present day. 
The Scholarly Erasure of Colonial South Asians from International History 
 One could be forgiven for believing that South Asians contributed nothing to the 
development of international political thought, law, or institutions before the end of 
British rule in 1947. A solitary monograph has examined the history of South Asians’ 
contributions to international law before independence.  It was published in 1967 and 21
focused only on the early modern period. Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, in An 
Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies, argued that 
diplomatic and treaty-making practices commonly regulated relations between Asian 
rulers and both European sovereigns and trading companies, as agents of states, between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. He posited that interactions proceeded based on an 
assumption of reciprocity between the parties and occurred on roughly equal terms 
because natural law theories recognized de facto sovereigns and states without regard to 
putative moral and cultural differences among peoples. 
 He contended that this inclusivity ended in the late-eighteenth or the early 
nineteenth century, when the “ideological cataclysm” of an emergent jurisprudence of 
positivism disparaged moral reasoning on behalf of humanity or mankind and redefined 
 C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th, 21
and 18th Centuries) (Oxford, 1967); see, also, David Armitage and Jennifer Pitts, “‘This Modern Grotius’: 
An Introduction to the Life and Thought of C. H. Alexandrowicz,” In Armitage and Pitts (eds.), The Law of 
Nations in Global History (Oxford, 2017), 1-34.
9
the sources and subjects of international law. The new theory of law relocated 
international legal authority by arguing that legitimate sovereigns alone commanded the 
actions of states. Sovereigns’ choices defined customary state practice, which created 
international law, and states, not peoples, were the only subjects of that law. This allowed 
sovereigns to act on civilizational or cultural bigotry, which was then reproduced in 
international jurisprudence as theorists and statesmen reimagined the “family of nations” 
entitled to international legal rights as coextensive with Christian Europe.  22
 According to Alexandrowicz, the resulting regionalized version of an international 
law that aspired to universal applicability allowed the use of force for the expansion of 
imperial-institutional rule and the “improvement” of subject peoples, whose civilizational 
inferiority necessitated European tutelage. State power suppressed and subsumed the 
autonomy of indigenous peoples, foreclosing their ability to participate in international 
politics. Positivism and the practices it generated, argued Alexandrowicz, led to a 
situation in which “the contribution of Asian countries to the further development of 
international law [in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries] was insignificant.”  South 23
Asian states, consequently, re-emerged as international actors only at the constitutional 
 C. H. Alexandrowicz, “A Persian-Dutch Treaty in the Seventeenth Century,” The Indian Year Book of 22
International Affairs, 7 (1958), 206.
 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations, 2.23
10
moment of independence from British rule on August 15, 1947, when “India [and 
Pakistan] joined the Family of Sovereign Nations.”  24
 Alexandrowicz characterized his monograph as “a venture into terra incognita” 
that, he hoped, would open a new field of study to acknowledge and explain the 
contributions of Asian states to pre-modern international law and politics.  He revised 25
the traditional argument that international law originated solely in Europe in the 
seventeenth century, but the history of the nineteenth century, for Alexandrowicz, 
remained one of imperial expansion and the erasure of colonized peoples.  Responding 26
to this assessment of the nineteenth century, legal historian David Kennedy argued that 
international lawyers and legal historians, rather than questioning this view, have used 
this image of the nineteenth century to emphasize the extent of international legal 
progress during the twentieth century.  Other legal scholars affiliated with the Third 27
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) collective adopted a critical approach 
to assumptions about the international legal subjugation of non-Europeans, but they 
eschewed archival sources and applied postcolonial theories to the traditional, nineteenth-
 C. H. Alexander, “International Law in India,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1 24
(1952), 289-300, at 289. Alexander and Alexandrowicz are the same author. He published as 
Alexandrowicz, as Alexandrowicz-Alexander, and as Alexander.
 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations, v.25
 See, e.g., Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, Revised ed. (New York, 1954); 26
Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, trans. Michael Byers (Berlin, 2000 [1984]).
 David Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion,” Quinnipiac Law 27
Review, 17 (1997), 99-138.
11
century, international law canon.  They decried but accepted the historical erasure of 28
non-Europeans. Historians of South Asia, simultaneously, neglected global issues to 
focus on the local and national dimensions of modern South Asian history.  29
 Like these commentators, Alexandrowicz was a man of his time, with 
professional goals and personal, ideological commitments. His historiographic objective, 
to demonstrate Asian states’ contributions to the development of international law on 
roughly equal footing with European states, served an explicit, normative function, the 
elimination of “European egocentricity” in postcolonial international law and politics.  30
The story of how Alexandrowicz came to write his monograph, and the specific, global 
politico-legal context for its production, illuminates the historiographical consequences of 
his normative goal.  31
 Alexandrowicz (1902-1975) was born a Polish subject of the multi-ethnic Austro-
Hungarian empire. His Roman Catholicism sheltered him from the anti-Semitic 
 See, e.g., K. M. Panikkar, The Afro-Asian States and Their Problems (London, 1959); Rupert Emerson, 28
From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge, 1960); R. P. 
Anand, New States and International Law (Delhi, 1972); Taslim O. Elias, Africa and the Development of 
International Law (Leiden, 1972).
 John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson, and Anil Seal (eds.), Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian 29
Politics, 1870-1940 (Cambridge, 1973); Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and 
Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, 1993).
 Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations, 1.30
 See the biographical note in Charles H. Alexandrowicz, “Treaty and Diplomatic Relations between 31
European and South Asian Powers in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” Recueil Des Cours, 100 
(1960/II), 203-321, at 205; T. S. Rama Rao, “Introduction,” The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 
11 (1962), vii-ix; W. A. Steiner, “Charles Henry Alexandrowicz 1902-1975,” British Yearbook of 
International Law, 47 (1976), 269-271; T. S. Rama Rao, “Professor C. H. Alexandrowicz: A Tribute,” The 
Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 18, pt. II (1980), viii-xii.
12
discrimination and violence that led some of his contemporaries to emigrate.  In Cracow, 32
he witnessed the empire’s collapse and the re-emergence of an independent Poland in 
1918, where he remained to study history and canon law. He practiced law between 1930 
and 1939 and then participated in the initial resistance to the German invasion of Poland 
before fleeing to London to work for the Polish government-in-exile during the Second 
World War.  In 1948, unwilling to return to a Poland under Russian control, he became a 33
British citizen and began both practicing law and lecturing at the University of London. 
He accepted the position of Research Professor of International and Constitutional Law at 
the University of Madras in south India in 1951, a position he held until 1961. His work, 
his relationships, and his extensive research in the Indian archives, formed the basis for 
An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies. 
 He arrived in India only six years after the end of the war and just four years after 
the end of British rule.  Astonishing violence, ethnic and religious cleansing, and 34
population transfers had accompanied both events, the consequences of which were still 
unfolding.  He founded and edited the Indian Year Book of International Affairs and 35
 Martti Koskenniemi, “Hersch Lauterpacht,” In Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Jurists 32
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organized the Indian Committee of Comparative Law, working alongside prominent 
Indian jurists, including B. R. Ambedkar, who had drafted the Indian constitution, and 
Radhabinod Pal, who was both a judge on the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East from 1946 to 1948 and a member of the United Nations’ (UN) International Law 
Commission from 1952 to 1966.  36
 Indian leaders, at this time, welcomed assistance from foreign institutions and 
individuals.  Friedrich Berber, a German legal scholar, advised the Indian government 37
on a water dispute with Pakistan from 1951 until 1954.  American scholars, universities, 38
and foundations worked on Indian legal education.  The Indian Constituent Assembly 39
studied, borrowed, and modified constitutional practices from around the world. 
Ambedkar reasoned, “the only new things, if there can be any, in a constitution framed so 
late in the day are the variations made to remove the faults (of its antecedents) and to 
accommodate it to the needs of the country.”  40
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 The new constitution was, however, only one aspect of the ongoing reconstruction 
of a postcolonial Indian state. Legal independence from British rule, accompanied by the 
partition of directly ruled British India into the new states of India and Pakistan, also 
freed over 500 indirectly ruled native, or princely, states. These states were advised to 
choose between joining India or Pakistan. Political pressure and the threat of military 
intervention compelled most to do so before August 1947, although some demanded the 
legal right to choose independent statehood.  Moreover, small French and Portuguese 41
colonies still existed within India.  The process of “national integration” imbricated 42
domestic, constitutional, and international law. 
 John Darwin, one of the pre-eminent historians of the British empire, has noted 
that the 1950s and, perhaps especially, the 1960s were marked by a “complicated 
interplay between domestic, colonial and international politics.”  Increasing numbers of 43
newly independent states condemned Eurocentrism in international law and politics.  44
Ongoing interventions by the United States and the Soviet Union in the affairs of the 
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“Third World” revealed ways in which international law and politics continued to be 
based on inequality and former imperial oppression.  At the same time, the doctrine of 45
equality among nation-states turned discussions of international affairs away from the 
after-effects of imperialism.  Most international lawyers and legal scholars ignored legal 46
history to focus on practical matters and specialized studies in an environment marked by 
the “emergence of a depoliticized legal pragmatism.”  47
 Alexandrowicz, in this environment, served as honorary legal adviser to the 
Government of India. He worked closely with Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first 
prime minister, who, according to one historian, Sunil Khilnani, “understood 
independence as an opportunity to establish India as a presence on the world stage”  48
Another historian, Manu Bhagavan, has argued that Indian leaders saw the United 
Nations as the best venue to shape the global ideological and institutional future and that 
individual human rights in “one world” lay at the core of Nehru’s vision of global order.  49
India’s actions revealed a more ambivalent international character. 
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 International law could liberate or subjugate, and Nehru, other Indian leaders, and 
Indian international lawyers were adept at cycling instrumentally between these 
possibilities to enforce the domestic authority and the international power of the Indian 
state.  India initially agreed to the intercession of the UN and the International Court of 50
Justice to solve disputes about the princely states of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh, and 
Hyderabad, and about the Portuguese colonies, but when the disputes lingered or the 
decisions of the international bodies seemed likely to oppose Indian wishes, Nehru used 
the Indian military to annex these territories.  This behavior affected India’s international 51
image. India’s claim to global, non-aligned leadership increasingly was questioned by 
more recently decolonized states, many of which perceived India’s international behavior 
as overbearing and even imperialistic.  52
 The historical currents of the time shaped historiography. New states, conceived 
as national states, required new and improved national histories, cleansed of 
colonialism.  The imperial past became an aberrant time, during which the sovereign 53
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nation-state was both the goal and the natural end-state of anti-colonial agitation. The 
nationalist historiography of India, for example, ignored legal history in favor of “an 
exclusive interest in lawyers who went on to become anticolonial freedom fighters.”  54
Nation-statist histories in India and Pakistan also removed inconvenient leaders, ones 
who could no longer belong “to the story of their ‘struggle for freedom’ from British rule 
but [only] to another illegitimate and deviant history that led to partition.”  The 55
intellectual history of political thought retreated within these national-state borders, and 
the normative status of the nation-state led to its problematic acceptance as “the political 
form characteristic of the ‘modern’ era.”  56
 In this context, Alexandrowicz’s claim of universality in early modern 
international law underpinned an argument both policy-related and moral. He posited that 
the exclusion of Asian states from the “family of nations” in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries had been a deviation from historical and proper state practice. Notably, the 
success of this normative assertion depends on the excision of Asian states from 
international space. Acknowledging non-European contributions to international law 
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during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could have undermined his argument for the 
postcolonial reemergence of historically appropriate, ethical state practice. 
 Consequently, he relied too much on particular interpretive concepts: universality, 
state practice, rupture, and exclusion. The East India Company often abrogated treaties, 
and the EIC used force to assume direct control over sixty percent of the territory and 
seventy-five percent of the people in South Asia between 1757 and 1857.  Dispossession 57
occurred gradually, and universality was honored more in theory than in practice. 
Moreover, British imperial expansion relied not only on the subjugation of South Asian 
sovereigns but also on the control of non-state social, economic, and religious inter-
relations. Alexandrowicz overstated both the supposed rupture caused by positivism and 
the degree to which South Asians were excluded from international life. Older inter-
relational pathways and patterns endured and formed the basis for South Asians’ 
international politico-legal argumentation and action. 
Inter-Relations in South Asia before the Nineteenth Century 
 Diverse overland and oceanic pathways connected peoples throughout the region 
stretching from the Mediterranean and east Africa into Southeast Asia and China starting 
in ancient times.  Geographically situated in the middle of this region, the Indian 58
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subcontinent was, in the words of Janet Abu-Lughod, “on the way to everywhere.”  A 59
Muslim world system existed, in the medieval period, interposed between Europe and 
Asia.  A Sanskritic world system rooted in linguistic and cultural power radiated 60
outward from South and Southeast Asia.  The peoples of South Asia, moving along 61
networks of varying densities, were embedded in the political, economic, cultural, and 
religious inter-relations that structured historical developments in the region.  62
 Affiliative sensibilities or identities arose from multiple sources, including shared 
language, religion, or kinship or membership in a scholarly, artisanal, laboring, or 
commercial group.  Rulers did use political power and military force to consolidate 63
cities and their outlying agricultural areas into states and to aggregate states into multi-
national, civilizational empires, but rulers’ power tended to be persuasive rather than 
compulsive.  Local and global factors, much more than the state, structured inter-64
relations among peoples.  Rulers worked to balance interests rather than to homogenize 65
difference. 
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 European inter-relations also developed over time, expanded through voyaging, 
and were altered through interactions with previously unknown peoples.  English traders 66
arrived in South Asia with distinct ideas about infidels and pagans, who would become 
the uncivilized and the barbarian populations, respectively, that occupied so much of the 
intellectual energy of nineteenth-century imperial and international legal theorists. 
European voyagers resolved religious and political-theoretical arguments about the 
proper treatment of indigenous peoples in the Americas in favor benevolent oppression, 
albeit near-genocidal violence had occurred in practice.  Theorists argued that 67
indigenous populations existed and should be treated kindly but that they were incapable 
of self-rule, possessing no understanding of enlightened political institutions, or of the 
proper use of god-given resources, such as land.  68
 The English interacted extensively with Muslim populations, too. Muslim traders 
operated in English and Welsh ports, while English traders could be found throughout 
north Africa. Muslims worked in London, and Englishmen settled in Morocco and 
Tunisia.  Interactions among Christians and Muslims in England were more engaging 69
and informative than adversarial.  John Locke’s theory of tolerance responded to the 70
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presence of Muslims in England, countering the negative literary and theological 
depictions of Islam with the positive portrayals of Muslims shared by diplomats and 
traders.  What constituted proper relations between England and South Asia was very 71
much undecided when South Asians began migrating to England shortly after 1600, but 
South Asian wives of English traders entered high society; Indian merchants in London 
sought and received satisfactory arbitration of business disputes; and Indian seamen 
stranded in England petitioned successfully for financial support from the Company..  72
 Tolerance at home did not necessarily extend overseas. Political theorists 
criticized the absolutism of infidel governments on the basis of a fifteenth-century 
distinction between dominium regale and dominium politicum et regale, between absolute 
monarchy and monarchy tempered by parliamentary oversight. Originally, the English 
mobilized this distinction to criticize continental European governments, but it became 
the foundation, first, for a critique of non-European and non-Christian rulers and, later, 
for the concept of natural, or innate, Oriental despotism.  The problem for Europeans 73
overseas revolved around the appropriate structure of regulation for the relationships 
between proper and improper sovereigns. The issue of dominium, the right to rule over 
specified territory, was complicated overseas by the issue of imperium, the need to 
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determine how far sovereign jurisdiction, or the right to rule, extended.  David Armitage 74
identified “the problem of uniting imperium and dominium… as the fundamental and 
ultimately combustible dilemma at the core of British imperial ideology.”  It remained 75
so into the nineteenth century, when these ideas were “surely the common currency of 
Macaulay’s schoolboys.”  76
 Machiavelli had argued that an empire could remain free only by avoiding the 
corruption of expanding territorial control, and international political theorists resolved 
the paradox of empire and liberty by elevating commerce as the most acceptable reason 
for empire during the eighteenth century.  A national sensibility, the idea of Britishness, 77
developed simultaneously following the Act of Union that created the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain from the unification of England, Scotland and Wales in 1707.  Britishness 78
failed to unite the colonies for long, because the notional unity of empire could not 
conceal the repressive social, political, and economic realities of imperial administration, 
which demonstrated to the colonists exactly how the empire had failed to deliver on the 
promise of constitutional equality. The composite nature of the empire, which had 
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provided the historical context for the ideology of empire, ultimately led to the separatism 
of the American Revolution and the perception among theorists and historians of a “first” 
and “second” British empire.  79
 Britishness eventually displaced the composite imperial ideal in favor of a unitary 
state. The government increased taxes and used deficit financing to expand the military 
and public administration.  The British state emerged, during this period of military 80
fiscalism, as a global power. British national identity, military fiscalism, the relative 
security of settled intra-European borders, and global commercial competition propelled 
increasingly invasive colonial practices in the extra-European world.  Adam Smith wrote 81
about the European empires in North America that “when these discoveries were made, 
the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they 
were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice.”  This assertion described 82
the situation in India increasingly well between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-
nineteenth centuries. 
 The East India Company replicated domestic patterns of increased taxation, debt 
financing, and militarization in India, which led to the Company’s transformation from 
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one of many state entities in South Asia to the most powerful state in the subcontinent.  83
The East India Company’s directors, empowered by the EIC’s charter to levy taxes and to 
make war, ignored Machiavelli’s admonition against imperial territorial aggrandizement 
as attention shifted from trade to the provision of political temperance in opposition to 
supposedly capricious local tyrants.  Specious legal rationalizations justified territorial 84
annexations to “protect” indigenous peoples from Oriental despots. The systematizing 
ideologies and practices of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries continued to alter the 
pluralistic inter-relations of earlier centuries, but the power of the imperial state never 
eliminated South Asians’ resistance to these ideologies and practices. 
Scope and Summary 
 This study is no less influenced by the time in which it has been produced than 
was Alexandrowicz’s work. A survey of recent scholarship reveals a resurgence of 
interest in the histories of empires and of international political thought, law, and 
institutions, especially as these are related to global policy-making.  One characteristic 85
of the newer work has been a desire to avoid the unquestioning acceptance of the nation-
state and what Hedley Bull called the “tyranny of the concepts and normative principles 
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associated with [the states system].”  New studies of international political thought, 86
including jurisprudence, have revisited the empires of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries to argue that imperial ideologies and the experience of empire played a critical 
role in the construction of ideas about liberalism and global order and in the elaboration 
of international law and institutions.  87
 One historian, Jennifer Pitts, averred that political theorizing in the 1780s 
appeared “to hold the promise of a critical approach to European expansion” that was 
displaced “by an imperial liberalism that by the 1830s provided some of the most 
insistent and well-developed arguments in favor of the conquest of non-European peoples 
and territories.”  It should be clear, however, that the contours of these debates were not 88
decided only in Europe but were the product of more than two centuries of inter-relations 
among Europeans and non-Europeans. The question of whether, and by what logic, to 
rule overseas dominated nineteenth-century liberalism, defined by Cheryl Welch as: 
a commitment to certain individual rights (specifically equality before the law, 
freedom of the press, and religious freedom), opposition to the policies of the 
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mercantilist state, opposition to monarchical power if not to monarchical 
government, and a certain expansiveness of social sympathies.  89
 The tensions within the late eighteenth-century debates about the possibility for 
colonial rule were heightened in the nineteenth, when European empires extended their 
reach throughout the non-European world and increasing numbers of colonized peoples 
entered the debates.  Most British intellectuals and statesmen responded by attempting 90
“to establish overseas despotisms which mirrored in many ways the politics of neo-
absolutism and the Holy Alliance of contemporary Europe.”  Most public intellectuals 91
formed justifications for empire, but criticism existed and persisted.  Many South Asians 92
were optimistic about the potential under British administration for political, economic, 
and educational progress in India.  They shared liberal values, such as justice, equity, 93
liberty, and a commitment to the common good that combined eighteenth-century civic 
humanism and nineteenth-century civic nationalism.  South Asians’ politico-legal 94
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argumentation aimed to compel the British government, the British state, to recognize 
these values as the common currency of the empire. 
 They faced a difficult challenge. Britain emerged from the Napoleonic wars and 
the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, as a global power with renewed confidence and the 
power to shape both European and global commerce and politics.  The agreement in 95
Vienna, that the Great Powers would resolve European disputes by acting in diplomatic 
concert, exacerbated imperial rivalries by exporting the practice of policing the borders 
within Europe to Asia and Africa. British international thought and practice shifted 
towards state-centrism and the systematization of the empire and away from inter-polity 
pluralism. Anti-colonial violence resulted, and British optimism turned pessimistic. 
 The European revolutions of 1848 were followed by the Indian revolt in 1857 and 
the rebellion in Jamaica in 1865, and the Māori wars in New Zealand that persisted until 
1872.  Russian interference with the Ottoman empire and expansion in Central Asia 96
appeared threatening, and Germany and the United States became global powers.  Legal 97
theorists responded in three ways. They adopted a natural-scientific “evolutionary-
progressive historical perspective” to resolve the problem of empire and liberty by 
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identifying peoples, or polities, who were unable to form states.  They institutionalized 98
the international legal field, founding the Institute of International Law in 1873.  Finally, 99
they undertook clarifying projects of codification for international law, as had been done 
within Britain and the colonies, and focused scholarly attention on the international 
arbitration of disputes.  100
 British intellectuals, statesmen, diplomats, and imperial agents were preoccupied 
by the task of defining and creating order among discrete states and different peoples 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Their ideas and practices mattered 101
greatly because, although its supremacy was increasingly contested, Britain dominated 
global politics for most of the nineteenth century and remained a great power into the 
twentieth century.  The concepts of civilization and progress, informed by the practice 102
of history, buttressed their efforts to achieve order.  Historical interpretation acted “to 103
stage disputes and stake claims over the normative foundations of legal principles, to 
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justify novel practices as conventional, and to demarcate the boundaries of the 
international legal community.”  104
 The interest in order was indelibly connected to the process of systematizing the 
empire.  Intellectuals adapted the natural-scientific practice of categorization to 105
organize global socio-political order by ranking different peoples using an instrumentally 
flexible, historical-evolutionary “standard of civilization.”  Civilizational inferiority, the 106
incapacity for reciprocity, and the propensity for misrule characterized the peoples who 
failed to meet the standard, and the dominant strain of global political and legal thought 
required the exclusion of “uncivilized” or “backward” peoples, including infidels, and 
non-Europeans, generally, from the scope of international law.  107
 British state practice actuated ideology by enacting governance in ways designed 
to exclude particular peoples from the realm of colonial governance.  State practice also 108
excluded colonized peoples from both imperial and international relations. Theorists and 
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practitioners, both, believed that Britain’s global mission on behalf of the civilized world 
justified imperial expansion, the expropriation of resources, the imposition of British rule, 
and more limited, violent interventions in the affairs of putatively uncivilized states and 
peoples.  One scholar referred to international law, at least in the early modern period, 109
as the means for articulating a “legal logic of conquest.”  The work on political thought 110
tends “to emphasize perceptions in Europe of relations in empire,” leaving South Asians 
out of the story.  Conversely, the work on colonial governance in South Asia tends to 111
focus on the local or national dimensions of this history, neglecting the global 
transformations in which South Asians were involved. 
 Recent scholarship on colonial legal conflicts provides a first step towards 
combining the fields of political thought and colonial governance. This work describes 
empire in a way that emphasizes the global exchange of ideas and the active connections 
between colonizers and the colonized.  Elite, English-speaking South Asians, for 112
example, acted as cultural translators or intermediaries in the process of cultural and legal 
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adaptation that occurred between Indians and others in the context of disputes in the 
colonial, imperial, and international environments.  This work demonstrates how ideas 113
were actualized as practices of law and governance and, consequently, modified.  For 114
example, international legal thought and local, imperial-institutional challenges combined 
to create imperial constitutional law in India.  These cross-cultural interactions, and 115
South Asians’ responses to administrative practice, used and re-created bodies of 
knowledge that informed theory and praxis.  This work on colonial disputes recognizes 116
the importance of legal rhetoric and law in South Asia, and of colonial knowledge, but 
also largely ignores South Asians’ contributions to international thought and law. Most 
often, however, colonial legal disputes were not purely local or national. 
 The process of globalization—tied to the movement of peoples, capital, goods, 
and information—strengthened the connection between politics and events at the 
domestic and the global levels.  Studies of South Asian migration illuminate the 117
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possibility for the globalization of colonial disputes.  Thomas Metcalf has argued that 118
India was “a nodal point from which peoples, ideas, goods, and institutions—everything 
that enable[d] empire to exist—radiated outward.”  Migration altered the global legal 119
context because South Asians carried with them the civilizational difference upon which 
colonial rule was predicated.  120
 Ideological debates about whether, by what right, or to what end the British might 
rule South Asian peoples in India traveled when South Asians arrived elsewhere, not least 
because South Asians participated actively in social life, and continued expressing 
opinions and criticizing discriminatory policies, regardless of their location.  Migration 121
converted domestic debates and disputes into intra-imperial and international questions 
arising from the conflict of political theories and of laws.  Migration also made it 122
possible for South Asian cultural translators to enter what the intellectual historian Stefan 
Collini called the “well-connected intellectual-cum-political stratum” in British society 
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and, according to Christopher Bayly’s intellectual history of South Asian liberalism, “to 
bring their concerns and formulations [for good governance] to the attention of their 
British rulers and to American and wider European opinion.”  123
 This study analyzes law-making outside of the traditional framework of treaties, 
treatises, and states, by approaching international law as “an argumentative practice in 
which political claims are defended and attacked,” to borrow the words of international 
legal historian Martti Koskenniemi.  It also attempts to place the perspectives of 124
historians of international law and historians of South Asia into the same scholarly 
framework by taking “international law [as a] process of articulating political preferences 
into legal claims that cannot be detached from the conditions of political contestation in 
which they are made.”  This dissertation uses both published and archival sources. 125
Published work on international law, commentary on international affairs, imperial 
constitutional treatises and histories, and essays and books on relevant issues written by 
characters in this story have been crucial. Archival research was conducted in India, the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the United States. 
 Efforts to imagine, create, and manage global order between the mid-nineteenth 
century and 1920 focused on states and peoples and relied on classification, 
hierarchization, and historical justification for imperial rule. Representatives of the 
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British empire-state attempted to sub-divide and systematize global space, assigning 
particular peoples to specific geopolitical locations and regulating both their civic 
participation within those spaces and the relationships between and among those spaces. 
The four chapters that follow this introduction examine South Asians’ international legal 
discourse within varied political and legal spaces to demonstrate how South Asians’ ideas 
about, and actions within and among, these various spaces reconfigured the 
conceptualization of international space, law, and politics from roughly 1850 until 
immediately after the First World War. 
 One can look to prominent international politico-legal theorists of the time to 
understand the mood of this period and the way South Asians confronted the challenge of 
Britain’s attempted erasure of their international legal existence. Henry Sumner Maine 
(1822-1888), a British jurist, came of age during a period of national and imperial 
confidence in the 1820s and the 1830s, but he served as the legal advisor to the Governor-
General’s council in India from 1862 to 1869, a time of rising pessimism. He described 
the turning point in his Cambridge lectures on international law in 1887, writing, about 
the public intellectuals of the 1850s: “[t]hat generation may be said to have had a dream 
of peace.” The Great Exhibition 
in 1851… added to the belief that wars had ceased… superseded by competition 
in the peaceful arts. … But the buildings of this Temple of Peace had hardly been 
removed when war broke out again, more terrible than ever. First came the 
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Crimean War… then followed the frightful struggle of the Indian Mutiny… [and] 
to the believers in the permanent return of peace they were a bitter deception.  126
William Edward Hall (1835-1894), another British jurist, expressed similar pessimism in 
1890, fearing that a brutal and “unscrupulous” European war was on the horizon, during 
which “the strength of international law [would] be too hardly tried,” but Hall, 
foreshadowing the post-war optimism of 1919, also believed that this war would “be 
followed by a reaction towards the increased stringency of law.”  127
 Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960), a Polish, Jewish emigre to Britain and, perhaps, 
the most prominent exponent of twentieth-century international jurisprudence, confirmed 
Hall’s wary optimism. In 1925, he quoted Alfred Tennyson’s poem, “Locksley Hall,” 
written in 1835, early in the hopeful era referenced by Maine, to argue that ongoing 
revisions in international legal thought and practice and the creation of the League of 
Nations signaled human progress towards “the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the 
World.”  International law, he claimed, was “no longer a servile ancilla regnorum [aid 128
to royal, or sovereign, power] registering the practice of states and supplying a scientific 
justification for the dogma of sovereignty.”  129
 South Asians contributed to creating this situation. James Bryce (1838-1922), a 
British jurist, historian, and politician, provided the best way to understand how South 
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Asians affected global ordering, when he distinguished between legal sovereignty (de 
jure) and practical sovereignty (de facto).  Legal sovereignty inhered in “the person (or 130
body) to whose directions the law attribute[d] legal force,” that is, the person or body 
“whose authority [was] that of the law itself.”  Legal sovereignty lay at the heart of the 131
dominant, theoretical doctrine of the nineteenth century, legal positivism, which reduced 
international law to the mere practice of states as commanded by sovereign power, in 
Britain, the Queen and Parliament. Practical sovereignty, on the other hand, resided in 
“the person (or body of persons) who [could] make his (or their) will prevail whether 
with the law or against the law.”  132
 South Asians mobilized popular, practical sovereignty against states’ claims of 
legal sovereignty to take advantage of ambiguity related to the recognition of 
international legal personality and statehood. The declarative theory of recognition 
straightforwardly required that specific criteria be met before the fact of statehood could 
be acknowledged.  Those were a national population, delimited territory, an efficacious 133
government, and independence, defined as the capacity to form reciprocal relationships 
with other states. The constitutive theory “deduce[d] the legal existence of new States 
from the will of those already established,” which created space for recognized states to 
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make political judgements about the recognizability of other, potentially international 
states.  South Asians’ use of international legal discourse to intervene in ideological and 134
political disputes before 1920 created a novel, anomalous form of separate Indian 
statehood that was recognized at the Paris Peace Conference 1919.  Their interventions 135
had led, slowly and with odd consequences, to the partial realization of Dadabhai 
Naoroji’s vision of an Indian government that acted as “an independent Power,” though 
the interwar years would require continued struggle to achieve a government that fully 
“represent[ed] Indian interests.”  136
 Chapter 1 focuses on the role of Dadabhai Naoroji’s civilizational and 
international legal discourse in his rhetorical construction of a discrete Indian state within 
an imperial commonwealth. It first introduces Naoroji’s formative civilizational and legal 
intellectual antecedents between the 1780s and the 1840s, when liberals opposed 
theoretical arguments favoring conquest with a commitment to legal equality, religious 
freedom, and opposition both to mercantilism and to absolute monarchical power. The 
chapter then examines the international legal argumentation related to the revolt of 1857. 
Naoroji gained the power to inform and affect public opinion in Britain by cultivating 
relationships with prominent British intellectuals, statesmen, colonial administrators, 
reformers, and businessmen and by sharing his ideas in English through the Victorian 
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press and in academic journals and at academic conferences and in political associations 
and institutions, all of which were recognizable and “western” in British eyes. 
 Naoroji built on this foundation to advocate for a representative government that 
recognized specific Indian interests and acted to ensure the welfare of the population 
through the argumentative use of the idea of national character, derived from liberal and 
international political thought. The chapter analyzes his arguments during the 1860s 
about good governance in British India and his critique of British rule in India for failing 
to fulfill its practical duties and ethical obligations to South Asians by restricting civic 
participation. Naoroji argued that the putatively poor civilizational and national character 
of India, which deprived the state of international recognition, resulted from Britain’s 
failure to govern according to its self-proclaimed ideals. His rhetoric re-constructed the 
British imperial state as a representative state of which India was a discrete political-
economic unit and advocated for South Asians as the rights-bearing subject-citizens of 
both. 
 Chapter 2 analyzes three South Asian Muslim modernists’ use of history and of 
international legal discourse between the mid-1850s and the mid-1880s in ideological 
disputes about Muslim-Christian civilizational difference during debates over the 
“Eastern Question,” the issue of European, international relations with the Ottoman 
empire. Muslims occupied a unique position in nineteenth-century international legal 
thought. Legal theorists allowed that Muslims were not barred entirely, on civilizational 
grounds, from possessing sovereign rights. The Ottoman empire had been absorbed into 
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the “civilized,” international family of nations in 1856, following the Crimean War. 
Muslim rulers had been dispossessed of dominium, or sovereignty, in the subcontinent 
only in 1858. 
 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, and Chiragh Ali accentuated the 
disjuncture between Ottoman recognition and South Asian dispossession. Like Naoroji, 
they cultivated relationships that ensured their ideas would be heard and considered 
seriously, and they used recognizable institutions and venues for public-intellectual 
communication to share their ideas. They reinterpreted Islamic history to argue for the 
specific national character of Muslims based on their capacity for recognizing and 
respecting civic rights and reciprocity in their engagements with non-Muslims. They 
argued for the international status of Muslims and the character-based civic-participatory 
rights of Muslims in India. 
 Chapter 3 focuses particularly on the dispute over the rights of South Asians in the 
South African Republic, or the Transvaal, which was both an internationally recognized 
state and part of Britain’s informal empire between 1850 and 1902. It examines how the 
ideas discussed in chapters one and two were put into action by South Asian migrants, 
who were not members of the public-intellectual class but instead were laborers, traders, 
and small business owners. It opens in the 1830s, when political liberalism underpinned 
the idea and adoption of responsible or self-government in the white settler colonies, 
which became the demand of South Asians in India. The chapter analyzes innovations in 
imperial governance in light of the tension between unity and separatism in imperial 
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thought within and between both the white settler colonies, later known as the 
Dominions, and India up to 1917. 
 South Asian indentured laborers began arriving in southern Africa in the 1850s, 
and others came to start businesses in growing South Asian communities. They faced 
racial discrimination and constant, legal limitations of their rights. They petitioned the 
colonial government, the Indian government, and the imperial government in London for 
redress, using explicit arguments about international law and the duty of the Indian and 
imperial governments to protect their citizen-subjects. Britain maintained imperial unity 
only by granting colonial governments expansive leeway to govern their domestic affairs 
and by recognizing intra-imperial equality among the settler colonies and India. 
Paradoxically, imperial acceptance of racialized governance within the Dominions partly 
produced recognition of the discrete Indian state. 
 Chapter 4 places South Asians directly in an international, geopolitical frame of 
reference to understand their influence on British foreign relations from the 1860s to 
around 1919. Like chapter three, it examines ideas in action. It begins by elucidating 
international legal politics related to European imperialism and to India in the nineteenth 
century and analyzes the nascent, proto-international institutional character of the British 
Colonial and Imperial Conferences between 1884 and 1897. The chapter then turns to the 
period between the mid-1890s and 1907, when South Asians, motivated by the lack of 
response to their demand, leveraged domestic and global unrest to gain political 
concessions. The chapter moves on to analyze three early twentieth-century issues: South 
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Asians’ participation in the Imperial Conferences; the effects of South Asian immigration 
to the United States on Anglo-American diplomacy; the effects of South Asian politico-
legal pressure on Anglo-Ottoman relations. 
 South Asians’ mobilization of political pressure regarding these three issues 
created the conditions for Britain’s willingness to engage in intra-imperial and 
international negotiations about India’s participation in the Paris Peace Conference 
following the First World War and for India’s accession to the League and the 
International Labor Organization. South Asians pressed rights claims both by creating 
international disputes between Britain and other states and through political commentary 
and action related to the international relations of Britain. India’s membership in the 
League of Nations, which preceded both dominion status and self-government, signified 




The “Rules of Good Breeding”: National Character and British Governance 
 Territorial annexations and the imposition of both direct and indirect British rule 
throughout the subcontinent led to the erasure of international legal personality and 
recognition for the independent Indian states subsumed within the empire.  South Asian 137
liberals’ rhetoric recreated an internationally recognizable polity by constructing a 
discrete Indian state with specific interests, populated by historically civilized peoples, 
who were capable of cooperation and reciprocity in their relations with British rulers. 
Perhaps their most formidable obstacle, between the mid-nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries, inhered in the Janus-faced quality of liberalism and its related 
concepts when abstract ideas about universal political rights collided with the messy 
reality of governing foreign peoples.  The standard of civilization allowed that 138
putatively incapable or uncivilized peoples, with tutelage and over time, could prepare 
themselves to fulfill their international civic duties, but in practice, the day of inclusion 
always receded to the temporal horizon.  139
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 Victorian liberals generally espoused a whiggish view of history as a story of 
progress or improvement, and this perspective shaped their ideas about the proper 
relationships both between rights-bearing individuals and the state and among individual 
states.  They posited the existence of individual rights but advocated gradual progress 140
towards the expansion of political participation and representation. The imperial 
“civilizing mission” of the nineteenth century embodied this universalizing sensibility, 
impelled by the belief that good institutions improved peoples and readied them for civic 
participation and self-government.  This universalist ethos was partially displaced, in 141
the mid-nineteenth century, by a particularistic “culturalist stance” that emphasized deep-
rooted historical differences among peoples, differences that necessarily conditioned the 
types of institutions appropriate for any society.  This shift made it easier for British 142
liberals to find, in the aspirational nature of liberalism, ways to justify the exclusion of 
South Asians from domestic, imperial, and international politics. 
 Liberal imperialists and their critics believed that the type and methods of 
municipal governance, and its effects on the people ruled, showed the moral character, or 
quality, of the unitary state. This idea entered into international legal thought as the 
metaphor of the state as an individual and the society of states as a family. According to 
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Lassa Oppenheim, John Westlake (1828-1913), a towering figure among nineteenth-
century international law scholars, wanted “International Law to develop more or less on 
the lines of Municipal Law,” which meant in practice “the codification of firm, decisive, 
unequivocal rules of International Law... [and] the establishment of International Courts 
for the purpose of the administration of international justice.”  Westlake compared 143
civilized states to individual “persons interested in maintaining the rules of good 
breeding.”  The rules of good breeding were ethical rules. The people interested in 144
maintaining those rules were those of good character, and for states recognized within the 
civilized family of nations subject to international law, those of good national character. 
 This chapter analyzes Dadabhai Naoroji’s (1825-1917) international legal 
discourse, which supported his demand for an imperial commonwealth, hierarchical but 
comprising discrete states, in which Indian national interests were represented by the 
Indian state. Naoroji opposed the authoritarian “civilizing” practices of the mid-to-late 
nineteenth-century British colonial state in two ways. He constructed a vision of Indian 
national character in which South Asians were knowledgeable, civilized, fellow subject-
citizens of the empire and due the rights of civic participation and representation both at 
home and abroad. He also questioned the morality of British national character and the 
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“good breeding” of the colonial state for ignoring the common good, understood to 
include both the interests of the Indian state and the welfare of South Asian peoples. 
 This chapter proceeds guided by an unnamed author in a Calcutta journal, Modern 
Review, who expressed the mood of the moment in 1907, the fiftieth anniversary year of 
the revolt of 1857, by complaining that “British publications were incapable of imagining 
Indian independence at the beginning of the twentieth century, whereas they had readily 
done so nearly a century before.”  The chapter begins during the confident, reformist 145
period in Britain before 1850, the sensibility of which informed Naoroji’s ideas and 
actions. It turns then to the international legal dispute that formed part of the basis for the 
revolt of 1857, the unexpected violence of which initiated a British shift to a pessimistic, 
culturalist approach to Anglo-Indian relations. The remainder of the chapter analyzes 
Naoroji's application of comparative historical sociology and international legal analysis, 
during the 1860s, to oppose the burgeoning civilizational and racial ideologies of British 
theorists and the autocratic practices of imperial administrators. 
 Naoroji’s imperial-institutional, civic-statist prescription for Indian government 
emphasized the obligations of the state, in its interconnected internal and external 
policies, to recognize the rights of the people to the good government promised both by 
the foundational documents of British rule and by theorists’ disquisitions on British 
character. It relied on the distinction between the internal and external aspects of the state 
 Quote in Bayly, “Rammohan Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism,” 40.145
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and ideas about the foreign versus the natural, organic, or indigenous, character of a 
government. 
Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917): The “Grand Old Man of India” 
 Naoroji was born in 1825 in western India outside the city of Bombay. His father 
was poor Parsi priest, but he won a scholarship to Elphinstone College, where he 
remained after graduation, eventually becoming Professor of Mathematics and Natural 
Philosophy, the first South Asian to earn a professorship at a major Indian college. He 
worked his way into the public-intellectual political community in British society soon 
after arriving in London as a business partner in Cama and Company in 1855, aided by 
his position as a professor of Gujarati at University College, London, from 1856 until 
1865.  He served as the first Indian Member of Parliament, elected in 1892 as a Liberal, 146
and represented the working-class district of Finsbury in central London until 1895. He 
returned to live full-time in India in 1907. 
 South Asians had travelled to Britain since shortly after the East India Company’s 
arrival in the subcontinent.  More Indians than ever arrived in the period from the 1830s 147
until the revolt of 1857.  The first British-trained Indian doctors received degrees during 148
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this period. Indian communities coalesced in particular locations as the population of 
migrants finally reached high enough numbers to sustain neighborhoods. Migrants kept 
arriving after the revolt in 1857. Social class and race interacted to affect any one South 
Asian individual’s reception.  Students came in even greater numbers than before, 149
including the first law students. Many were amazed, and many underwhelmed, by what 
they found in Britain.  Naoroji’s personal warmth and generosity, along with his 150
intellect, were touchstones for South Asians in London. 
 He can be imagined as a human analogue to Thomas Metcalf’s India, “a nodal 
point from which peoples, ideas… and institutions… radiated outward.”  He, more than 151
any other person, because of his public-intellectual stature and his influence on younger 
Indians, defined the contours of South Asian liberalism in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Mahatma Gandhi reminisced about his first meeting with Naoroji, 
eased by a letter of introduction from a family friend that was given to a young Mohandas 
Gandhi as he was leaving for London in September 1888 to study law at Middle 
Temple.  The friend had never met Naoroji, but, according to Gandhi, said, “[w]hat 152
does it matter? Everyone knows him and adores him as India’s great son and champion. 
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… Your being an Indian is sufficient introduction.” Gandhi “soon found that Indian 
students had free access to the G.O.M. [Grand Old Man] at all hours of the day… no 
matter to which province or religion they belonged.” Naoroji became a “constant adviser 
and inspiration” during Gandhi’s years in southern Africa fighting the discriminatory 
treatment of South Asians, when “[h]ardly a week passed without a letter from me to him 
describing the conditions of Indians,” to which Naoroji replied, “without fail in his own 
handwriting.”  153
 Naoroji and many of his fellow moderates are generally described as early Indian 
economic nationalists.  He remains best known for his 1901 work, Poverty and Un-154
British Rule in India, accurately described as nationalist political-economic treatise.  155
This perspective and the focus on this later work overshadows the statist orientation of 
Naoroji’s early liberalism. His arguments about the obligations of the British-Indian state 
and his territorialization of an Indian polity preceded his economic nationalism. Both 
were part of a global process that began in the 1860s and inspired national political 
agendas throughout the following century. Theorists devised a more nuanced vocabulary 
for distinguishing among political concepts like the state, sovereign, commonwealth, and 
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government, and practitioners began applying these concepts to locate particular peoples 
in specific places.  156
 Two points regarding the scholarship on Indian nationalism are worth remarking. 
First, the political separatism of “later” nationalism arose in the early 1900s, so the 
nationalist appellation sometimes confuses later intellectuals’ and activists’ 
interpretations of the so-called moderates’ ideas with the proximate goals of the 
moderates, which aimed to shape the behavior of the state.  Second, nationalism often 157
serves as shorthand for nation-statism, especially in discussions of international law, but 
the conflation of nation and state begs the question. The resolution of many nations into 
“the nation” is a process that can be separated from demands that the state represent the 
interests of the populace. Many South Asians, after the revolt, were accepting of and 
optimistic about British rule.  These intellectuals, like their British counterparts, fell 158
prey to the illusion of British-imperial permanence, so they dedicated much of their 
energy to advocating measures to improve British-Indian and imperial governance. 
 Naoroji certainly approached the challenge of empire in this way, at least until 
around the turn of the century. This is unsurprising given his reformist intellectual 
inheritance. Despite Naoroji’s preeminence among South Asian liberals, his ideas, 
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including the belief that imperial rule would lead, eventually, to South Asian self-
government, rose on a foundation built by earlier intellectuals, statesmen, and 
reformers.  159
The Imperial Civilizing Mission and Naoroji’s Formative Years 
 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), a political theorist and Utilitarian philosopher, 
argued in the late eighteenth century that Britain should free her colonies entirely because 
the distance interposed between rulers and the ruled in colonial systems meant that 
colonial rulers could not rule well.  Bentham responded to the development of the 160
unitary national state in Europe in part by coining the term international law. He argued 
that the commonly used phrase, “law of nations,” seemed to refer to internal, or domestic, 
law, and he wrote that only “mutual transactions between sovereigns” could be “properly 
and exclusively termed international.”  Bentham’s ideas have been described as 161
inherently authoritarian and imperialistic.  Bentham scholar Jennifer Pitts views this as 162
a selective reading of Bentham in which the later views of Bentham’s followers, most 
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famously John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), were displaced onto Bentham.  Unlike James 163
Mill (1773-1836), Bentham had not imbibed the Scottish Enlightenment thinking about 
historical progress that led the elder Mill to rank peoples on a scale from barbaric to 
civilized. Mill argued, for example, that South Asians were uncivilized, incapable of 
ruling themselves, and due only a “simple form of arbitrary government.”   164
 The bigotry underlying the Company’s behavior was controversial. Religious and 
civilizational intolerance was common at the time but not universal.  William Jones 165
(1746-1794), who worked as a Supreme Court judge for the East India Company, was an 
Oxford-educated classicist who lived in Calcutta for almost 11 years, from 1783 until his 
death.  He studied linguistics, law, botany, Sanskrit, and Persian; he argued that 166
scholarship, especially in the areas of language and law would improve British 
interactions in India, creating a better and more just system of governance. Addressing 
the first meeting of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, he recounted his arrival in the Bay of 
Bengal: 
It gave me inexpressible pleasure to find myself in the midst of so noble an 
amphitheater, almost encircled by the vast regions of Asia, which has been 
ever the esteemed nurse of the sciences, the inventress of delightful and useful 
arts… fertile in the productions of human genius, abounding in natural 
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wonders, and infinitely diversified in the forms of religion and government, in 
the laws, manners, customs and languages, as well as in the features and 
complexions of men.  167
Jones was committed to good British governance in India, but others like Edmund Burke 
(1729-1797), a politician and political theorist, believed that the injustice inherent in 
colonial rule over foreign peoples would corrupt British society.  168
 The debate about whether to hold colonies became, by the 1830s, a debate about 
how to govern colonies well. Economic depression in Britain in 1830, followed by rising 
crime, increased pauperism among the general population, and financial insecurity among 
the propertied class “created a moral panic [and] a demand for the purification of social 
values by political action.”  The concept of emancipation provided a common thread in 169
early nineteenth-century British and Indian reform debates. Reformist ideas cut across 
and intertwined seemingly disparate domestic, imperial, and international issues.  Two, 170
competing visions of Britain vied for supremacy. Reformers used an idea of historic 
Britain—Protestant, commercial, and free—to challenge what they believed was a 
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corrupt, military-fiscal state, reliant on imperial economic protectionism and the colonial 
expropriation of land, labor, and wealth.  171
 Reformers often discussed the character of the East India Company, with the 
Company portrayed as the apotheosis of the monopolistic, predatory state. South Asians 
played an active role in varied reform movements in which economics was a moral issue 
and fighting corruption became a moral imperative.  The following section describes 172
the antecedents of Naoroji’s political theorizing with a brief examination of Thomas 
Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), a frequent commentator about India, who would later 
serve as Law Member on the Governor-General’s Council in Calcutta (1834-1838), and 
Raja Rammohan Roy (1772-1833), a South Asian social and religious reformer. Together 
they exemplify the ways that India and South Asians figured in the reformist moment of 
the 1830s. Indeed, one scholar has characterized Naoroji’s political advocacy as a form of 
“radicalized Macaulayism.”  173
 Macaulay spoke in support of the proposed Bill in the House of Commons on 
March 2, 1831. He attributed the current reformist sensibility to a middle-class antipathy 
for the characterological and institutional shortcomings of Britain’s monarchical 
aristocracy. He situated this discontent at the contemporary end of a long historical arc, 
using examples from ancient times to the present to argue that “[a]ll history [was] full of 
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revolutions, produced by causes similar to those which are now operating in England.”  174
In October 1831, again in the House of Commons, he chided the Members of the House 
of Lords for their sluggish response to middle-class demands, referring to the Lords’ 
earlier lethargy when deciding whether to support the end of the slave trade and right of 
Catholics to sit in Parliament. Macaulay asserted that the British upper classes had failed 
to acknowledge or to adapt to progressive historical change and questioned why the 
Commons ought “to surrender our judgement to those who have acknowledged that, on 
former occasions of the same kind, we have judged more correctly than they.”  175
 His analysis of the relationship between the universal and the particular led him to 
see political participation and representative government as “contingent entitlements in 
which the precise lines of inclusion and exclusion would always have to be drawn in a 
provisional way.”  However, he believed that history moved in the direction of moral 176
and material progress, and good government would ensure that the included population 
was ever growing. The goal of imperial governance had to be the realization of its 
“civilizing potential,” which could only bear fruit if rulers attended to the interests of the 
ruled. He opposed slavery for similar reasons, because “it [was] not under oppression that 
we learn[ed] how to use freedom.”  Servitude and subjugation impeded progress 177
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towards the expansion of political and civic communities, not only for the middle classes 
in Britain but also for imperial subjects in India. Equally important, the inferiority of the 
slave, or of those living under despotic rule, was a “matter of shame and remorse” for the 
society that tolerated slavery or despotism.  178
 Macaulay’s historicism displayed a balancing sensibility best understood as 
progressive gradualism. History moved in the direction of universal progress, but reform 
occurred as a response to tradition and context. It shaded his approach to the debates 
about charter renewal for the East India Company in 1833, which overlapped the final 
readings in Parliament of the Slavery Abolition Act. He fully supported ending the 
Company’s trade monopoly and eliminating discrimination against qualified South 
Asians seeking a place in the Indian government. The political and economic despotism 
of the Company had to end because South Asians’ state of servitude was both an obstacle 
to their eventual political emancipation and a blot on the British national character. 
 The civilizing mission ideology often encouraged illiberal means to achieve 
liberal ends. Macaulay’s position in the later “Orientalist-Anglicist" debates in India, 
disagreements about whether to rely on indigenous methods of education and rule or to 
impose English-Language education and British administrative practices, provides a case 
in point. He advocated eliminating indigenous-language education because “a single shelf 
of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” 
English-language teaching offered the best chance to create “a class of persons, Indian in 
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blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect,” persons 
who would occupy a critical role as “interpreters between us and the millions whom we 
govern.”  His implication of equality regarding intellectual capacity was fairly radical, 179
as was his belief that Britain owed a duty to South Asians to provide the means by which 
they could achieve actual equality with Britons.  180
 Rammohan Roy shared Macaulay’s progressive-gradualist sensibility. He was a 
“cautious” and critical, but flexible and “constructive,” supporter of the British civilizing 
mission.  He was born into a wealthy Hindu family in Bengal, and his “ancestors were 181
Brahmins of a high order.”  He studied Persian and Arabic, “these being indispensable 182
to those who attached themselves to the courts of the Mahommedan princes,” as well as 
Sanskrit and “theological works… which contain[ed] the body of Hindoo literature, law 
and religion.”  His outlook was shaped both by the expansion of the East India 183
Company in Bengal and by knowledge of contemporary global events, including “the 
fight for constitutional government in Spain, the struggle of the Italians for emancipation 
from the Austrian yoke, the agitation for good government of Ireland, [and] the conflict 
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over the abolition of slavery in America.”  He feared, equally, the capriciousness of the 184
French Revolution and the potential return of monarchical absolutism enabled by the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815.  His perspective evolved from his interactions with 185
Europeans, but his ideas flowed from his attempts to balance and to integrate strains of 
western and Indian thought and practice, and his constitutional ideas and institutional 
activities were designed to fend off the interventionist, ordering tendencies of colonial 
utilitarianism.  186
 He sought a constitutional middle ground in his propositions for imperial and 
Indian reform that allowed for limited and local popular participation in government 
within an empire unified under the Crown. He argued for South Asians’ rights to serve on 
juries and to a free press and believed that the colonies should receive dedicated seats in 
Parliament to ensure that local imperial interests received a fair hearing, even though he 
did not imagine that South Asians would represent India in Parliament or be capable of 
self-government for another two or three generations.  In 1828, he drew on his 187
connections with Unitarian Christians and founded the Brahmo Samaj, a social reform 
organization with a rationalized, monotheistic, socially emancipatory vision at its core.  188
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He anticipated the public moralism of later South Asian liberals, like Dadabhai Naoroji, 
both in his progressive-gradualist approach to reform and in the content of his ideas. 
Prasanna Kumar Tagore, in 1833, referred to Rammohan Roy as “India’s unofficial 
member of Parliament,” albeit South Asians would have to wait for this milestone until 
1892, when Naoroji became the first Asian Parliamentarian.  189
 Rammohan arrived in Liverpool in April 1831 on a mission for the Mughal 
emperor, Akbar II, to petition for the redress of grievances against the East India 
Company.  This formal diplomatic task aside, the people of Britain perceived 190
Rammohan as a “real, if informal, Ambassador from the people of India.”  His visit had 191
been eagerly anticipated, and “[f]rom the moment he arrived, [he] was besieged by 
visitors and invitations, his social calendar was filled, and his whereabouts were 
published.” Even Thomas Macaulay “waited in vain at one gathering until midnight, 
when he “went away in despair”.”  Jeremy Bentham, 83 years old at the time, settled 192
for leaving a letter at Rammohan’s hotel.  Rammohan lived the remainder of his life in 193
Britain, dying unexpectedly in Bristol in September 1833, one month after the Slavery 
Abolition Act and the Government of India Act received Royal assent and became law. 
 Quote in Zastoupil, Rammohun Roy, 127.189
 Zastoupil, Rammohun Roy, 148-149.190
 Sarkar (ed.), The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy, 183.191
 Zastoupil, Rammohun Roy, 1-2.192
 Sarkar (ed.), The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy, 183.193
59
 His advocacy for the elimination of sati, the immolation of Hindu widows, 
attracted large numbers of supporters in Britain, especially women, and he joined these 
supporters to fight for the Reform Bill and the abolition of slavery.  He linked the 194
abolition of sati both to progress advancing the Reform Bill and to global improvement, 
writing to a fellow activist in Brighton in April 1832, “[t]he struggles are not merely 
between the reformers and the anti-reformers, but between liberty and tyranny throughout 
the world; between justice and injustice, and between right and wrong.” He advocated 
persistence because in “the past event of history, we clearly perceive that liberal 
principles in politics and religion have been long gradually, but steadily, gaining ground, 
notwithstanding the opposition and obstinacy of despots and bigots.”  195
 What becomes clear, looking at both Macaulay and Rammohan Roy, is that the 
reformist sensibility of the 1830s involved interlocking political, humanitarian, and 
economic concerns that cut across domestic, imperial, and international spaces. 
Economic reform appeared often in debates regarding monopoly and free trade. 
Protectionists argued that imperial preference would encourage imperial unity, but the 
free traders, the intellectual descendants of Adam Smith and often anti-colonial in 
outlook, espoused a belief in the emancipatory, pacific effects of open trade.  Macaulay 196
and Rammohan saw the East India Company’s commercial monopoly, with its high taxes 
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and unnecessary frontier wars, as the natural result of mercantilism’s protectionist 
corruption. Their advocacy against the Company’s monopoly condemned the exclusion 
South Asians from their own governance. Both men advocated for the anti-discrimination 
provisions in the 1833 charter, which promised that “[n]o native of the said territories… 
shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them, be 
disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company.”  197
 Free trade arguments also focused attention on free labor, which enhanced 
economic efficiency and the flow of capital, eliminated the likelihood of labor revolts, 
and created the conditions for gradual progress associated with the civilizing mission. 
The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society grappled with all of these ideas at its 
General Convention in June 1840 and emphasized the responsibilities of the family of 
Man to ensure global liberty and well-being.  J. H. Tredgold expressed the guiding 198
sentiment of the General Convention, stating, “all things whatsoever ye would that men 
should do to you, do ye even so to them.”  The convention ended with a vote to approve 199
an “Address to Heads of Government,” calling on “the civilized world, and more 
especially those nations which bear the Christian name,” to recognize that “God [had] 
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created of one blood all nations of men… [who] in [a] relation of brotherhood… [were] 
all entitled to the equal enjoyment of personal and civil liberty.”  200
 International lawyers also engaged with ideas about character, progress, the 
obligations of states, and international legal reform. William Whewell (1794-1866), a 
prominent moral philosopher and a professor at Cambridge University, wrote, in 1845, 
“the State undoubtedly possesses a Moral Character; and has Duties, as we have 
intimated, of the same description as those of individuals:—Duties of Humanity, Justice, 
Truth, Purity, Order; the Duties of Moral and Intellectual Progress.”  Whewell’s ideas 201
drew on an older tradition of universal, moral, and natural legal reasoning that understood 
international law as the “common law of all peoples.” He later bequeathed money to 
Cambridge University to support the study of international law to “diminish the evils of 
war” with the goal of “extinguish[ing] war between nations.”  202
 Countervailing, exclusivist conceptions of international law certainly existed at 
this time, and theorists continued to develop these ideas as extensions of earlier 
international legal justifications for conquest.  John Austin (1790-1859), an English 203
legal philosopher and a friend and neighbor of Jeremy Bentham, built on Bentham’s 
formulation of international, more accurately inter-state, law “between sovereigns” to 
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eliminate the “mystical foundations” of natural law in favor “of the centrality of authority 
and sovereignty in enactments of law.”  Positive law originated in the command of a 204
sovereign. It was both prescriptive and empirical, visible in the acts and agreements of 
sovereigns. Hierarchy, in the form of sovereign command and the concomitant existence 
of political superiors and inferiors, occurred naturally in Austin’s formulation.  205
 Henry Wheaton (1785-1848), an American jurist and diplomat, wrote the history 
of international diplomacy and law that was adopted in European diplomatic circles after 
1850 and governed European international relations throughout the nineteenth century.  206
He represented the United States as the ambassador to Denmark (1827-1835) and to 
Prussia (1835-1844) and was both well known and respected in European diplomatic 
circles.  Wheaton’s work became the standard reference book on international law in 207
China, Japan, and Turkey.  Wheaton, a prominent Unitarian, but for illness would have 208
introduced Rammohan Roy at a meeting of the Unitarian Association in London in May 
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1831.  His hierarchical and exclusivist international jurisprudence owed much to 209
Austin’s positivism, and also to his personal religious beliefs. Wheaton first articulated 
the constitutive theory of state recognition that bifurcated sovereignty into internal 
(constitutional law) and external (international law) aspects. External sovereignty did not 
exist by natural right but as a right bestowed by other states.  210
 The society of states, by its collective assessment or judgement, constituted the 
recognizable, international community. Despite his seemingly expansive religious 
predispositions, Wheaton circumscribed the society of states to include only those that 
were civilized, Christian and European. This view opened the door for John Stuart Mill to 
write, “[t]o suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of 
international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between 
civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall 
into… [because] [t]o characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a 
violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered 
the subject.”  Mill wrote these words only two years after the violent revolt against East 211
India Company rule in India and one year after the British government’s dispossession of 
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the Company cost Mill his job with the EIC. He was well aware of the international 
political and legal disputes that formed part of the reason and the response to the revolt. 
International Law and the Revolt of 1857 
 The Crimean War brought the European, imperial geopolitics of the Eastern 
Question to the doorstep of India. Britons, later, would ascribe to the war a role in 
precipitating the revolt of 1857 in India.  The Indian government played its part in the 212
Crimean conflict by seconding European, Indian-army troops to supplement British-army 
troops.  James Broun-Ramsay, Lord Dalhousie (1812-1860), the East India Company’s 213
penultimate Governor-General (1848-1856), remarked that Britain fought the war “to 
thwart the policy of the Czar, which [was] destructive of peace and security in 
Europe.”  Dalhousie steadfastly denied that Britain fought “to sustain the religion of the 214
Prophet” but acknowledged that some South Asian Muslims had “rushed to join the 
standard of the Sultan” in the “Turkish crusade against the Infidels,” having heard about 
the war during their return to India from the hajj.  215
 “The Abyssinian War,” The London Review of Politics; F. W. Buckler, “The Political Theory of the 212
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 William Howard Russell (1820-1907), a war correspondent with The Times of 
London, recounted meeting South Asian Muslims in the Crimea. They were returning 
from a diplomatic mission to London in support of the Royal Family of Awadh and 
curious about the reports of British military setbacks.  Robert Phillimore (1810-1885), a 216
British international jurist, argued that the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean war 
in 1856, admitted the Ottoman empire into the Concert of Europe and the family of 
nations recognized as members of the international community and subject to 
international law.  The settlement of the war and the apparent acceptance of the Muslim 217
Ottoman empire into the international-legal family of nations struck a hopeful chord in 
India regarding the international possibilities for South Asians and for Muslims, which 
exacerbated the disappointment and anger that followed the annexation of South Asian 
princely state of Awadh, also in 1856. 
 Lord Dalhousie had mentioned his guiding principles regarding plans to annex the 
Muslim princely state of Awadh in a letter to his friend, George Couper, in December 
1855.  He was, as he saw it, constrained by international law and public opinion, and 218
the course of action preferred by the Company’s Court of Directors at the time was “not 
warranted by international law. It would [have been] either conquest or usurpation of 
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powers of Government by force of arms.”  Dalhousie believed he had overcome these 219
objections by the time of Awadh’s annexation, which extinguished Awadh’s international 
legal personality. 
 Many nineteenth-century observers identified the East India Company’s 
annexations of indigenous rulers’ territories as a major cause of the violent revolt in India 
that started in May 1857.  Anti-Company violence was not extraordinary but usually 220
had been localized, the participants comprising small groups with specific political, 
economic, or religious grievances. The geographical and popular scale of the revolt and 
the accompanying brutality were shocking to South Asians and Britons. Discerning the 
immediate causes of the revolt and debating and deciding the future place of India in the 
empire preoccupied Company officials, British politicians, and members of the public in 
both Britain and India. Contemporary reactions were varied.  Recent scholarship “still 221
seems, in part at least, to be responding to the prejudices of colonial accounts of the 19th 
century,” which assumed the subordination of South Asian polities.  222
 Placing the revolt in a broader geographical and temporal context reveals the role 
of international political thought, law, and institutions in the expansion of British rule and 
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lays the foundation for considering South Asians’ international legal discourse and 
politics. Dalhousie arrived in India during the European revolutions of 1848 and served 
until 1856. He pursued an ongoing policy of territorial annexation more aggressively than 
any other Governor-General in the Company’s history, undertaking in eight years “a 
quarter of the entire annexations by the Company from its inception” at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century.  His increase in annexationist practice makes sense in light of 223
domestic practices of governance both in post-revolution European states after 1848 and, 
subsequently, in 1850s Britain. 
 He relied on claims of good governance through scientific reform, political 
disinterestedness, and moral character and, like European monarchs, launched large 
public works projects, expanded the use of data collection and statistics to modernize 
administration, and attempted to integrate India into the global economy.  Dalhousie’s 224
and the Company’s administrative practices were part of a mid-century network of 
knowledge related to good governance.  The goal of good governance, combined with 225
the common theoretical acceptance of the relative moral superiority of Christian 
Europeans reflected in international legal thought and in state practice, justified an 
annexationist policy. 
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 The EIC’s annexation relied on international legal justifications by alleging 
misrule and treaty violations. John Stuart Mill justified the annexations by distinguishing 
between civilized peoples and barbarians and disavowing any sort of moral or 
civilizational universalism that would have required fidelity to the Company’s treaties or 
reciprocity in its engagements with the Muslim king.  Support for Mill’s view was not 226
universal. Travers Twiss, a prominent international lawyer, opined on behalf of the King 
of Awadh that Dalhousie had erred in treaty interpretation, omitting entirely from his 
analysis a renegotiated version of the original treaty from the 1830s.  227
 F. W. Newman argued that Indian rulers were independent entities and that 
Dalhousie’s annexations were, therefore, illegal.  Mill, likely willfully in light of his 228
career with the EIC, ignored a long history of international law, diplomatic exchange, and 
treaty arrangements in India to distinguish so clearly between “civilized nations and 
barbarians.”  Even for Mill, eventually, political and legal theory could only stretch so 229
far. Mill, in 1866 as a Member of Parliament, characterized the racial arguments for the 
dispossession of the Māori in New Zealand as evidence of “the overbearing and insolent 
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disregard of the rights and feelings of inferiors which is the common characteristic of 
John Bull when he thinks he cannot be resisted.”  230
 Dalhousie had indicated a desire to annex Awadh as early as 1848, when “Oude… 
[was] on the highroad to be taken under [the Company’s] management—[but] not into 
[the Company’s] possession… before two years [were] over.”  Awadh avoided that fate, 231
and Dalhousie’s attitude hardened. He asserted: 
The wretch at Lucknow, who sent his crown to the Exhibition [of 1851], would 
have done his people and us a good service if he had sent his head in it, and he 
never would have missed it. That is a cherry which will drop into our mouths 
some day. It has long been ripening; but in these days annexation is so 
unfashionable, and the Charter Committee is so near, that I don’t think the court 
would approve of my shaking the tree to help it down.  232
He began building a case for “native” misrule in Awadh in 1854, compiling and 
categorizing examples of financial and judicial corruption, rampant crime, and the 
impoverishment of Awadh’s inhabitants.  Numerous allegations of misrule were used to 233
argue that the King of Awadh had violated the Treaty of 1801.  Article 6 required the 234
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EIC to guarantee in perpetuity to the Royal Family of Awadh both the possession of their 
remaining lands and Family’s authority within those lands, while requiring that the 
administration of Awadh “be conducive to the prosperity of [the King’s] subjects, and be 
calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants [of Awadh].”  235
 The Company’s Court of Directors, which supervised the Governor-General from 
London, accepted Dalhousie’s allegations and eventually agreed that the supposed treaty 
violation legitimized annexation. South Asian rulers’ previous responses to annexation 
had been largely diplomatic and political, so the Royal Family petitioned the Crown, 
arguing “that the Military occupation and annexation of the Kingdom of Oude by the East 
India Company is a violation of solemn Treaties and Engagements existing between the 
British Nation and the Sovereign of Oude, that it is a violation of International Law and 
Public Justice.”  The Royal Family’s claims were dismissed. 236
 Edward Williams, reflecting on his work as a representative of the EIC in Awadh 
in 1856, identified the dismissal as a turning point in relations between the Company and 
the “native army,” the soldiers wherein regarded the annexation as an act “of rude and 
unjustifiable spoliation.”  The reverberations of the revolt rippled outward around the 237
world. It was represented in some European countries as representing the anti-absolutist, 
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nationalistic spirit of 1848.  American abolitionists likened British imperial rule in India 238
to slavery in the United States.  Queen Victoria described the revolt in its relationship to 239
the recently ended Crimean War, compared to which it was more indiscriminately violent 
and more distressing. 
We are in sad anxiety about India, which engrosses all our attention. … 
Altogether, the whole is so much more distressing than the Crimea—where there 
was glory and honorable warfare, and where the poor women and children were 
safe. … Then the distance and the difficulty of communication is such an 
additional suffering to us all. … There is not a family hardly who is not in sorrow 
and anxiety about their children, and in all ranks—India being the place where 
every one was anxious to place a son!  240
She wrote to Lady Canning, the wife of the Charles Canning (1812-1862), the Governor-
General of India during and after the revolt, “[t]hat our thoughts are almost solely 
occupied with India and with the fearful state in which everything there is—that we feel 
as we did during Crimean days and indeed far more anxiety, you will easily believe.”  241
Political introspection regarding Britain’s international and imperial engagements, and 
serious critiques of British imperialism, was a common feature of post-revolt Britain.  242
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 The public identification by those in revolt of the Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah 
Zafar, as the legitimate ruler of India created a focal point in Delhi for symbolic unity 
among people throughout India and with various reasons to challenge the authority of the 
EIC. Likewise, the Company’s eventual arrest, prosecution, conviction, and exile of 
Bahadur Shah, belittled by the Company as the “King of Delhi,” symbolized, for the EIC, 
the legitimacy of Company rule over India.  Long-standing opposition to Company rule 243
in India became increasingly vigorous in Britain, despite the success of the EIC in 
quelling the revolt.  John Stuart Mill defended the Company’s administration in India 244
and the policy of annexations in an 1858 memorandum and petition to the British 
Parliament, claiming the policy necessary for improving India and arguing for continued 
Company rule.  245
 The Company’s petition, like the Royal Family’s, failed. Parliament alleged 
Company misrule, intervened to censure the EIC, and legislatively ended Company 
governance, while assuming the prerogative to rule India.  The Government of India 246
Act of 1858 annexed an imaginatively rendered, territorially discrete India that could be 
subsumed, completely, into the British Empire. Parliament’s legislative step ignored the 
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variegated texture of South Asian politico-legal life characteristic of the EIC era, erased 
the international status of the numerous pre-Crown, South Asian rulers, and deprived the 
India created by the Act of international legal personality. 
 Henry Maine identified the trauma of the Indian revolt as “the greatest fact in all 
Anglo-Indian history.”  Maine imagined the intellectual shift from the universalist ethos 247
of the civilizing mission to a “culturalist stance” that accepted deep-rooted historical 
differences and used these alleged differences to explain past failures of British policy.  248
He saw India as an example of an ancient, or primitive, society, still organized by ties of 
kinship and status, that required British trusteeship to move into a modern, institutional 
world rooted in contract and reciprocity among peoples.  Alongside Maine’s historical-249
evolutionary ideas, British racial attitudes hardened during the 1860s and the 1870s.  250
Naoroji’s Civilizational and International Legal Thought 
 Naoroji epitomized Macaulay’s figure of the cultural intermediary, or translator, 
informing and attempting to ease the process of interaction, disputation, and adaptation 
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between South Asians and Britons in the imperial environment.  He shared earlier 251
reformers’ concern with good character and their belief in the power of knowledge and 
institutions to impel moral and material progress. Similarly, a progressive-gradualist 
sensibility tempered his demands for governmental reform. His strategic collaboration 
with influential European allies aimed to focus attention on South Asians’ liberal thought 
and to forestall criticism that South Asian liberals were simply anti-British or, worse, 
revolutionary.  His ability to form productive intellectual and political relationships 252
with curious and sympathetic Britons strengthened and extended his influence on the 
development of liberalism and of liberal anti-imperialism.  253
 Victorian political theorists’ contradictory impulses regarding the expansion or the 
restriction of rights became more elaborate and restrictive around the mid-nineteenth 
century and were closely tied to the concepts of nationality and character.  National 254
character underlay and connected political-theoretical debates about Britain’s domestic 
and imperial governance and her global role as an arbiter of civilization. Theorists 
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commonly argued that the unique conjuncture of British heritage and Britain’s historical 
development created the moment in which ideas about individual rights and the practice 
of representative government could arise. The added focus on heritage, or nationality, 
modified Macaulay’s thought, limiting his universalism by specifying a new criterion, an 
historical contingency, that affected the expansion of rights. 
 National differentiation, as a basis for rule, required separate and distinct 
nationalities, defined by John Stuart Mill as communities possessing a shared “identity of 
political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of 
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the 
same incidents in the past.”  Nationality, when attached to territory, could be explained  255
by presence or absence. India, regularly understood as a land of many nations, itself 
lacking a singular national population, existed as a mere administrative fiction, the 
composite Indian empire for the purposes of British rule.  Naoroji, in his early years, 256
avoided this debate. It was enough that South Asians shared the ongoing experience of 
British rule, and Naoroji simply and regularly referred to the “Indian nation” throughout 
decades of writing.  257
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 The evaluative aspect of the idea of character animated liberal political thought 
about the quality of varied, collective peoples’ suitability, capacity, and preparedness for 
the exercise of liberty and self-government.  The right to free, representative institutions 258
and international recognition depended on the moral and ethical qualities associated with 
national character both within Britain and among particular foreign peoples.  Mill and 259
other intellectuals argued that uncivilized peoples, lacking good character, created 
uncivilized institutions or degraded the institutions in which they participated and should 
be precluded from participating in their own governance.  In India, the empirical 260
methods of natural science, applied to the human world, described the many nations of 
India with tools like the census and cartography, classifying the peoples of India into 
religious, caste, linguistic, and geographical categories for disinterested management.  261
 Scientific racism underlay many theories of civilizational hierarchy, but both 
jurisprudence and missionary activities held out the possibility that inferior peoples could 
be improved through the law or through the gospel. The concept of race in imperial 
thought, although influenced by Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1892) and Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882), “usually figured as a biocultural assemblage, a hybrid compound of 
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‘cultural’ and ‘biological’ claims about human evolutionary history, individual and 
collective character, comportment, physiognomy and mental capacity.”  The 262
malleability of race, as an idea, was matched by variations in ideas about the nature of 
imperial belonging. 
 Duncan Bell identifies four, late-Victorian models of theorizing about imperial 
citizenship or belonging.  Two are important here, and the others will be discussed in 263
chapter three. “Imperial-statism” inscribed the local state within the imperial. This vision 
prized loyalty to the empire, the capacity for reciprocity in engagements, as the marker of 
local-state citizenship. It accommodated multiple polities at different stages of political 
development and allocated rights based on civilizational capacity and status. 
“Institutional-imperialism” held that citizenship traveled with the boundaries of the 
empire-state. Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), Conservative Party member and two-time 
British Prime Minister, expressed the essence of this view in a speech in Manchester in 
1866, saying, “[i]ndividuals may form communities, but it is institutions alone that can 
create a nation,” a Macaulay-esque view, but one that left undefined the political rights 
associated with imperial institutions.  South Asians argued for their rights from these 264
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vantage points, emphasizing both their fidelity to the empire and the promises associated 
with British rule. 
 Naoroji responded as a public intellectual and as a practical, strategic political 
actor to these imperial, civilizational, racial ideologies, all of which affected imperial 
governance, and all of which were imbricated with international legal thought and 
practice. The documentary foundation for his work comprised the Company’s 1833 
charter and Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858, which acknowledged the anti-
discrimination policy of 1833 and promised that the British Crown would rule with 
respect for South Asian treaties, territories, rights, and religions.  These documents 265
functioned as a moral-constitutional charter, a Magna Carta for India, deviation from 
which reflected poorly on British national character and on imperial institutions.  He 266
combined the universalism and progressive historicism of the civilizing mission with a 
commitment to institutional-imperial constitutional order and a nascent internationalism 
to compel the state to recognize the Indian polity and to represent Indian interests. 
 Naoroji's public-intellectual efforts to address oppressive civilizational, religious, 
and racial ideologies predate his political-economic work. He published two papers on 
his own religious community, the Parsis, in 1861 and 1862. Parsi identity encompassed 
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more than religion. It derived from the communal understanding of Parsis as migratory, 
urban, commercial, and cosmopolitan, and Naoroji himself exemplified the community in 
these terms.  He delivered both papers in Liverpool, one before the Literary and 267
Philosophical Society and the other before the Philomathic Society.  The scholarly 268
institutions that welcomed him and the European audiences that acknowledged his 
expertise did so not because he was a Parsi but on the basis of his effective mobilization 
of the academic and public-intellectual conventions of the time, including his 
publications and participation in conferences. 
 Naoroji pursued educational and persuasive goals with his papers on the Parsis. 
He emphasized civilizational similarities in the face of arguments that stressed difference. 
Parsis, he explained, were monotheists, like Christians and Muslims. The religious 
teachings of Zoroastrianism, again emphasizing equivalence, required monogamy, 
honesty, and charity, while disallowing idolatry and the degradation of women. He also 
compared the Parsis to the Jews, noting that both diasporic nations had maintained their 
integrity despite persecution, migration, and subsequent lives as exiles among foreigners. 
Historical circumstances had degraded Parsis’ educational and social condition, but the 
Parsi community, heir to a great Persian civilization, had imbibed the spirit of reform and 
was actively contributing to the betterment of India. 
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 Naoroji engaged publicly with scientific-racist thinking in a paper delivered to the 
London Ethnological Society in July 1866. He rebutted the assertions made in February 
of that year by the Society’s president, John Crawfurd, who had delivered a paper 
entitled, “On the Physical and Mental Characteristics of European and Asiatic Races of 
Man.”  Crawfurd had argued, ostensibly using scientific methods and evidence, that 269
Asians were morally and culturally inferior to Europeans, deceitful, and possessed “no 
fidelity to engagements.”  Naoroji accused Crawfurd of applying a rhetorical veneer of 270
science onto civilizational and racial bigotry. Naoroji used in literary criticism to compare 
European and Asian cultural works, illustrating the merits of both in a way that made 
Crawfurd seem more polemicist than scientist. He cited extensively and catholically both 
historical persons as examples of Asian creativity in religion, governance, and literature, 
and modern European scholars, who supported his analysis and lent authority to his 
critique. 
 He traversed time and space, revisiting his earlier papers on the Parsis to argue 
that this religious community possessed an ancient history of teaching the value of 
honesty, quoting Herodotus on the ancient Persians’ aversion to deceit, and mobilizing 
both the Code of Manu and the Mughal emperor Akbar’s prime minister, Abul Fazl, to 
demonstrate Hindus’ love of justice, truth, and fidelity. He asserted that any people would 
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happily admit pride in Confucius, Christ, or Muhammad. His European authorities 
included William Jones and John Malcolm, both East India Company civil servants and 
scholars; two German orientalists, Max Muller and Theodore Goldstucker; and some 
British Indian judges, including Thomas Erskine Perry and J. B. Phear. The last two 
vouched that contemporary South Asians’ veracity as complainants, defendants, lawyers, 
and judges in the courts equalled that of the British. Some people were truthful and others 
deceitful, they maintained. Naoroji also referenced his current duties as a professor at 
University College in London to demonstrate a similar point, that Indian students 
performed equally well, and equally poorly, as British students, when given the same 
educational opportunities. 
 Context and contingency, not innate differences, mattered. If Herodotus was 
correct about ancient Persians’ honesty, and if Crawfurd was also correct about 
contemporary Persians’ proclivity for deceit, then race could not explain the change over 
time. He also noted that two early modern, European, international-law authorities, 
Grotius and Samuel Puffendorf, had sanctioned deceit for limited, moral reasons, as had 
Jeremy Bentham. Historical contingencies could give “a peculiar direction to [a peoples’] 
character and history,” and Naoroji wondered whether the United States would have 
existed without a tax on tea or whether Britain would be merely the province of some 
other empire but for her island geography.  It was no more fair, in his analysis, to point 271
to individual instances of dishonesty to disparage all South Asians than it was to blame 
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the British, as a people, for the “iniquitous annexation policy in spite of treaties.”  His 272
paper attempted to disentangle the supposed science of racial difference from history to 
argue that an acknowledgment of historical contingency, knowledge born of careful 
study, and institutional accountability offered the best framework for understanding 
human events and ordering inter-relations. 
 Naoroji did not merely participate in scholarly institutions. He founded 
“knowledgeable” institutions, by gathering European allies whose participation in South 
Asian institutions undermined the authority of British public intellectuals like Mill and by 
using these institutions to express a vision of participatory civic nationalism that could be 
juxtaposed with the civilizational nationalism that animated British governance in India. 
He worked to institutionalize his relationships and South Asian liberalism as a body of 
knowledge, by founding the London Indian Society in 1865, along with W. C. Bonnerjee, 
a law student at Middle Temple, to allow South Asians and Britons to exchange views on 
subjects related to India. He collaborated with Bonnerjee again in 1866 to found the East 
India Association, which was funded by donations from the rulers of South Asian 
princely states and intended to provide “independent and disinterested advocacy and 
promotion by all legitimate means of the interests and welfare of India generally.”  He 273
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convinced the members of the Association, in 1868, to assist his efforts to create local 
branches in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.  274
 The Association’s office and reading room were located at 55 Parliament Street, 
no more than a short two or three minute walk from the Houses of Commons and Lords, 
and the India and Foreign Offices, the latter two being purpose-built between 1856 and 
1868 to convey Britain’s global power and prestige.  The founders envisioned the 275
Association as an institution that could educate others to act as constructive critics of 
empire. They aimed to supersede the fairly casual exchanges of ideas fostered by the 
London Indian Society and to educate anyone interested in India through regular 
presentations and discussions of papers on Indian political issues, to advocate particular 
policies to Parliament and the India Office, and to “become one of the permanent 
institutions of London.”  Naoroji imagined an institutional, informational network that 276
would connect and distinguish local and imperial knowledge, thereby strengthening the 
Association’s efforts to influence policy. 
 The Association provided the venue for Naoroji to share his early political and 
economic ideas, which built on a global legacy of economic thought.  He responded to 277
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British free-trade ideology, which became one of the defining features of the British 
empire in nineteenth century, and one crucial aspect of what it meant to be British.  The 278
version of free trade propounded by Adam Smith and some French economists, and 
adopted by later British intellectuals like Richard Cobden, argued against the possession 
of colonies.  Adam Smith had denounced mercantilism’s avaricious, monopoly-seeking 279
behavior and imagined that free trade, rooted in international negotiation and law, would 
achieve both international peace and widespread economic progress.  280
 The potential pacific effects of free trade captivated liberal intellectuals and 
motivated organizational efforts to support free trade. Later intellectuals like John Stuart 
Mill argued against the universalism of Smith and Richard Cobden. Mill attempted to 
reconcile free-trade theory with colonialism by comparing, in an imperial-statist vein, 
colonies to towns within Britain, in Principles of Political Economy, published in 1848. 
Colonies, he argued, were “hardly to be looked upon as countries, carrying an exchange 
of commodities with other countries, but more properly, as outlying agricultural or 
manufacturing estates belonging to a larger community.”  281
 Theoretically, this stance placed South Asians in a position of equality with all 
other Britons regarding the claims they could make on the government to represent their 
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interests, but in political practice, it led to second-class status. Mill had already argued 
that supposedly uncivilized peoples, including South Asians, could, and should, be barred 
from political and civic life until the civilizing effects of British rule enabled their 
participation. Increasingly over time, a distinction emerged related to the use of colonies 
as safety valves for excess population and as sources of revenue to offset taxes at 
home.  The settler colonies were “Britannia’s children,” extensions of Britain with 282
populations culturally and nationally British, so imperial constitutional law was adjusted 
in ways that precluded using the settler colonies as safety valves.  283
 Naoroji’s early political and economic ideas appeared in a speech entitled, 
“England’s Duties to India,” given at a meeting of the East India Association in London 
on May 2, 1867.  The “drain of wealth” theory, for which he is most known, held that 284
the East India Company had transferred to Britain, and the Government of India under 
Crown rule continued to transfer to Britain, the wealth of India. The theoretical conceit of 
draining wealth required a departure from the Henry Rawlinson’s imperial-statist idea of 
empire and interests. India, in Naoroji’s imagining, existed as a one space that could be 
emptied into another, separate space, necessarily a distinct political-economic space. He 
began his reading by identifying as the desired audience for his paper those Britons who 
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asked whether British rule had been a blessing for India in a spirit of sincerity, patriotism, 
and philanthropy, desirous of a candid answer. He clearly believed that such Britons 
existed and that knowledge of the true state of affairs in India would motivate reform. 
 Naoroji chided those among the British who claimed that the wealth of India was 
due to British rule, noting that it had not been Indian poverty but the pre-existing 
prosperity of the subcontinent that had attracted both conquerors and trading companies. 
He proceeded by using data collected and compiled by the British and Indian 
governments as the foundation for a discussion of the many ways that Indian wealth was 
transferred to Britain; home charges, the monies assessed by the British imperial 
government for costs associated with administration in South Asia, such as certain 
military costs; interest on debt for public works; remittances sent to Britain by civil 
servants for their families; money spent on British manufactures by civil servants and the 
government. He regularly used the government’s data to craft arguments criticizing 
British rule, a method that historian Christopher Bayly called statistical liberalism.  285
 Naoroji asserted that Indian revenues ought to be used for Indian purposes, and 
the British were bleeding the country by compelling tribute. He explained this conclusion 
by discussing “[t]he foreign invaders of former times,” a direct but tactful reference to the 
Mughals.  In the past, invaders would plunder the country and leave, but when they 286
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stayed to rule, they “became of the country,” and wealth remained “in the country.”  287
The British could not claim credit for the benefits their governance, if they chose to enact 
foreign, extractive practices of rule, and the people of India should not be required to pay 
for British governance if they obtained no benefit from it. His implication that the 
Muslim invaders of the past had become “of the country” served two goals. First, it 
compared British rule unfavorably to Mughal rule, which had ended at the hands of the 
British only nine years earlier, thereby calling into question the good character and 
beneficence of British governance and the idea of might makes right. Second, it 
countered the common idea that South Asians were a congeries of nations, lacking any 
unifying sensibility, and it situated Muslims as Indians, unlike the British foreigners. 
 The British, according to Naoroji, faced a choice among three policies for 
governing India: despotic, exclusionary rule; benign, exclusionary rule; or “equality 
among all her Majesty’s subjects and honesty with the princes of India… the policy of 
justice.”  The first policy would perpetuate tyranny. The second would deaden 288
aspiration and render impossible either moral or intellectual progress. In either case, the 
ethical justifications for British rule in South Asia would be revealed as empty boasting, 
designed to conceal practices of extraction and expropriation. The only true path forward 
led back to the elimination of discrimination in the civil service promised by the East 
India Company charter of 1833 and to the respect for princely sovereignty and the rights 
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and religions of South Asian subjects promised by the Queen in 1858. He also advocated 
that South Asians, as tax-paying fellow-subjects, ought to hold seats in the imperial 
Parliament, and that Parliament generally should pay greater attention to Indian affairs, 
all recommendations that would become constant features in his political thought. He 
argued that the fact of India as a part of the British empire had enriched Britain and 
enhanced her global power and prestige, and the demands of good character obligated 
them to acknowledge this reality by governing properly. 
 Despite the power of free-trade thought, the practice of free trading was 
challenged by pro-imperial and mercantilist-inflected protectionist ideas throughout the 
nineteenth century.  Mercantilism is notoriously difficult to define, but generally, it 289
refers to policies related to economic and military competition between developing states. 
It relates, more specifically, to ideas about competition between states for the 
enhancement of trade in the national interest.  Theorists saw states as self-contained 290
units participating in a zero-sum system of international trade. State-building was 
enhanced by conquest and colonialism because colonies provided new markets and 
outlets for surplus capital and people. Colonialism, in a mercantilist world, was perceived 
as a form of self-defense for developing empire-states. 
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 Naoroji drew on the free trade versus mercantilism debates and used the political-
economic rhetoric of both to craft arguments that were aimed at state building within the 
empire. He argued that Britain had governed India from a mercantilist perspective, that 
colonial governance had acted as a mechanism for India’s economic immiseration, as 
though Britain and India were locked in a zero-sum game of competition. Good character 
required that Britain adopt her own self-proclaimed ideals with respect to India. The 
ideological underpinnings of free-trade thought held that commerce among free and equal 
peoples would promote civilization and the welfare of all peoples, maintain peace, and 
encourage progress by eliminating national rivalries.  291
 He was aligned in his thought with intellectuals like Richard Cobden, who saw 
among the moral and practical benefits of free trade mutual respect and recognition, an 
end to territorial conquest, and the elimination of militarism. Naoroji, at the same time, 
reinvigorated the concept of mercantilism for his own purposes, by envisioning an 
internally differentiated empire. He described India as a discrete space that could be 
drained only with the uncivilized complicity of British India’s centralized, bureaucratic 
state but that should be allowed to prosper as an equal part of the British world state.  292
 Naoroji’s response to India’s involvement in the Abyssinian dispute occurred 
within both a global and a domestic historical context. The period between 1840 and 
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1880 was one “of endemic violence,” the death toll especially high in the 1850s and the 
1860s due to the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), the Crimean War (1853-1856), and the 
American Civil War (1861-1865).  East India Association discussions indicated a 293
distinct awareness India’s global connections. Robert Knight (1825-1890), a British 
journalist for the Times of India and founder of The Statesman, contextualized Naoroji’s 
commentary, noting that the “chronic deficits” of the Indian government before 1857 no 
longer existed because of the discovery of gold in California and Australia, which had 
increased global currency, the opium trade, and the demand for Indian jute and cotton 
created by the Crimean war and the American Civil War.  294
 The Foreign Office contacted the India Office in London in 1866 to request 
diplomatic assistance from the Government of [British] India in Calcutta (GoI). The 
GoI’s Foreign Department had retained the East India Company’s (EIC) responsibility for 
British foreign policy and diplomacy between coastal eastern Africa and East Asia, and 
for relations with the princely, or native, states, after the Company’s dissolution in 
1858.  Abyssinia fell outside the GoI’s regular political-geographical jurisdiction, but 295
the Foreign Office believed that negotiations could be conducted more quickly from India 
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than from Britain. The regional, Bombay-presidency government in western India, which 
routinely managed foreign relations in eastern Africa and parts of the Middle East, sent 
members of the Indian Political Service, the GoI’s diplomatic corps, from the Aden 
protectorate in contemporary Yemen, to undertake a second negotiation for the captives’ 
release.  296
 King Theodore, “capricious in disposition and violent in temper,” jailed the envoy 
and retained him with the consul and the other hostages.  The Foreign and War Offices 297
in London called again on the India Office for help, in autumn 1867, and the regional 
government in Bombay assumed war-planning duties. Stafford Northcote, the Secretary 
of State for India, was not alone in justifying his support by alluding to global order and 
by citing the belief that Britain was part of, and possessed an obligation to, the “civilized 
world.” Henry Rawlinson believed that Theodore’s actions, left unchecked, would 
undermine Britain’s honor and prestige and, therefore, her credibility as an exemplar and 
an arbiter of civilizational status and progress. 
 Northcote justified the government’s plan in two ways. First, he argued, South 
Asians were curious and knowledgeable about the foreign relations of India and the 
empire. Many possessed close economic, religious, and political ties, sustained by 
purposeful migration, with peoples throughout eastern Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 
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Second, emissaries dispatched from “the Indian empire” went most often to “semi-
barbarous states” unacquainted with Western or, tautologically, civilized international 
legal practice. Consequently, the peoples and the state of India had “a very keen interest 
in the protection of those who [were] sent to speak in her name.”  The expedition would 298
serve as a lesson to all “uncivilized” states, thereby strengthening Indian security. 
 Henry Rawlinson also recognized South Asians’ extra-subcontinental knowledge 
and relationships, but he saw these as a cause for concern. The Indian empire allowed 
Britain to control Russian imperial expansion, and South Asians’ relationships outside of 
India threatened to make this more difficult.  Rawlinson, like many observers, believed 299
that the perception of British weakness during the Crimean War (1853-1856), fought 
alongside the Muslim Ottoman empire against Russia, had emboldened the perpetrators 
of the Indian revolt in 1857.  A demonstration of British military might in Abyssinia, 300
witnessed first-hand by South Asian troops, would lessen the likelihood that disaffection 
in India would again turn violent. Indian interests and resources, for Rawlinson, were 
British interests and resources, to be used as needed to project British power, which 
buttressed Britain’s rule in “the East.” 
 Naoroji’s interest was not in the legality of the expedition but in the cavalier use 
of Indian resources to plan and execute an imperial war. His arguments resonated 
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especially clearly because the government had been criticized for funding the state visit 
to Britain of the Ottoman sultan during the past summer.  Naoroji expressed a desire for 301
cooperation with the Government of India, with which he shared the goal of “the good 
government and welfare of India,” but he argued that the British government’s decision to 
fund the Abyssinian expedition with Indian money was unjust, injurious to British 
prestige, and contrary to past practice, recalling the commonplace nature of treaties 
between the East India Company and native rulers in the late-eighteenth century, “[w]hen 
the English Government was only one of many independent Indian Powers.”  302
 The treaties, easily accessible being collected and published by the Government 
of India, required that the party activating a mutual-defense provision by requesting 
assistance from the other signatory would assume total financial responsibility for the 
military help it received.  Naoroji reminded the British, in an echo of his debate with 303
John Crawfurd, that civilized peoples respect the “fidelity of engagements.” The structure 
of his argument drew on “the pervading maxim of International… jurisprudence,” the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, agreements must be kept, which required adherence to 
both the letter and the spirit of a treaty.  The principle of rebus sic stantibus allowed 304
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that changed circumstances could obviate earlier agreements, but the Queen’s 
Proclamation seemed to indicate that circumstances had not altered conditions so much 
so that the treaties could be considered extinguished. 
 His analysis led to him to “hope [that] the standard of fair play of the Crown 
[was] not to be inferior to that of the Company.”  No one hearing this entreaty, only 305
nine years after the British government had dispossessed the East India Company of its 
Indian empire, would have failed to remember that Parliament had done so on the basis of 
Company misrule in India or that the Queen had proclaimed that India would be 
governed, in part, based on respect for earlier treaty obligations. The discussion of 
treaties acted to demarcate the British and Indian governments, as well as the British and 
India polities. The treaties were based on a clear recognition of separate political entities, 
states, negotiating in a relationship of nominal equality. 
 The people who funded the administration of their own civic life had a right to 
receive respect for their separate existence and recognition of their distinct interests and 
needs. India needed, according to Naoroji, to save money when possible, a need more 
pressing for India than for Britain. “Famines, intellectual and physical, [were the] crying 
evils [of India’s impoverishment].”  South Asians should not have been compelled to 306
fund military expenditures greater than necessary for protection of Indian interests, and 
certainly not to protect the interests of Britain, which was capable of supporting itself. 
 Naoroji, “Expenses of the Abyssinian War,” 48.305
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Naoroji acknowledged the arguments that British prestige was at stake and that Britain 
had a duty to protect its envoys. However, he wrote, 
The prestige which England has to maintain under such circumstances is to shew 
[sic] that she is herself able to hold her own, from her own resources; not that she 
is so poor or unfair that she is unable or unwilling to pay for the very troops 
which are employed in vindicating her honour, and liberating her own 
representative, and helps herself from the Indian purse.  307
 He ended by citing the Government of India Act of 1858, which allowed Indian 
monies to be used for military operations beyond the frontiers of India only “for 
preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty’s Indian possessions, or under 
sudden and urgent necessity,” unless both Houses of Parliament approved an expenditure 
that departed from the sort imagined by the Act.  Naoroji described India as a distinct 308
political entity with unique needs and interests, nothing like one of John Stuart Mill’s 
“outlying agricultural or manufacturing estates belonging to a larger community.”  He 309
imagined a Government of India that recognized these needs and represented these 
interests, negotiating with external parties from a position of equality. He also 
acknowledged that good character was the only bulwark against governmental abuse, 
when Parliament could override the explicit provisions of its own legislation, so he called 
on the British live up to their claims of civilization and good breeding, to act on the moral 
and ethical obligations of rulers who believe in law, order, and justice. 
 Naoroji, “Expenses of the Abyssinian War,” 49, italics in the original.307
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 Naoroji had no way of knowing, as he prepared his paper for delivery on 
November 29, that Parliament would approve the expedition plan on November 28, 1867. 
In fact, Stafford Northcote acknowledged that Parliament’s vote had been taken earlier 
than planned because of increasingly effective public agitation against the expedition.  310
This acknowledgement gave Naoroji the chance to offer additional remarks based on the 
Parliamentary debate following his reading of the prepared paper. Northcote had admitted 
that India’s material interests were not implicated in the Abyssinian war question, but he 
claimed to have negotiated the use of Indian troops with the goal that India not “make 
money.” India would pay only what would have been paid absent the war. Naoroji rightly 
noted that this approach still required India to pay for a notional Indian portion of the 
conflict, despite the fact that British goals in Abyssinia failed to involve Indian interests. 
 More importantly, Northcote invoked principles of imperial unity and 
international law. He went on to declare that it was important for South Asians to witness 
the British upholding this principle. Naoroji posed the question, why, if this principle of 
international law were of imperial import, was India the only colony expected to share 
the burden of money and men? He also remarked that South Asians were likely to 
interpret Britain’s use of India’s money and men as an example of unethical parsimony, 
an extraction of resources from India “simply because India [could not] help herself.”  311
Northcote and Rawlinson, Naoroji opined, misapprehended the supposed lesson that 
 HC Deb., November 28, 1867, vol. 190, col. 372.310
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would be learned in India. The use of Indian resources to prosecute a British war would, 
in fact, undermine, rather than strengthen, British credibility. 
 The British government, like the EIC, was abrogating, methodically and 
unilaterally, its institutional, inter-state legal obligations, thereby besmirching its 
character in the subcontinent to save its honor in Africa. The use of these resources, 
contrary to the legal, institutional, and constitutional obligations that bound India to the 
empire amounted to an unjustifiable expropriation and arbitrary misrule, one of the main 
reasons for the British government’s dispossession of the Company. Naoroji could offer 
no counter argument, if British character and the civilizing mission were simply 
theoretical veneers for despotism based on the principle of might makes right, but he 
believed “the English government to be guided by the principles of justice and truth.”  312
 Naoroji’s vision of global and imperial order differed greatly from the one 
propounded by supporters of the expedition, which was dominant, though not universal. 
He applied his earlier civilizational discourses in a more assertive, affirmative manner, 
portraying South Asians, in this dispute, as the people who understood the international 
legal value of fidelity in engagements and of reciprocity in inter-relations. His borrowing 
from economic theory had imagined India as discrete and territorially delimited, and he 
combined the imperial-statist and imperial-institutional models of citizenship to explain 
India as an equal part of a composite, multi-ethnic empire, with interests of state that 
demanded imperial recognition. This vision underpinned his call for the Secretary of 
 Naoroji, “Expenses of the Abyssinian War,” 53.312
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State to represent the interests of India and the common good of its South Asian citizen-
subjects. 
Conclusion 
 Dadabhai Naoroji used the ideology of the imperial civilizing mission to build a 
critique of British imperial governance in India. He argued that British national character 
was questionable, both in the colloquial sense, implying that it might not be what it 
seemed, and more directly, that it could be questioned, criticized, and opposed. He used 
comparative sociological methods to describe South Asian Parsis as historically civilized 
peoples. The international legal discourse and politics of his Abyssinian war-related 
commentary on treaty relations between the East India Company and independent South 
Asian rulers imagined an alternative future with historical evidence by arguing that 
Britain and India ought to be separate political entities negotiating honestly and as equals 
within the empire. He created institutions in Britain and in India to disseminate this 
critique and to influence British imperial policy. 
 He envisioned a discrete Indian state within the empire and the equality of Indian 
interests within an imperial commonwealth. This preceded and informed his neo-
mercantilist political-economic model of India within the empire, both of which provided 
a model for later South Asian liberals. Naoroji's foreign-affairs commentary focused on 
the use of Indian wealth to prosecute imperial wars unrelated to India. South Asians who 
adopted Naoroji’s political-economic methods used his argumentative strategy to 
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juxtapose the legitimate, internal, societal responsibilities of the Indian state, such as 
famine relief or economic development, with illegitimate, external, imperial frontier wars 
and territorial expansion. Naoroji’s demand that the state recognize and prioritize Indian 
interests invoked a South Asian national sensibility grounded in the British birthright of 
justice and shared responsibility for governance. 
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Chapter 2 
South Asian Muslim Modernists and the “Standard of Civilization” 
 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, “[a]fter 1857, the heavy hand of the British fell more 
upon the Moslems than on the Hindus.”  Opinions about the historical accuracy of this 313
assertion vary, but the feeling that this was true was widespread among Muslims.  314
Religious thinkers and leaders actively questioned both how to accommodate changing 
political circumstances and what should be the proper relationship between Muslims and 
non-Muslims.  They did so in the face of challenges posed by a new sensibility of 315
decline and inferiority.  British intellectuals, colonial administrators, and South Asian 316
Muslims debated the history and the contemporary meaning of a centuries-old Islamicate 
civilization, which encompassed both the religion of Islam and, according to Marshall 
Hodgson, “the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the 
Muslims.”  Historically developed Islamicate forms of statecraft, diplomacy, law, and 317
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inter-relational practices existed, but the British regarded these as inferior, duplicitous, 
and even barbarous.  318
 Responses to this new state of affairs varied. Some Muslims chose to eschew 
politics, to retain traditional methods and topics of Islamic education, and to return to a 
closer study of the Quran and both the actions and the sayings of the Prophet, 
Muhammad.  Shia religious scholars in Lucknow opened schools focused on traditional 319
learning, but they also opened publishing houses, charities, and welfare organizations.  320
Some Muslims fled to Ottoman lands, creating a moment of “unprecedented connectivity 
between the Ottoman and the British worlds,” which inspired resistance to British rule in 
Egypt, the creation of educational programs and the construction of constitutional 
analyses that influenced Ottoman imperial reforms, Muslim intellectual endeavors in 
India, and British fears.  One thing is clear: the Muslim “community” imagined by the 321
British as monolithic was actually socially, politically, and intellectually variegated, and 
engaged with the world outside India. 
 This chapter examines the public-intellectual contributions of three South Asian 
Muslim modernists to debates about Islamic and Muslim history with respect to the 
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Imagination (Cambridge, 2005).
 Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India; Francis Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic 319
Culture in South Asia (London, 2001); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Review Essay: Modernity and 
Religious Change in South Asian Islam.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 14 (2004), 253-263.
 Justin Jones, Shi’a Islam in Colonial India: Religion, Community and Sectarianism (Cambridge, 2012), 320
114-146.
 Seema Alavi, Muslim Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Empire (Cambridge MA, 2015), 18; see, also, 321
Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Asian Thought (New York, 2007).
102
“Eastern Question,” the international and legal relations between the Ottoman empire and 
the European empires.  It argues that Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Syed Ameer 322
Ali (1849-1928), and Maulvi Chiragh Ali (1844-1895) managed the situation of Indian 
Muslims described by Nehru, the transition from ruling to dispossession and 
incorporation into Britain’s imperial world system, by articulating what Nile Green has 
called an “imperial-Islamicate” model of order and governance.  They reinterpreted 323
Islamicate history to demonstrate the civilizational character of Indian Muslims as a 
people capable of progress and of reciprocity in relations with non-Muslims using the 
imperial vernacular of civilization and improvement.  
 One historian of South Asian Muslims, Mansoor Moaddel, noted that, “Islamic” 
modernists “attempted to address the intellectual problems that beset Islam as a result of 
the sweeping criticisms leveled against it by adherents” of other discourses, specifically, 
Enlightenment-influenced secularists, proponents of the modern bureaucratic state, and 
Christian missionaries.  Muslim modernism better captures the sensibility of this 324
chapter’s main characters. They were not, primarily, theologians. They were overtly 
 Matthew Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (New York, 322
1966).
 Nile Green, “Africa in Indian Ink: Urdu Articulations of Indian Settlement in East Africa,” Journal of 323
African History, 53 (2012), 131-150. Green analyzes an imperial-Islamicate settler discourse that appeared 
fully formed in the travelogues of Muslim Indians writing about East Africa at and after 1900; see, for other 
borrowings of the concept, Soumen Mukherjee, “Universalising Aspirations: Community and Social 
Service in the Isma’ili Imagination in Twentieth-Century South Asia and East Africa, Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 24 (2014), 435-453; James R. Brennan, “Constructing Arguments and Institutions of 
Islamic Belonging: M. O. Abbasi, Colonial Tanzania, and the Western Indian Ocean World, 1925-1961, 
Journal of African History, 55 (2014), 211-228.
 Mansoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse 324
(Chicago, 2005), 31.
103
concerned with the real-life problems of Muslim men and women resulting from 
misconceptions about Islam, the dispossession of Muslims’ political power, and the 
educational, social, and political challenges faced by Muslims under direct British rule in 
India. The scientific, historical, and legal foundations of their reinterpretations of Islam 
were designed to meet, head on, British scientific approaches to municipal and 
international governance. Their historical concerns included issues that occupied British, 
and more broadly, western, legal thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the 
standard of civilization, the obligations of membership in international society, the 
relationship between states and peoples, interstate relations, peace, and the rules of war. 
 South Asians engaged the Eastern Question for multiple reasons. South Asian 
Muslims were subjects of the British empire and interested in imperial and international 
political matters that affected India. They were motivated by questions about the place of 
Muslims in the British empire, which were related to debates about the legitimacy of their 
Ottoman co-religionists’ presence in Europe and the generally vitriolic British attitude 
toward Islam. South Asians were drawn within the ambit of the Eastern Question for both 
geopolitical and religious-civilizational reasons, but this chapter will focus on Muslim 
modernists’ intellectual responses to the latter. 
 The story faces outward to focus on Christian-Muslim disputation and the 
modernists’ efforts to craft a rational explication of Islam for non-Muslim audiences after 
1857. They revised Europeans’ historical analyses of Islam and Islamicate civilizations, 
the cultures and the societies associated with the religion of Islam and its adherents, to 
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argue for a more expansive and inclusive definition of international society, a definition 
that included space for Muslims as equal members. The story ends in the mid-1880s, with 
Britain’s decisive rejection of Anglo-Ottoman entente under the leadership of Liberal 
Prime Minister William Gladstone (1809-1898) and rising fears of anti-imperial and anti-
western pan-Islamicism. 
 Ahmad Khan, Ameer Ali, and Chiragh Ali used liberal politico-legal concepts to 
articulate an imperial-Islamicate model of global order, the latter two men explicitly 
engaging with international legal discourse.  Their histories explained Islam as a 325
civilizing theology that introduced legal and moral ideas and constraints into Arabian life 
and portrayed the early Muslim community as a force for the expansion of civil and 
political rights. Islam, in their historical narratives, provided a constitution for civilized 
social and inter-polity relations. These histories created an historical continuity in which 
Muslims were the imperial, civilizing predecessors of the British. This idea was coupled 
with positive assessments of British rule and achievements in India that served as an 
invitation to the British to see Indian Muslims as partners. Like Dadabhai Naoroji, these 
men acted as cultural translators and engaged with English-speaking, British audiences 
through their written work with the goal of shaping imperial political thought and 
governance. Again like Naoroji, they were recognized as public intellectuals and experts, 
so their ideas were actively debated as the British attempted to rule in India. 
 See, Green, “Africa in Indian Ink.”325
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The Eastern Question and International Law in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
 John Morley (1838-1923)—a journalist, politician, and the Secretary of State for 
India from 1905 until 1910—described the Eastern Question, in 1903, as a “shifting, 
intractable, and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic 
faiths that is veiled under [an] easy name.”  Norman Harris, more colloquially, called 326
the matter a “whole knot of problems rolled into one.”  Morley understood that 327
diplomatic, legal, and military disputes were expressions of the “conflicting interests” 
that underlay the Eastern Question, and he also recognized that civilizational and 
religious entanglements made the Question as much about peoples as about states. 
 The Question arose, in part, from efforts to define the appropriate political place 
and legal status of the Ottoman empire in its relation to Great-Power politics in Europe, 
to extra-European imperial politics, and to the international-legal family of nations, 
which was supposed, by jurists, to be European and Christian. These efforts were 
complicated, throughout the nineteenth century and up to the First World War, by a belief 
in ongoing Ottoman imperial decline leading to imminent dissolution. Broadly, the 
Ottoman presence in Europe created two, intertwined political and ideological difficulties 
for British statesmen. The Ottoman empire ruled from Constantinople, an “incomparable 
 John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, vol. I (New York, 1903), 476-477.326
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centre of imperial power standing in Europe but facing Asia,” and its imperial leaders 
ruled as “Mahometan masters over Christian races.”  328
 The “Turks” were believed to be barbarous infidels, the inheritors and 
perpetuators of a deficient civilization, and both religiously and racially inferior to white, 
Christian Europeans. Their presence degraded civilized, Christian Europe, and Ottoman 
rule over “Christian races” was increasingly perceived as a problem throughout the 
nineteenth century. Henry Wheaton denied the existence of any 
universal, immutable law of nations binding upon the whole human race.… [T]he 
international law of the civilized, Christian nations of Europe and America, [was] 
one thing; and that which govern[ed] the intercourse of the Mohammedan nations 
of the East with each other, and with Christians, [was] another and very different 
thing.  329
He admitted that Muslims, for example, might possess their own form of international 
law, but he excluded the “nations of the East” from the international legal protection 
afforded to civilized peoples by the Christian and European legal regime.  The 330
supposed characteristics of uncivilized, or backward, peoples—a “propensity for 
despotism” and capriciousness, an incapacity for reciprocity in relations with others, 
untrustworthiness, religious infidelity, and racial inferiority—meant they had not 
achieved the civilizational standard necessary to comprise a state that could participate as 
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an equal in the society of civilized states. These attitudes were common among 
nineteenth-century international political and legal theorists and colonial administrators, 
who faced the problem of justifying colonial rule.  331
 The resolution of the Crimean War challenged these international civilizational 
and legal narratives. Robert Phillimore, as mentioned in chapter 1, argued that the Treaty 
of Paris admitted the Ottoman empire into the recognized family of nations. Some legal 
theorists, at this point, accepted that the western-European variant of international law, 
rooted in the idea of Christendom, had become universal.  Phillimore achieved this 332
universality not by extending the boundaries of international law beyond its putative 
Christian foundation but by arguing that the treaty had created “the quasi-Christian status 
of the Turkish Empire.”  333
 This position was unconvincing for many jurists. James Lorimer wrote, “[t]o talk 
of the recognition of Mahometan States as a question of time [was] to talk nonsense” 
because the religion of Islam was “always false when seen from an international point of 
view.”  He argued that the Ottoman sultan ought to be deposed and Constantinople 334
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converted into a home for an international legislature, Christian and European.  Most 335
jurists were not so obviously bigoted, but they none the less leaned in the direction of 
Lorimer’s opinion of the Ottoman empire, increasingly so throughout the nineteenth 
century, and Turkey’s nominal inclusion in the family of nations did little to ease the 
slow-motion subjugation of the Ottoman state at the hands of the “civilized” powers.  336
 One scholar, Jennifer Pitts, described Lorimer’s plan for Constantinople as 
approaching farcical. He argued that the rule of law—in the form of property rights, 
religious freedom, and low taxes—would attract “the whole yachting world” to the newly 
international city, thus increasing property values.  Still, the reasoning underlying this 337
implausible idea demonstrated the connection between international legal thought and the 
principles of disinterest, improvement, and moralism that formed the foundation of the 
domestic governing ethos. The next section follows the movement of “domestic” 
religious disputation in India into the realm of international relations and law regarding 
the Eastern Question. 
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Religious Disputation, the Eastern Question, and International Law 
 Christian polemicists became active in South Asia after the review and revision of 
the East India Company’s Charter in 1813 allowed missionary activity. Muslim 
intellectuals actively responded to negative portrayals of Islam and of non-Christians, 
generally. The Reverend Carl Pfander condemned Muslims as “foolish” for rejecting “the 
wisdom and the power of God revealed in the cross of Christ,” arguing that a close 
reading of the Quran “refute[s] itself and the religion founded upon it.”  Elsewhere, he 338
likened Quranic revelations to “false imaginations” in “the nature of fables.”  The 339
Prophet, Muhammad, is supposed to have borrowed ideas and practices from the early 
Jews and Christians to create a sense of familiarity among idolaters, who were lured to 
Islam by the promise of multiple wives, easy divorce, and “a Paradise suited to man’s 
lower nature, consisting of carnal delights and sensual pleasures.”  When these 340
promises failed to attract followers, Muhammad gained converts through violence and 
fear. 
 William Muir, a member of the Indian Civil Service in Bengal, in a work 
encouraged by Pfander, allowed that Muhammad might have acted on super-natural 
guidance, but if so, his “ambition, rapine, assassination, [and] lust” prove the source to 
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have been evil.  The Reverend Malcolm MacColl (1831-1907) was neither a missionary 341
nor a civil servant but a Protestant evangelist who wrote about religious history and the 
public-affairs issues of the day. The British legal historian, Frederic Maitland, wrote, “Mr. 
MacColl has the public ear, and what he says, even by way of hypothesis, will soon be 
believed by the many.”  MacColl shared the opinions of Pfander and Muir regarding 342
Islam and Muslims, and he was a friend of William Gladstone, with whom he 
corresponded regularly for decades.  343
 He intervened in the Eastern Question debates during the Eastern Crisis of 
1875-1878, a series of uprisings among Ottoman Christians that started in Herzegovina in 
1875 and spread to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria in 1876.  The Crisis divided 344
Liberal and Conservative opinion in Britain, with the former desiring intervention 
alongside Russia to protect Christians and the latter advocating support for Turkey based 
on fears of Russian expansion and pan-Slavism. MacColl entered the debate on the side 
of the interventionists, deriding Russophobia and arguing that alleged Turkish atrocities 
against Bulgarian Christians demonstrated the true nature of Islam and the barbarity of 
 William Muir, The Life of Mahomet and History of Islam, to the Era of the Hegira, vol. II (London, 341
1858), 95.
 Frederic William Maitland, “Canon MacColl’s New Convocation,” in H. A. L. Fisher (ed.), The 342
Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, Downing Professor of the Laws of England, vol. III 
(Cambridge, 1911), 119-136, at 119.
 See, George W. E. Russell, (ed.), Malcolm MacColl, Memoirs and Correspondence (New York, 1914).343
 For the effects of the Crisis on later British imperial expansion, see, Leslie Rogne Schumacher, “A 344
‘Lasting Solution’: The Eastern Question and British Imperialism, 1875-1878,” Ph.D. Dissertation, The 
University of Minnesota (2012); see, for the general pattern of Anglo-Ottoman relations, M. Sukuru 
Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 2008); Suraiya Faroqui, The Ottoman 
Empire and the World around It (London, 2004).
111
Ottoman rule.  MacColl’s tendentious, anti-Muslim disputations underlay a politicized 345
humanitarianism.  346
 A group of Bombay Muslims, including Badruddin Tyabji (1844-1906), the first 
Indian lawyer to practice at the Bombay High Court where he was later a judge, held a 
public meeting, also in 1876, to discuss the alleged Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria. They 
drafted, passed, and submitted to the Queen, in the name of 40 million South Asian 
Muslims, a petition requesting British neutrality and suggesting that the alleged atrocities 
were exaggerated for political purposes. They noted that, “the persistent efforts which 
certain interested Powers [had] made to bring about a downfall of the Turkish Empire… 
by charging it with atrocious and barbarous acts, [had been] gradually producing a 
revulsion of feelings on the part of some of your Majesty’s Christian subjects.”  The 347
interested Powers they mention were both foreign and domestic. The imagery of Turkish 
savagery towards Christians was used by British Liberals, most notably William 
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Gladstone and members of the Eastern Question Association, and by Russia, alongside 
ideas about pan-Slavism, to mobilize support for intervention in the Ottoman empire.  348
 John Marriott defined the Eastern Question as “the clash in the lands of South-
Eastern Europe between the habits, ideas, and preconceptions of the West and those of 
the East.”  He placed the geographic origin of “the clash” between “West” and “East” in 349
the European lands of the Ottoman empire, the Balkans. This was understandable. 
Marriott wrote in Britain in the middle of the First World War. Popular debates about the 
Ottoman empire in Europe had been widespread in Britain since the 1870s, and it was a 
foreign-affairs issue that influenced parliamentary elections.  The Ottoman empire and 350
Islam were common topics in the Victorian periodical press, and the content was almost 
uniformly derogatory.  Discussions in the press and among the public had been 351
dominated by allegations of Ottoman atrocities and humanitarian disasters, and by 
debates about the duty of civilized, Christian states to intervene.  352
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 The Bombay Muslim petitioners used international legal language to circumvent 
the claims of the propagandists. They argued that the war in Turkey had been started by 
vassals of the Turkish empire and was, therefore, a civil war, or revolt. Russia, first 
surreptitiously and then openly, supported the rebels to undermine the Ottoman empire. 
They attributed British allegations of Turkish atrocities to a desire to remove the current, 
Conservative British government and to expel Turkey from Europe and encouraged the 
Queen to avoid violating the provisions of the Treaty of 1856, which had ended the 
Crimean War and invited Turkey into the European family of nations subject to 
international law. 
 The Conservative government of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli already 
leaned in the direction of the Bombay petitioners and supported the Ottoman empire 
throughout the Crisis. The government threatened military intervention in 1878 to 
convince the Russians that it was serious about defending British and Ottoman interests. 
The India Office moved South Asian troops to Malta, in conjunction with the War and 
Foreign Offices and without Parliamentary approval. The troops returned to India, but 
only after lengthy debates in the Houses of Lords and Commons about the constitutional 
legality of the India Office’s action. This disputation recapitulated the dispute about the 
Abyssinian expedition with Naoroji's earlier, unsuccessful reasoning carrying the day in 
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1878, but the Crisis initiated a period of steady deterioration in Anglo-Ottoman relations, 
which accelerated after Gladstone became prime minister in 1880.  353
 This was the context for the intellectual work of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Syed 
Ameer Ali, and Maulvi Chiragh Ali. The international legal settlement of the Crimean 
war and the Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 were hopeful signs of what might be possible 
for South Asian Muslims. They attempted to fulfill those hopes until the mid-1880s, 
when the Liberals assumed power and the British relationship with the Ottoman empire 
began its irreparable decline. 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
 The progenitor of Muslim modernism, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, was forty years old 
and working for the East India Company as a district judge in Bijnor at the time of the 
revolt in 1857. He risked his own safety to protect the British residents of the district, 
winning praise and respect. He became unsettled when the British, in his opinion, 
persecuted Muslims, whom they believed had instigated the uprising. He attempted to 
disabuse the British of the notion that the revolt had been planned by the Muslims, 
shifting the burden to the East India Company’s exclusion of South Asians from positions 
of responsibility in government. He wrote, “[m]ost men, I believe, agree in thinking that 
it is highly conducive to the welfare and prosperity of Government: indeed it is essential 
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to its stability that the people should have a voice in its Councils.”  More directly, “[t]he 354
men who have ruled India should never have forgotten that they were here in the position 
of foreigners, that they differed from the natives in religion, in customs, in habits of life 
and thought.”  355
 He also highlighted the distinction between the past practices of Muslim rulers, 
for whom proselytizing was unimportant, and the British, who foisted Christianity on 
South Asians as part of a “civilizing duty.” In a preview of Chiragh Ali’s explanation 
about the effects of British condescension, Sayyid Ahmad identified the pernicious results 
of civilizational discrimination as one of the underlying causes of the refusal to allow 
Indians to serve in government, writing, “[dishonoring us] is a thing that without 
producing any perceptible injury builds malice and enmity in the heart, and wounds so 
deeply that nothing heals the heart.”  356
 Despite his disagreement about the causes of the revolt, he continued working for 
the British-Indian government until his retirement in 1876. He was appointed to serve on 
the Viceroy’s legislative council in 1878, which allowed him to discuss and question the 
policy decisions of the government and to advise the Viceroy. The appointment, like the 
appointment of Ameer Ali in 1883, recognized Sayyid Ahmad’s public-intellectual stature 
and his willingness to cooperate with the British rulers of India. Firsthand experience of 
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the violent revolt and its brutal aftermath led him to believe that the pre-revolt days of 
Muslim rule in South Asia were gone forever. The fear of Muslims’ religious “duty to 
rebel” against non-Muslim rulers was a common feature of British thought for at least 
two decades following the revolt. Sayyid Ahmad disputed the misunderstanding into the 
1870s.  He argued instead that the British had disregarded the needs of the people and 357
had failed to communicate their intentions as leaders.  He criticized the British turn 358
away from indigenous knowledge and towards a scientific, statistical, disinterested 
governing philosophy. The devaluation of indigenous knowledge, not religion, was the 
problem.  359
 He espoused a desire for close cooperation with the British, an interpretation of 
Islam steeped in a worldview emphasizing natural-scientific inquiry, and a belief that 
educational progress would improve the future for Muslims. He attributed the expansion 
of British rule to scientific and technological advancement, and he sought to correct the 
view of those who saw an incommensurability between Islam and modern science. The 
study of science and technology were not contrary to Islam; in fact, he argued, the study 
of the natural world, created by God, was the study of Islam.  Sayyid Ahmad believed 360
that all of nature was vested with the unity of God and the spirit of the Quran. He sought 
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to reconcile religious knowledge and the laws of nature, believing that while the Quran 
was infallible, man’s understanding of the Quran was not. He believed that the 
“Western,” empirical, scientific method could improve Muslims’ understanding of the 
Quran. The laws of nature and the Quran could never be in conflict, he maintained, so 
empirical study of the world could correct human misapprehensions of the Quran.  361
 He also stressed the pragmatism of Islam. His goal for Indian Muslims was not 
that they adopt wholesale the beliefs and traditions of the British but that they become 
educated and able to assume a place within the British establishment. This was never a 
call to mimicry. Sayyid Ahmad thought that Muslims needed to study “modern” subjects 
in order to succeed in the world––to adapt to economic, political and social realities––
while studying Islamic ideas and ideals in vernacular languages to remain good 
Muslims.  His “‘modernism’ as it is often called, was not a simple imitation of Western 362
ideas but had its roots in indigenous movements of reform” and in the historical reactions 
of the Muslim elite to new rulers.  He viewed the religiously based opposition to 363
modern education as a reactionary misinterpretation of the Quran based on non-religious 
accretions. His theological ideas were designed to wipe away these accretions, and his 
harkening back to the early days of Islam and to Quranic primacy was a technique shared 
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by reformers throughout the Islamic world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  364
Sayyid Ahmad’s faith in Western education led him to found the Muhammadan Anglo-
Oriental (MAO) College, which later became Aligarh University and was modeled on the 
residential colleges at Oxford and Cambridge that Sayyid Ahmad had visited during a 
tour of Britain in 1869 and 1870.  365
 Sayyid Ahmad attracted followers from among wealthier Muslims and Muslim 
princely rulers like those in Bhopal and Hyderabad. The college at Aligarh initially 
catered to this group, although he desired to expand the provision of education to all 
Muslims. Some of his followers formed less radical re-conceptions of Islam by focusing 
on the culture of the Abbasid Empire, with its patronage of scientific learning, cultural 
openness, and artistic freedom. This way of thinking tended to be more palatable both to 
the British, who were afraid of a “radical” Islam, and to conservative religious scholars. 
The main contribution of Sayyid Ahmad and Aligarh, in this vein, was the intellectual 
revivification of the Islamic and the Islamicate heritage and the encouragement to 
Muslims to work actively to define their destiny as Indian Muslims. The roots of this 
definition were to be found in the ways of adapting to non-Muslim rule and required the 
reinterpretation of an Islam compatible with current circumstances. 
 Sayyid Ahmad's main work of note, prior to 1857, was a history of the people and 
monuments of Delhi, entitled Athar al-Sanadid, published for the first time in 1847 and 
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in a significantly revised version in 1854. The first version represented, stylistically, a 
long-standing “manner of topographical and biographical writing in Persian.”  Events 366
between publication dates offer some understanding of the more direct style of Sayyid 
Ahmad’s language in future work. The Royal Asiatic Society, which from its founding 
had allowed Indian scholars to contribute work even while denying them membership, 
had increased its efforts to publish work by Indian authors in 1850 and began offering 
honorary memberships to Indians to elicit their scholarship. The Society had expressed an 
interest in publishing a new edition of Sayyid Ahmad’s history, and he worked 
extensively with Mr. A. A. Roberts, the Collector and Magistrate of Shahjahanabad, to 
improve the chronology and evidentiary basis for Athar al-Sanadid. 
 Sayyid Ahmad’s relationship with the British was developing during these years 
through his work in the Civil Service, and his self-directed studies were continuing. His 
work with the Royal Asiatic Society furthered his interest in history as a means of 
understanding the world of nineteenth-century India, but the work was also meant to 
“serve as a lesson to mankind, [showing] that once mighty rulers now lie helplessly in 
dust. Such is the fate of mankind. Its study will awaken, enrich, refurbish, and enlighten 
man’s knowledge and wisdom.”  Athar al-Sanadid also provides insights into Sayyid 367
Ahmad Khan’s religious affiliations. In his descriptions of Delhi life, the scholars who 
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are the focus of his spiritual loyalty are brought to the fore; others receive short 
descriptions or escape mention altogether.  368
 Other Muslim intellectuals did not necessarily share his belief in the importance 
of historical studies, but it was Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s appreciation of history that shaped 
his response to social, political and cultural events after the revolt and that underlay his 
refutations of Christian polemicists. In 1870, the year he returned from Britain, he 
published A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammed and Subjects Subsidiary Thereto. 
The essays were written in an historical style, with attention to chronology and 
evidentiary detail, and they often illuminate his theological predispositions. He focused 
on the Quran as the sole source of revealed guidance for Muslims and distinguished 
between secular and religious aspects of Quranic injunctions. 
 Certain injunctions were valid only during the Prophet’s life, a view opposed by 
some Muslim religious scholars. Sayyid Ahmad wrote, “we find some of [the sayings and 
deeds] of our Prophet relating to religion, others connected with the peculiar 
circumstances of his life, some bearing upon society in general, and others, again, 
concerning the art of government.”  Although Muslims were obligated to follow the 369
example of the Prophet, the obligation only extended to matters “relative to religion 
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exclusively.”  Recalling his post-revolt critique of British rule in India, he criticized the 370
Ottoman rulers for ignoring this principle and courting stagnation by confusing religious 
and secular laws and failing to uphold the “rights of its subjects to free and equal 
expression of opinion, to free and equal exercise of their own religion and to peaceful 
enjoyment of their property.”  371
 Sayyid Ahmad averred that studying historically accurate collections of the 
sayings and deeds of the Prophet assisted Muslims who were seeking to live properly. 
The reliance of ordinary people on these collections, however, required scholars to 
recognize the distinctions between religious and non-religious injunctions so that modern 
Muslims could take account of their own “peculiar circumstances.” The essay on Muslim 
traditions aimed specifically to refute the work of William Muir, Sayyid Ahmad’s fellow 
member of the Indian Civil Service. Muir was well known for his scholarship on Islamic 
history, regarded as contentious but authoritative, and for his work on the education 
system in India.  Sayyid Ahmad appreciated Muir’s efforts to return to the use of 372
Persian in higher education, but he was skeptical of Muir’s evangelizing tendencies and 
Muir’s belief that Christianity underlay British social reform and civilizing efforts. 
Sayyid Ahmad “regret[ed]” the need to point out that, “the entire character” of Muir’s 
study of Muhammad’s life demonstrated a failure to arrive “at any conclusion by an 
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unprejudiced and candid investigation” or to use “fair, just, and legitimate reasoning” 
because “his mind was prepossessed by the idea that all these traditions were nothing else 
than mere fabrications or inventions of the narrators.”  Sayyid Ahmad marshaled the 373
work of European historians to criticize Muir, leveraging their credibility to support his 
critique. 
 Elsewhere, Sayyid Ahmad used the same techniques of close reading, historical 
analysis, and the citation of competing analyses to criticize Muir’s views of Islam 
regarding polygamy, divorce, slavery, and the freedom of judgement in religious 
matters.  Sayyid Ahmad accepted the formative or foundational role of Judaism and 374
Christianity for Islam, but he described the relationship among the revelations on which 
these traditions were based as not merely successive but progressive. The Quran and the 
practices of the Prophet reduced polygamy and divorce, nearly eliminated slavery, and 
encouraged rational thought, all of which advanced goals of peace and justice. Muslims 
in South Asia were, therefore, the inheritors of civilizational greatness and equal to the 
British. Syed Ameer Ali and Maulvi Chiragh Ali followed Sayyid Ahmad’s lead in their 
historical scholarship. 
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Syed Ameer Ali’s Early Work 
 Ameer Ali was born in Bengal in 1849 into a wealthy, land-owning family. His 
father decided to seek English-language education for his children, and Ameer Ali was 
the first Muslim to receive an M.A. degree in history and political economy from 
Calcutta University.  He received a scholarship to study law in London and left India 375
for Britain in 1869, staying three days in Ottoman Egypt as he traveled overland because 
the Suez Canal had not yet opened.  The London community of Indians was substantial 376
and active.  The London Indian Society had been founded in 1865 by Dadabhai 377
Naoroji. Ameer Ali participated in the National Indian Association, founded in 1871, 
which published the Handbook of Information relating to University and Professional 
Studies, etc., &c. for Indian Students in the United Kingdom and brought “Indian students 
and visitors from India in touch with English social life.”  378
 Ameer Ali also entered the well-connected intellectual and political stratum of 
British society. The Viceroy, Lord Mayo had provided Ameer Ali with letters of 
 S. V. FitzGerald, “Ameer Ali, Saiyid (1849–1928),” rev. Roger T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National 375
Biography (Oxford, 2004); online edn, Oct 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/view/
article/30400, accessed 8 April 2012].
 Syed Ameer Ali, “Memoirs of the Late Rt. Hon’ble Syed Ameer Ali,” part I, Islamic Culture, 5 (1931), 376
509-542, at 524 and 530-531. Ameer Ali’s memoirs were written after his death by his wife and youngest 
son using Ameer Ali’s personal papers, most of which were then destroyed, as Ameer Ali had requested. 
The memoir was published in five parts, in successive issues of the journal, Islamic Culture, which was 
published through the patronage of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The entire memoir is reprinted in K. K. Aziz 
(ed.), Ameer Ali: His Life and Work (Lahore, 1968).
 Gail Minault, Secluded Scholars: Women’s Education and Muslim Social Reform in Colonial India 377
(Delhi, 1998), 192-197; Rozina Visram, Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History (London, 2002); Michael 
Fisher, Shompa Lahiri, and Shinder Thandi, A South-Asian History of Britain: Four Centuries of Peoples 
from the Indian Sub-Continent (Oxford, 2007).
 Syed Ameer Ali, “Memoirs,” 538.378
124
introduction, and he used this opportunity to begin his life-long engagement with 
imperial and international politics. He began relationships with numerous Britons who 
shared his reformist leanings: Charlotte Manning, social and educational reformer, and, 
along with Mary Carpenter, founder of the National Indian Association; Liberal 
politicians John Bright and Henry Fawcett, and Fawcett’s wife, Millicent, who were 
active in the peace and women’s suffrage movements; Thomas Taylor, an industrialist 
who owned coal mines and cotton mills in northern Britain; Sir Frederick Halliday, Lt.-
Governor of Bengal during the 1857 revolt; and Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State 
for India. 
 Ameer Ali shared, debated, and wrote about many of the same current events and 
issues that motivated this group: peace, the status of women, and education.  He 379
developed a close relationship with James Bryce, the British jurist, historian and Liberal 
politician, but they fell out over significant disagreements about the treatment of 
Armenians by the Ottomans during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878. American 
abolitionist and Unitarian clergyman, Daniel Conway, who met Ameer Ali in London and 
later in India, recalled his “beautiful spirit” and wrote about Ameer Ali’s first book that, 
“it raised all Islam—which I had deemed a hard eastern Calvinism—in my esteem that 
such a man could love it, and draw so much truth and beauty out of it.”  380
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 Ameer Ali worked as an apprentice in a law office while meeting the requirements 
to be called to the bar. British-trained, South Asian lawyers were beginning to work as 
legal professionals in increasing numbers in the 1870s, so when he was called to the bar 
at Inner Temple in January 1873, more opportunities existed than previously.  He 381
established a successful legal practice in Calcutta and lectured on law at Calcutta 
University, including delivering the prestigious Tagore Law Lectures in 1884 on the 
“Mahommedan” Law related to gifts, trusts, and wills. He spent vacation periods in 
Britain, where he met, in 1880, and married, in 1884, a British woman, Isabell Konstam. 
 He served as the Presidency Magistrate (1878) and the Chief Magistrate 
(1879-1881) in Bengal, a member of the Bengal legislative council (1878-1883), a 
member of the Viceroy’s legislative council (1883-1885), and a judge on the Calcutta 
High Court (1890-1904). He resettled in Britain after his retirement, remaining active in 
Indian and international affairs through his writing and advocacy and with the Woking 
and East London mosques. He was the first South Asian judge appointed to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of appeals for colonial cases, in 1909, 
and he heard Indian appeals until shortly before his death in 1928. 
 Ameer Ali was one of many Shia Muslims who were part of the Calcutta school 
of modernity, westernization, and loyalism.  His work was characterized by scriptural 382
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fundamentalism, a view that the Quran was the sole source necessary to understand 
Islam, something common among Muslim modernists but also in other religious reform 
movements. He participated in the Muslim-Christian polemical debates in Bengal in the 
nineteenth century, re-examining Islamic history and championing Islam’s ethical 
standards.  He became a leader of an intellectual, pan-Islamic movement for the defense 383
of Islam in the West. Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872-1953), a later Muslim modernist, 
remembered Ameer Ali “as a Muslim jurist, as an interpreter of modernism in Islam… 
and as a worker in the cause of Islam in the larger movements, political, social, and 
international.”  384
 Islamic law, for Ameer Ali, was an international system of jurisprudence and not 
limited by a circumscribed body of texts. He used hadith collections (traditions) as 
records of events tied to their time. He believed that the law changed and scholars had to 
read widely and keep up with new knowledge. Ameer Ali had mastered the British style 
of legal argumentation, which he combined effectively with his knowledge of Islamic 
history and religious law as a judge. He believed that Hindu and Islamic laws formed a 
crucial part of the British legal system in India. He was criticized by some Muslim jurists 
for straying too far from historical interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence.  385
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 Ameer Ali’s modernist project treated law as a living, changing body of 
knowledge, properly adapted to changing circumstances and modified by judicial 
reasoning. Proper legal decisions rested, in large part, on accurate knowledge of both 
“Musulman Jurisprudence” and “Musulman manners, customs and usages.”  The 386
foundations of accurate knowledge of the law were to be found in the history of Islam, 
primarily in the “Koranic laws and the traditional sayings of the Prophet,” but as Ameer 
Ali notes, the expansion of Islam into new settings meant that one also had to seek 
accurate knowledge in “Baghdad, in Bokhara, in Syria, in Andalusia and Persia,” as well 
as in South Asia.  He shared an “evolutionary-progressive historical” approach to the 387
law with many of his contemporaries, including Henry Maine. 
 Maine, famous for his work Ancient Law, published in 1862, had returned to 
Britain for an academic appointment at Oxford in the same year Ameer Ali arrived in 
London for the first time. The men possessed different understandings of evolution. 
Maine imagined civilizations traversing an evolutionary spectrum, whereas Ameer Ali 
refused to see civilizations as trapped in amber and placed the onus on legal theorists, 
lawyers, and legislators to create legal order based on historical knowledge and current 
circumstances. Ameer Ali possessed a progressive sensibility and a belief in the goal of 
improvement. Circumstantial differences among civilizations or cultures were not 
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indicative of a need for governance rooted in an idea of trusteeship but merely of the need 
among leaders for accurate knowledge of the population. 
 Aziz Ahmad judges Ameer Ali’s “principal contribution” to the Muslim modernist 
project to be “his re-statement of the history of Islam for consumption in the west.”  388
Ameer Ali’s historical work demonstrated a mastery of language and argumentation that 
he paired with a modernist reinterpretation of Islamic history. His first book, A Critical 
Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed, was published in London to mixed 
reviews shortly before his return to India in 1873. An anonymous reviewer in “The 
Athenaeum” described it as “the work of a beginner... heaped together in so confused and 
injudicious a manner that we should not suspect the author of a deep acquaintance” with 
his sources, although the anonymity of the reviewer makes it difficult to judge the 
objectivity of this assessment.  389
 A German Orientalist, Theodor Noldeke, was more positive, but mainly because 
Noldeke was impressed by “the remarkable and welcome indication of the growing 
influence exercised by modern European ideas amongst certain circles of Indian 
Mohammedans.” Ameer Ali’s argumentative strategy, he wrote, “softens or evades 
whatever is unfavourable to Mohammed,” describing this strategy as “a skill which 
betrays the practiced lawyer.”  Noldeke’s comment about the dissemination of modern 390
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ideas reiterated the accepted conflation of modern and European. Modern ideas could 
only spread outwards from Europe. Ameer Ali’s method of historical writing may have 
been characteristic of responses to modernity, but his participation in the debate, and his 
contribution of a South Asian perspective on Islamic sources, challenges the 
unidirectional flow of ideas that Noldeke describes. 
 Ameer Ali directly challenged critics of Islam, arguing repeatedly for the 
superiority of Islam and Muhammad. Christianity, Jesus, and Judaism were incomplete. 
He was aggressive when discussing historical Christianity, turning missionaries’ 
assessments of Islam against them. He argued that early Judaism and Christianity 
displayed instances of immorality, cruelty, intolerance, that Christianity raised no protest 
against slavery. He believed that, historically, Christians might have disagreed among 
themselves but were unified in denying rights to non-Christians, whereas Islam opposed 
isolation and exclusivity. The Church had been guilty of a continuous “infringement of 
international duties” because of its constant refusal to recognize non-Christians’ “claims 
of humanity.”  This was poor recompense for Muslims to whom Christendom owed the 391
preservation of its intellectual and cultural heritage. 
 Like Sayyid Ahmad, he posited that the status of women and slaves, according to 
the Quran, was always higher than allowed in the Bible. Polygamy and slavery were pre-
Islamic, cultural remnants, accepted by other religious communities but regulated into 
near nonexistence by Muhammad, who had united ethics and law. Ameer Ali followed 
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Sayyid Ahmad to assert that Islam treated women more favorably than other religions, 
but allowed that the condition of women in advanced countries was better than that of 
Muslim women in India.  The disjuncture between the Quran and the contemporary 392
situation of Muslims drove his belief in the need for internal religious reform. Renewal 
was possible because, like the common law, Islamic law evolved; “the compatibility of 
the laws of Mohammed with every stage of progress shows their founder’s wisdom. The 
elasticity of the laws is the great test of their beneficence and usefulness.”  393
 Ameer Ali’s polemics went beyond responses to critical portrayals of discrete 
issues related to Islam and the Prophet. He crafted a political theory of Islam and Muslim 
civilization. Muhammad, based on Quranic revelation, created a composite Muslim 
commonwealth, uniting various peoples, or nations, within a single state based on a 
shared allegiance to Islam. The multi-ethnic and religious nature of the commonwealth 
embodied a distinction between nations and states that was a feature of nineteenth-
century international jurisprudence.  Unification did not occur “by the sword,” as was 394
often argued by Christian polemicists, but through negotiation and treaty-making. Treaty 
violations were met with mercy, and for the peoples newly integrated into the umma, the 
community of Muslims, the protection of civil, political, and religious rights were 
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enforced. Ameer Ali’s word choices, here, offer interesting examples of his attempts to 
write for contemporary, English-speaking, educated audiences. The umma became a 
Muslim commonwealth, and his description of dhimmis, or “protected peoples,” as 
individual, rights-bearing subjects of that commonwealth was distinctly modern. 
 He also argued that the Quran condemned aggressive war and conquest. Ameer 
Ali responded to contemporary debates about the supposed religious duty of Muslims to 
rebel against the British, or any non-Muslim rulers, by arguing that the distinction 
between dar ul-harb (House of war) and dar ul-Islam (House of peace) identified only 
the condition of belligerency—a time of war versus a time of peace—and was not a 
judgment of non-Muslim rulers, generally.  Islam was a religion of humanity, practical 395
charity, and political liberty. His arguments were framed in the language of comparison, 
of history and of civilization. The goal was to demonstrate that the contemporary 
arguments for the exclusion of Muslims from the purview of civilized, international 
society were historically problematic, an underlying goal similar to the one that 
motivated Charles Alexandrowicz’s argument regarding the exclusion of colonial South 
Asians from the family of nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 Historical unity served as an example of the potential for unity among Muslims in 
India across sectarian divisions but also for the unity of Muslims throughout the world 
across modern, national-territorial boundaries. Ameer Ali described an international 
 W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen? 395
(London, 1871); see, also, the same argument in Sayyid Ahmad’s response to Hunter, Review on Dr. 
Hunter’s Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen? (Benares, 1872).
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system of greater flexibility than the politicians and jurists of his day. Subjects and 
citizens ought to demonstrate loyalty to the state and follow the just laws of the state, but 
national affiliative communities were equally legitimate entities and could cut across state 
boundaries. This was not an anti-imperial, anti-colonial, or separatist stance. Ameer Ali 
accepted and was content with British rule in South Asia. It was a strategy to leverage 
and increase political power within India and the empire, much like the later Khilafat 
movement (1919-1924).  The trans-state unity of the Muslim community cut against 396
Indian Muslim minority status. This unity could then be leveraged in dealings with the 
British, who, Ameer Ali often argued, needed to concern themselves with the opinions of 
Indian Muslims on domestic and international political issues, especially with respect to 
the Ottoman empire. 
 Ameer Ali’s writing was not only historical. He also argued against standard 
interpretations of international law. Leading British international lawyer John Westlake 
wrote, in 1894, that, “[i]t is true that politics are not law, but an adequate notion of the 
body of law cannot be gained without understanding the society in and for which it exists, 
and it is therefore necessary for the student of international law to appreciate the actual 
position of the great powers of Europe.”  Westlake believed that political contestation 397
among people sharing a commitment to a common society underpinned the law. Law 
reflected society’s values. Law could be delineated and enforced. The enforcement of law 
 See, Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India 396
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supported and reaffirmed society’s values. Law could only derive from a shared 
understanding of the society for which the law was created. Western Europe shared a 
common political society. The idea of Christendom formed the religious basis for 
common values, even though explicitly religious and natural law arguments were 
attenuated by legal theorists’ shift toward historical approaches to legal reasoning in the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century. 
 Westlake’s focus on the great powers of Europe, in the context of international 
law, was a moral stance that excluded non-European societies. Civilizational 
unfamiliarity, the unknowability of other cultures, and the lack of a shared societal ethos 
placed non-European societies outside of the scope of international law. Ameer Ali’s 
divergence from Maine on the evolution of civilizations was applicable to Westlake’s 
assertions, too. Civilizations other than one’s own were not unknowable, except through 
the willful neglect to educate oneself. The moral duty of rulers was not to protect the 
populace because of a supposedly underdeveloped evolutionary status but to educate 
themselves about the history and the current needs of the populace. 
 The historical turn in legal reasoning meant that Ameer Ali’s approach to 
historical Muslim modernism served not only to explain Islam to non-Muslims but also to 
argue for the equality of Muslims in the international order. His focus on the morality of 
the Prophet and the Prophet’s ethics-inflected construction of a Muslim state mirrored the 
commentary of British legal thinkers in their debates about civilizational hierarchy and 
the proper behavior of states. Westlake and other European legal thinkers excluded 
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Muslims from international society based on the alleged inferiority of Islam. Ameer Ali 
wrote to construct an international society based on a historical jurisprudence that 
included all “People of the Book,” or adherents of the Abrahamic, monotheistic religions. 
He acknowledged the influence of Rabbinical thought on the development of Islamic 
legal thought, as well as of Roman law on the Byzantine law that was incorporated into 
Islamic jurisprudence at the time of Muslim eastward expansion.  In chapter four, 398
Ameer Ali’s application of these ideas in his political advocacy in support of the Ottoman 
empire will be discussed.  
Maulvi Chiragh Ali 
 Ameer Ali’s description of Islam and Muslim society as liberal, humanistic, and 
international in its worldview infused Chiragh Ali’s work. Chiragh Ali came from a 
Kashmiri background and grew up in north India. His father died early, so he did not 
pursue higher education but instead worked for the British government. In 1877, the 
Nizam of Hyderabad, on Sayyid Ahmad’s recommendation, hired Chiragh Ali for a post 
in revenue administration, where he eventually rose to the position of Finance Secretary, 
advancing faster than he would have done working for the British-dominated 
Government of India.  Hyderabad was a felicitous location for Chiragh Ali. The Nizam 399
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was one of the most generous benefactors of Muslims in the arts, literature, and education 
in nineteenth-century India.  His patronage connected individual reformers and 400
reformist organizations, creating a network that extended throughout India. 
 Chiragh Ali’s book, The Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire, published in 1883, directly challenged the view, espoused by Malcolm 
MacColl, that Islam was a naturally rigid belief system, not only unchanging but 
unchangeable and theocratic, and that the Ottoman empire was incapable of respecting 
the rights of its Christian subjects because of the inherent deficiencies in Islam. MacColl 
had written, “[a]n honest Mussulman can deal justice to Christian and Mussulman, 
provided that he is administering a non-Mussulman code, under the orders of a non-
Mussulman superior” because “the more conscientious a Mussulman ruler is the less 
capable he is of doing justice to his non-Mussulman subjects.”  Injustice was the only 401
possible outcome, if a Muslim ruler were ruling according to the dictates of Islam. 
 Consequently, according to MacColl, no reforms were possible that might allow 
the continued existence of a Muslim Ottoman empire. No honest Muslim could ever rule 
non-Muslim subjects. Chiragh Ali realized that MacColl’s rhetorical aims were to make 
acceptable the dispossession of the Ottoman rulers. After all, according to MacColl, “the 
Ottoman empire [was] clearly doomed,” it being the concern of statesmen only to 
determine whether “the end shall come in a sudden crash, or slowly, through the gradual 
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emancipation and political discipline of the subject populations.”  Chiragh Ali wrote in 402
reply for “those European and Anglo-Indian writers who… suffer under a delusion that 
Islam is incapable of any political, legal or social reforms,” and whose ignorance was 
“unbecoming” because “[t]he British Empire [was] the greatest Mohammedan Power in 
the world,” a trope often used by pro-imperial British politicians and by Muslims 
appealing to the British and the British-Indian governments on behalf of the Ottoman 
empire..  403
 Unlike Sayyid Ahmad and Ameer Ali, Chiragh Ali endeavors neither to defend the 
character of Muhammad nor to revise Islamic history. Chiragh Ali’s work mobilizes the 
historical work of both men and the evolutionary jurisprudence practiced by Ameer Ali in 
support of the goal of entering explicitly into a debate about international politics and 
law. Chiragh Ali exemplifies a radical modernism extended to explain and call for legal 
reforms in both the Ottoman empire and in British India.  He does not rationalize 
religious laws but calls for the expurgation of those laws that fail to meet the modern 
needs of Muslims in both the Ottoman empire and in India. His call to modify the law 
relies on a distinction between revealed law in the Quran and what he calls the Muslim 
“common law,” the accretions built up over centuries by scholarly interpretations that 
rightly apply only to the times in which those interpretations arose. 
 MacColl, “Are Reforms Possible?,” 281.402
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 He meets MacColl’s charge of Islamic theocracy by recalling the historical 
descriptions of a democratic commonwealth provided by Sayyid Ahmad and Ameer Ali. 
He explains that Islamic states are not naturally theocratic, that the early Caliphs, 
following the death of Muhammad, were the consensus choice of the Muslim people. He 
agrees with MacColl that reform, in both Turkey and India, is necessary. Unlike MacColl, 
Chiragh Ali argues that reform is possible. One of his goals is that “several chapters of 
the Common Law, as those on political Institutes, Concubinage, Marriage, Divorce, and 
the disabilities of non-Muslim fellow subjects are to be remodeled and re-written in 
accordance with the strict interpretations of the Koran.”  404
 Chiragh Ali uses Ameer Ali’s scriptural arguments to make his case for both the 
possibility of reform and the examples of potential reforms that he discusses. No common 
code existed for the guidance of government and no law books had yet been written 
during the earliest days after the Quranic revelation. The schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
evolved later and had been regional, thereby reflecting the customs and usages of 
particular places in particular times. Contemporary Muslims in Ottoman lands or in India 
had to confront their own, different historical, interpretive context, and the accreted 
Muslim common law could not speak to current challenges. 
 The Muslim common law was also manipulable and had been used “to support all 
manner of lies and absurdities, or to satisfy the passion, caprice, or arbitrary will” of past 
 Chiragh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire, xxvii.404
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rulers.  Resistance to many British reforms in India resulted from reasoning based on 405
the Muslim common law, rather than the Quran. Reason applied to the revealed law, read 
and re-read in light of ever-changing historical circumstances, was crucial, if Islam and 
Muslims were to make progress. Chiragh Ali wrote, 
the fact that Mohammad did not compile a law, civil or canonical, for the conduct 
of the believers, nor did he enjoin them to do so, shows that he left to the 
believers in general to frame any code, civil or canon law, and to found systems 
which would harmonize with the times, and suit the political and social changes 
going on around them”  406
This argument was aimed directly at a Western audience and at other Muslim modernists. 
Traditional Muslim religious scholars rejected this argument. 
 The Quran did not comprise civil or political law, so the Ottoman Sultan, as 
Caliph, was free to enact such reforms as he desired based on contemporary civil and 
political circumstances. “He [was] the only legal authority on matters of innovation… the 
living voice of Islam.”  Unrelenting European intervention in the internal affairs of the 407
Ottoman empire made this politically impossible, squeezing the Sultan between domestic 
and international rivals. The Sultan possessed the religious freedom necessary to enact 
reforms, but he also required political freedom. Chiragh Ali also applied this reasoning to 
India, arguing that reform could not be imposed by the British. “Political inequality, race 
distinctions and social contempt” both characterized and undermined British rule.  The 408
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solution was simple: “political and social equality must be freely and practically granted 
to the natives of British India.”  409
 He also took up the challenge of explaining Islamic understandings of war, or 
jihad, and the supposed Islamic intolerance of other faiths.  He continued to write 410
against the “Quranic interpreters” and the “Muhammadan doctors” whose “[s]lavish 
adherence to the letter” of the Muslim common law leads to “taking not the least notice 
of the spirit of the Quran.”  He avoids the debate about whether British India was in a 411
state of peace or a state of war, declaring that the Muslims were living under a third 
category, a state of protection, imagining the British as trustees, a status that Ameer Ali 
later came to see as akin to slavery.  412
 Chiragh Ali accepted Ameer Ali’s position that Muhammad’s wars were defensive 
and fought in the name of freedom and liberty. He made his arguments about these wars 
based on nineteenth-century international law, citing some of the best respected 
international jurists of the time.  The crux of his argument is that treaties existed 413
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between the “nation” of Muslims and various “nations” of Jews, Christians, and idolaters 
who opposed Muhammad. These opponents violated treaty agreements. He cites Edward 
Gibbon that, “every man has the right to defend, by force of arms, his person and his 
possessions… [and] Mahommed, in the exercise of a peaceful and benevolent mission 
had been despoiled and banished by the injustice of his countrymen.”  Muhammad’s 414
wars required no declaration because the Muslim nation was the injured party.  415
Moreover, Muhammad had attempted to resolve earlier disputes through negotiation and 
treaty-making, fulfilling his duty under inter-polity law to find pacific modes of redress 
for grievances.  Finally, according to Chiragh Ali, Muhammad, once the Muslim nation 416
entered into the state of belligerence, adhered to the rules of war, adopting only those 
measures “which [were] indispensable for securing the ends of the war.”  417
 Chiragh Ali accepted the conclusion reached by Sayyid Ahmad and Ameer Ali 
about the primacy of the Quranic revelation, the Prophet’s character, and the existence of 
an early Muslim, republican commonwealth that respected the civil, political, and 
religious rights of its subjects. His advancement of their arguments came in the form of 
anachronistically re-interpreting early Muslim society as embedded in international 
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relations, the rules for which derived in large part from the ethical vision of the Quran 
and the Prophet. This republican, international ethos placed Muslim society on par with 
the Romans to whose law contemporary international jurists referred when contemplating 
nineteenth-century international law. It also argued for the incorporation of contemporary 
Muslims into international society, allowing him to critique European interventions in 
Ottoman and South Asian affairs. 
Conclusion 
 The quality of Anglo-Ottoman relations declined steadily after the Turkish defeat 
in the Russo-Turkish war, especially after the ascension of William Gladstone as prime 
minister in 1880. The specter of pan-Islam appeared in the British press with increasing 
frequency from the early 1880s, possibly as a variant of two familiar terms of imperial 
aggrandizement, Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.  Ottoman-Muslim intellectuals 418
invoked pan-Islamic ideas instrumentally, hoping to attract extra-imperial support for 
their empire. Ahmad Khan, Ameer Ali, and Chiragh Ali were interested in cooperative 
inter-relations between the British and a pan-Indian, Muslim community, and while they 
were generally supportive of the Ottoman empire, and certainly desirous of good Anglo-
Ottoman relations, they acknowledged the need for Ottoman reform. 
 Ahmad Khan had focused on Britain’s foreign character to argue that South 
Asians’ knowledge of their own communities was a valuable resource, if the British 
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intended to rule well. Ameer Ali’s and Chiragh Ali’s reinterpretations of the history of 
Islam undermined contemporary interpretations of Muslims as tradition-bound, 
backward, and deficient with respect to a European standard of civilization. They used 
the language of liberal political thought and international relations and law to describe the 
Prophet as a purveyor of laws and order among Muslims and non-Muslims rooted in a 
respect for civil and political rights and to describe the early Muslim community as a 
commonwealth with an imperial civilizing mission. This heritage enabled an imagined 




Greater Britain, the Indian Empire, and Intra-Imperial Internationalism 
 John Robert Seeley (1834-1895), lecturing to Cambridge University students in 
1882, lamented that British ignorance and indifference regarding the “mighty 
phenomenon of the diffusion of our race and the expansion of our state” had created the 
impression that Britain had “conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of 
mind.” These words, intended as an historiographical critique of contemporary histories 
of Britain for regularly neglecting the empire, set the stage for Seeley to argue that the 
British people were not merely an isolated “race inhabiting an island off the northern 
coast of the Continent of Europe.”  Emigration had created a national, world state, 419
Greater Britain, populated by a people “one in blood, language, religion and laws, but 
dispersed over boundless space.”  420
 The Greater British nation differed, Seeley warned, fundamentally from Britain’s 
Indian empire. The British-Indian state had been superimposed over many peoples, 
languages, legal systems, and, especially, religions. South Asians were “of alien race and 
religion, and [were] bound to [Britons] only by the tie of conquest.”  No Indian nation 421
existed, no common feeling of nationality. This, for Seeley, was the crucial fact of the 
Indian empire. British power had enabled British rule only with the help of Indian allies 
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and soldiers, who aided the British because South Asians lacked a shared sensibility of 
Indian-ness. This idea endured. Reginald Coupland, the Beit Professor of Colonial 
History at Oxford University from 1920 until 1948, referenced Seeley’s argument in a 
1945 book on the constitutional history of India to explain both the origins of British rule 
and the Hindu-Muslim religious animus that was threatening the existence of a unified 
independent India.  422
 The absence of national, cultural kinship between Greater Britain and India meant 
that “[w]hatever political maxims [were] most applicable to the one, [were] most 
inapplicable to the other.”  White, settler colonists throughout the empire assumed their 423
shared, British cultural and political consanguinity.  This, broadly, and local 424
circumstances, particularly, conditioned their conceptions or models of imperial 
belonging. The colonists argued, returning to the ideologies of citizenship enumerated by 
Duncan Bell, that Britishness was in their blood and that British imperial institutions 
were their birthright.  Their loyalty to the imperial state was both natural and organic, 425
an outgrowth of their common heritage, but it was contingent both on the imperial 
government’s recognition of colonists’ common national and cultural ancestry and on the 
imperial-constitutional provision of representative, participatory, local political control. 
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 South Asians’ presence in the white, settlement colonies, what we know now as 
the states of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, prompted debates about 
civil and political rights, the passage of discriminatory laws that were challenged by 
petitions to the imperial and Indian governments and in local courts, and an imperial 
constitutional crisis regarding the equality of British citizen-subjects.  The prosaic 426
origin of the part played by South Asians in the imperial “Indian problem” of the white 
colonies, which itself was part of a global “Asiatic problem” from the 1890s, lay in the 
exigencies of colonial economies in southern Africa, the Caribbean, and southeast 
Asia.  Colonies required plantation laborers, so governments in London, Calcutta, and 427
the individual colonies negotiated systems of indentured-labor emigration after the 
abolition of slavery throughout the empire in 1834.  A “triangular pact” among “the 428
governments of Natal, India and Great Britain” set the stage for conflict throughout all 
southern Africa.   429
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 The disputes between settlers and South Asian migrants were shaped by the 
earlier interactions of white colonists with indigenous peoples, South Asians’ experiences 
and expectations of British rule, and the racial and culturalist theorizing common in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Bell’s remaining two models of imperial belonging 
invoked explicit racial criteria, taking account of these circumstances.  “Racial-430
imperialism” allowed only for white citizenship. This perspective animated settler-
colonial legal politics, wherein the putative superiority of the white polity explained 
differential legal-institutional arrangements for non-whites. “Racial-isopolitanism” 
adapted the Greek and Roman practice of granting reciprocal rights of belonging between 
independent states to link Britain, the settler colonies, and the United States in a white, 
cultural-national, kinship-based federation.  431
 This chapter analyzes the conflict between settler-colonial British-ness and 
migrant, imperial British-Indian-ness. It extends Mrinalini Sinha’s recent efforts to 
examine competing “spatial and moral imaginaries of [developing colonial and Indian] 
national space[s]” to explain how intra-imperial rivalries contributed to the creation of an 
“imperial nationalizing” moment, in the midst of the First World War, during which 
theorists, statesmen, and imperial administrators re-constitutionalized the empire as an 
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international entity comprising proto-sovereign states.  The chapter first explains the 432
colonial origins of responsible government for white Britons in early to mid-nineteenth-
century British North America and the way that local self-government could be used to 
undermine imperial directives in settlers’ interactions with indigenous peoples. It then 
examines early ideas about Britishness in light of the tension between imperial unity and 
colonial separatism in political theory. The main, third, section of the chapter traces the 
ideological contest between Seeley and South Asian thinkers and South Asian settlers’ 
use of international legal argumentation to fight discriminatory treatment, mostly in the 
South African Republic, known as the Transvaal. 
 The triangular relationship that organized indentured labor in Natal did not exist 
in the Transvaal, which was independent from 1852 until 1877, when the British asserted 
paramountcy, then independent again between the end of the First Boer War in 1884 and 
the end of the Second Boer War in 1902, after which it remained a British colony until 
unification with Natal, the Cape Colony, and the Orange River Colony created the Union 
of South Africa in 1910. Colonists disregarded debates about the presence or absence of 
Indian nationality. They argued two points. First, national differences justified the 
application of restrictive, race-based political and economic laws for South Asians within 
the colonies. Second, local governance should supersede imperial constitutional law. The 
narrative of British justice had led South Asians to believe that they should be treated 
fairly throughout the empire, but they faced exclusivist political ideologies rooted in 
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culture-and-race-inflected understandings of democratic self-government. They fought 
the ideologies, the legislation and laws, and the administrative practices that created 
separate and unequal communities within the empire. The final section explains both 
Britain’s refusal to over-rule discriminatory practices in the colonies and Britain’s 
recognition of the Indian state’s equality within the empire. 
The Invention of “Responsible Government” 
 The origins of the later disputes both between the white settler colonies and the 
British government and between the governments of the white settler colonies and South 
Asian migrants lay in the reformist era of the 1830s. Many colonists, contra Thomas 
Babington Macaulay, saw political participation and active citizenship as a national 
birthright. They saw themselves, in Macauley’s words, as “a portion of the community 
which had been of no account” but that had expanded and become strong, and they 
demanded more attention to their own ideas about proper governance. Their accusations 
of overbearing imperial control and of deprivation of settlers’ national rights as Britons 
recalled North American complaints in the 1770s. The Upper and Lower Canadian revolts 
of 1837 and 1838 were resolved with the colonies intact, but the imperial government 
was compelled to adjust constitutional relations. 
 The Crown appointed a commissioner, Lord Durham, to assess and recommend 
new constitutional arrangements following the revolt. Durham reported in 1839 that “the 
lamentable and hazardous state of things” had been “produced by [a] conflict of races 
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which… divided the Province of Lower Canada.”  He went on to describe the problem 433
as one of “jealousy between two races, so long habituated to regard each other with 
hereditary enmity, and so differing in habits, in language and laws,” that only “liberal 
institutions and a prudent policy” might have ameliorated the conflict.  Arthur 434
Berriedale Keith (1879-1944), a scholar of imperial constitutional law, Sanskrit, and 
Indian history, as well as a British civil servant, identified Durham’s innovation as the 
creation of “responsible government,” the “concession to the local legislature of the 
control of the executive, to permit the colonies to enjoy full autonomy in domestic 
concerns, while preserving to the Imperial Government supremacy over all matters of 
real imperial interest.”  The imperial government focused on striking a balance between 435
imperial and local control, and how to achieve that balance, to hold colonists to the 
empire, even if that meant devolving power, preoccupied administrators.  436
 Racial-imperialism did not yet exist. The peoples “habituated to regard each other 
with hereditary enmity” were the British and the French settlers, the latter lacking 
experience of representative institutions and required the civilizing tutelage of British 
institutions. This “French deficiency,” rooted in monarchical absolutism, could be 
 John Lambton, the Earl of Durham, “Report on the Affairs of British North America,” In C. P. Lucas 433
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ameliorated through civic education and British institutions. The potential of Macaulay’s 
civilizing mission extended, theoretically, also to indigenous peoples in the colonies. 
Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, described the expectations 
of the British government for relationships between British settlers and indigenous 
peoples in southern Africa in a letter to George Napier, Governor of Natal, on December 
13, 1842. Stanley, in language strikingly reminiscent of the language used in the East 
India Company charter of 1833, explicitly disallowed slavery, “any distinction of colour, 
origin, race, or creed” in the law, and “aggression… upon the natives residing beyond the 
limits of the colony.”  437
 The case of New Zealand is instructive regarding the general pattern of 
interactions between colonial governments and indigenous peoples. The initial 
relationship between the British and the Māori was one of sovereign equals. Captain 
William Hobson signed the Treaty of Waitangi with Māori tribal leaders on February 6, 
1840. The British Parliament had ruled that the Treaty was necessary because the Māori 
had attained sovereignty after British resident James Busby drafted and signed with 
Māori chiefs the Declaration of Independence of New Zealand in 1835.  Competing 438
understandings of the status of the Māori under the Treaty and concomitant land-rights 
disputes caused significant problems between settlers and the Māori almost immediately. 
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1495-1845, Volume II (Pietermaritzburg, 1888), 140-147, at 146.
 F. M. Brookfield, Waitangi & Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law & Legitimation (Auckland, 2006), 438
96-98.
151
These early conflicts laid the foundation for relations between white New Zealanders and 
the Māori. It was an unstable foundation supported by two shaky pillars. 
 First, the British understanding of Crown sovereignty written into the Treaty of 
Waitangi lost its meaning in translation. “Sovereignty” was translated into the Māori text 
as rangatiratanga, which was understood by the Māori as implying equality.  Second, 439
the Enlightenment-era cosmopolitan appreciation for historical diversity was steadily 
losing ground by 1840 to the liberal idea of progress.  The Lockean conception of 440
individual property rights in land, coupled with a dualistic notion of improvement that 
was both moral and material, led the British to see collectively held Māori land as 
underutilized.  Despite the nominal sovereignty accorded the Māori under the Treaty of 441
Waitangi, settlers’ political and economic wants encouraged the New Zealand Land 
Company to coerce the sale of land.  In 1865, the Māori Land Court Act promoted the 442
individualization of Māori collective title to land, undermining traditional land rights and 
placing alienated land on the auction block.  443
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 Exactly this sort of dispossession, overlaid with a thin veneer of legality, had been 
criticized by the Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines in 1837.  The loss of 444
land and growing numbers of settlers sparked the New Zealand Wars (1845-1870), in 
which the Māori fought the settlers to a standstill.  The expropriation of land troubled 445
John Stuart Mill, who saw it as an abrogation of the duty to rule responsibly and with due 
regard for historical variations among peoples. In 1866, near the end of these wars, he 
wrote, “[p]erhaps the proofs which the Māoris have given that they can be formidable 
enemies may have produced towards them in the colonists a different state of mind,” but 
if so, the New Zealand settlers would be “the only “Englishmen under new conditions” 
who do not think any injustice or tyranny whatever legitimate against what they call 
inferior races.”  446
 Three facts, by 1870, set the stage for a long period in which white New 
Zealanders and the Māori lived largely separate lives of “improvement” and of 
impoverishment. The settlers outnumbered the Māori, and the demographic trend was in 
the settlers’ favor.  The originally divided structure of New Zealand government had 447
been integrated, thereby reducing tensions both between Parliament and New Zealand 
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and between the Governor and the provinces.  New Zealand was able to raise foreign 448
capital for domestic investments for land-intensive economic development that propelled 
further alienation of Māori land.  In 1877, Chief Justice James Prendergast, arguing 449
around the law and state practice, declared the Treaty a “simple nullity.”  450
 Some empire theorists in the mid-nineteenth century imagined that responsible 
government would ensure imperial unity.  This was certainly the argument of South 451
Asians like Naoroji, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Ameer Ali, and Chiragh Ali. The concession 
forestalled colonial independence movements, but it set the stage for disputes between 
the colonial and imperial governments, especially concerning the treatment of indigenous 
peoples and, later, South Asians. Responsible government became the primary 
distinguishing factor between the colonies and India. The colonies received this 
concession mostly between 1850 and 1907, when Dominion status evolved to demarcate 
the settler colonies from India and the dependencies, while South Asians were compelled 
to demand it, continually and unsuccessfully. The struggle to define the appropriate locus 
of governmental authority, sovereignty, and jurisdiction, defined the relationships among 
imperial and colonial governments and both indigenous peoples and South Asians.  452
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 Thomas Metcalf argues that life overseas and “[p]articipation in the overseas 
empire… helped to create a sense of a distinctive “Indian” nationality.”  National 453
sensibilities were shaped equally by colonists’ efforts to prevent South Asians’ 
participation in the overseas empire. Contact between settlers and South Asians shaped 
the evolution of national sensibilities for both groups. While efforts to regulate both the 
indentured labor system and settler-South Asian inter-relations occurred “across national 
boundaries,” it is important to recognize that the efforts also served to create national 
boundaries.  These were “struggles over the nature of Britishness itself” and the extent 454
to which South Asians could claim Britishness in any form.  455
The Settler Colonies and the Empire: Unity or Separation 
 Debates about economic policy and colonial self-government continued. Some 
empire theorists believed that responsible government was, and should be, a signpost on 
the path to complete independence for the colonies. Goldwin Smith (1823-1910), the 
Regis Professor of Modern History at Oxford (1858-1866) before he emigrated to North 
America to become a professor of history at Cornell and then a journalist in Canada, 
argued that the expense of protecting the colonies heaped “gratuitous” taxation onto an 
already “overtaxed people,” and scattered British military forces “over the globe, leaving 
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the heart of England open to a sudden blow.” The expansion of free trade had ended the 
need to protect monopolies, so the “perilous connexion” between Britain and the colonies 
had “survived its sole legitimate cause.” Hubris led theorists and politicians to imagine 
the colonies as national or constitutional extensions of Britain. The colonies “must be 
developed by a nation itself out of the elements of its own character and circumstances,” 
because “constitutions are not made, but grow.”  Self-government had been adjudged 456
appropriate in certain colonies, and within one strain of thought, emancipation should 
follow. 
 The Times of London responded in a leading article on February 4, 1862, 
expressing an opposing view by deprecating Smith as a man who fancied himself 
“capable of great political discoveries” but who merely repeated one of a number of 
“certain fallacies which reappear at intervals like comets of short period.” The Times 
opined, claiming the support of public opinion while ignoring no small measure of 
dissent in the colonies, that “[t]o have established communities in every region of the 
globe, and to find them uniformly prosperous, and desirous of maintaining their 
connexion with the mother country and each other, is a triumph of enterprise and 
civilization of which few among us fail to be proud.”  Smith, like Henry Maine and 457
Seeley, saw no way out of India, where the British had assumed “duties which we are 
bound for the present to perform.” 
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 British rule was the difference between order and anarchy, even though the best 
the British could do was to give the “empire” of “India a despotism carried on by a line of 
able and honourable despots, amenable in the last resort to the tribunal of a public 
opinion much higher than that of the Indians themselves.”  Smith expressed the 458
hierarchical distinction between Britons and South Asians in the culturalist terms 
identified with Henry Maine.  His opinion of South Asians allowed for progress, 459
although it would be even more gradual than Macaulay envisioned, but unlike many later 
theorists, he sided with John Stuart Mill in eschewing the scientific racism that replaced 
cultural difference with biological inferiority and the idea that innate distinctions defined 
character and limited the potential for cultural or civilizational achievement.  460
 Charles Dilke (1843-1911) coined the term Greater Britain in 1869 in his book of 
the same name. He wrote Greater Britain as a travelogue to chronicle his experiences as 
a twenty-three-year-old Cambridge graduate following “England round the world.”  461
Greater Britain entered the lexicon of political, public opinion slowly.  The term was 462
used loosely to refer either to the entire empire, to Britain and the settler colonies, or to 
the English-speaking, Anglo-world of Britain, the colonies, and the United States.  463
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Dilke had been influenced by the “father of ethnographic racism,” Arthur de Gobineau, 
who, long before W. E. B. DuBois identified “the problem of the color line” as the 
problem of the twentieth century, declared “that the racial question overshadows all other 
problems in history.”  The question of race also affected ideas about civilization and 464
hierarchy in international law.  James Lorimer believed “no modern contribution to 465
science seem[ed] destined to influence international politics and jurisprudence to so great 
an extent as that which [was] known as ethnology, or the science of races.”  466
 Dilke’s book appeared in the early years of the mass global migrations, at a time 
when relatively few people were able to share knowledge about Britons overseas. He 
agreed that the future of the empire in its relation to the colonies was one of greater or 
lesser separation, but the national bonds of race, language, and law struck him as so 
strong that he both coined the phrase Greater Britain and advocated for the constitutional 
emancipation of the colonies.  Like later theorists, Dilke was ambivalent about India. 467
He saw Greater Britain as a universalizing force for good that would eventually extend its 
dominion across the globe, but as with blacks in America, South Asians were an 
impediment to the achievement of this end, a perspective later shared by James Bryce. 
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 On the other hand, even though racial inferiority could not be eliminated, 
according to these theorists, the English language and British institutions and laws could 
remediate the inherent deficiencies of the “cheaper” races. Dilke, like Goldwin Smith, 
supported the constitutional separation of the colonies, believing that sympathetic ties of 
national kinship would sustain cultural connections. Others advocated stronger, formal 
institutional and constitutional arrangements among the component parts of the empire. 
The debate assumed a more urgent tone after 1870, when conservatives began discussing 
variations of imperial federation to “save” the empire from Liberal dismemberment at the 
hands of William Gladstone, an opponent of foreign adventurism and an ambivalent 
imperialist.  468
A Clash of Empires: South Asian Migrants in Southern Africa 
 Massive global migration, of which South Asian migration to the colonies was a 
small and distinct part, created both explosive growth in the colonies and attractive 
opportunities for South Asian emigrants.  Britain was the largest source of global 469
migrants until the late nineteenth century.  Social and economic changes at home led 470
many to seek their fortunes elsewhere, mostly in the United States, and “the white 
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deluge” altered the imperial division of labor and the “economic, cultural and political 
geography of the globe.”  The anglophone countries of Britain, the United States, and 471
the white, settler colonies had become, by 1850, “a politically divided but culturally and 
economically united intercontinental system.”  Nevertheless, indenture and expanding 472
imperial transportation networks created the conditions for the emergence of South 
Asians as, in the words of Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, “the global working class 
of the British Empire,” the presence of which in the white, settler colonies gave rise to 
political, legal, and constitutional disputes.  473
 British settler migration created the colonial circumstances that required labor.  474
South Asian migrant labor fed the system.  The number of South Asian emigrants to 475
destinations outside the settler colonies far exceeded the number who participated in the 
indentured-emigration scheme. Adam McKeown estimates that only eight percent of total 
South Asian migrants departed India having signed indenture contracts, while more than 
29 million went to Southeast Asia, excluding Australasia, and around one million went 
somewhere in Africa.  The indentured-emigration regime responded to economic needs 476
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in ways that eventually challenged cultural unity.  Planters in Natal, in the 1850s, 477
required laborers. The Natal Mercury asserted, in April 1959, that, “the fate of the colony 
hangs on a thread and that thread is Labour.”  Colonial legislators were willing to work 478
with imperial administrators in London and Calcutta to use law “to eradicate abuses and 
make indenture a legitimate system.”  479
 Natal Law 13 of 1859 required licenses for vessels carrying indentured laborers, 
detailed reporting of information about the identities of laborers and their points of origin 
and disembarkation, five-year limits on contracts, and “a sufficient quantity of good and 
wholesome provisions and water” during voyages.  The Government of India Act XIII 480
of 1864 standardized the rules of the system, including: recruitment processes; conditions 
in residential depots for laborers at the points of embarkation and landing; quality and 
quantity of food, water, clothing, blankets, and medicines to be provided or available 
during transit and on the plantations; and wages and working conditions.  The Natal 481
Mercury, in 1865, praised the system as, “more essential to our prosperity than ever.”  482
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 Contracts ended for the first wave of indentured laborers around 1871, and most 
of these workers decided to remain in Natal to work as household servants, small-scale 
farmers, and shopkeepers. Legislative efforts to reduce and control the number of South 
Asian immigrants failed during the 1870s because planters still needed workers, the 
Colonial Office chose to assist the planters, and the India Office decided to support South 
Asian migrants, who saw opportunities overseas. In 1875, Lord Salisbury, the Secretary 
of State for India (1874-1878), identified “the great advantage which must result from 
peopling the warmer British possessions which are rich in natural resources and only 
want population, by an intelligent and industrious race to whom the climate of these 
countries is well suited.”  483
 No one had anticipated that free migrants would follow the indentured workers, 
but starting in the 1870s, and especially in the 1880s, South Asian traders and retail 
business owners, mostly Muslims from Gujarat on the west coast of India, arrived and 
began competing with white colonists’ businesses. These “Arabs,” as they were called, 
aroused resentment and eventually animosity.  Rising unrest in Natal and the other 484
southern African colonies, coupled with a desire to hold the colonies to Britain, provided 
the context in which John Robert Seeley developed his segregationist, two-empire theory. 
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 Seeley, the Regis Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1869 until his 
death in 1895, likely accounts for the spread of the term Greater Britain. The Expansion 
of England sold 80,000 copies within three years and remained in print until 1956.  485
Migration of the Anglo-Saxon race and of the state lay at the heart of his history. 
Territorial contiguity was not required to bind peoples to one another. “Community of 
race, community of religion, and community of interest” bound polities together as 
states.  National and cultural incommensurability explained why “[t]he [white, settler] 486
colonies and India [were] in opposite extremes.”  487
 His interest in imperial federation stemmed from geopolitical concerns. Only 
Greater Britain could remain a Great Power in a world of both established and rising 
empire-states. The United States, in particular, attracted his attention because of the 
racial, linguistic, and religious connection. He wrote, “[i]nstead of comparing [the British 
empire] to that which it resembles in no degree, some Turkish or Persian congeries of 
nations forced together by a conquering horde, let us compare it to the United States.”  488
Segregating the Greater British and the Indian empires allowed Seeley to focus on the 
common Anglo-Saxon heritage of Britain and the colonies, and either to include the 
United States within the ambit of Greater Britain or to use it as a point of comparison. 
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This also allowed him to argue that heritage, not the mere possession of India, the “jewel 
in the Crown” of the empire, was the source of British strength. 
 India, like Turkey or Persia, was a “congeries of nations,” not a state. Seeley, like 
Henry Maine, believed that Britain was duty-bound to act in the role of a cultural 
caretaker for a conquered India, and following Goldwin Smith, to provide for India a 
better form of government than South Asians could provide for themselves. This did not 
make the British “a conquering horde.” The British had arrived in India at a time of 
expansive unrest and had created public order out of anarchy using South Asian troops. 
India had “rather conquered herself.”  British rule was benevolent and necessary. 489
Seeley decried the scientific racism common at the time. He emphasized that Greater 
Britain and India had arrived in the present along different evolutionary-historical-
progressive pathways, which amounted to a form of historical racism.  
 Greater Britons in the colonies were “the most progressive race put in the 
circumstances most favourable to progress. They have no past and an unbounded future. 
Government and institutions are all ultra-English. All is liberty, industry, invention, 
innovation, and as yet tranquility.” India was “all past and… no future… but in the past it 
opens vistas into a fabulous antiquity. All the oldest religions, all the oldest customs, 
petrified as it were. No form of popular government as yet possible.”  The juxtaposition 490
of progress and petrification allowed Seeley to justify political inequality by emphasizing 
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civilizational difference and distance and by ignoring the role of South Asian labor, at 
least in Natal, in creating colonial progress. 
 Popular participation in government was exactly what South Asians were 
demanding, and Seeley’s racial-isopolitanism was met with institutional-imperial 
arguments rooted in the promises of non-discrimination and the equal treatment of the 
Queen’s subjects found in the 1833 East India Company charter and the Proclamation of 
1858. Syed Ameer Ali, in his 1873 work A Critical Examination of the Life and 
Teachings of Mohammed, described Islam as a political system that “consecrated the 
principles of self-government,” suggesting that the capacity for active political 
participation was an evolutionary-historical characteristic of South Asian Muslims.  491
Two years earlier, Pherozeshah Mehta (1845-1915), a leader of the Parsi community and 
a politician who had been called to the bar from Lincoln’s Inn in London in 1868, opined 
that “[l]ocal self-government… [was] as old as the East itself.” 
 He offered a suggestion for the administration of India. He wrote, “from west to 
east, from north to south,” all of India comprised municipalities, “bound together as in a 
species of net-work [sic] so that you have ready-made to your hand the frame-work [sic] 
of a great system of representation and all you have to do is to adopt what you have there 
and invite the municipalities to send you their delegates.”  Badruddin Tyabji 492
(1844-1906), a Shi’i Muslim judge and reformer, who had been called to the bar in 1867 
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after studying at Middle Temple, ended his presidential address to the third Indian 
National Congress meeting on December 27, 1887, in Madras, advocating for South 
Asian participation in the administration of Indian affairs.  This had been a common 493
feature in the first three presidential addresses.  Mehta revisited the municipal model in 494
greater detail in his presidential address to the sixth Indian National Congress meeting in 
1890 in Calcutta.  Numerous British observers agreed with these men that British 495
promises were being ignored or too slowly enacted.  496
South Asians in the Transvaal: International Law and Imperial Legal Politics 
 The conditions for South Asians in southern Africa were especially harsh in the 
Dutch republics of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, also known as 
the Transvaal. The Netherlands, in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814, ceded the Cape of 
Good Hope, or the Cape Colony, to Britain as part of the settlement of the Napoleonic 
Wars.  Britain annexed Natal to the Cape Colony in May of 1844 to preserve “peace, 497
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order, and good government,” and created Natal as a separate Crown colony in April of 
1845.  British relations with the South African Republic and the Orange Free State were 498
partly international and partly imperial. Britain recognized the sovereignty of both the 
South African Republic, in the Sand River Convention (1852), and the Orange Free State, 
in the Bloemfontein Convention (1854).  The Orange Free State remained independent 499
until annexed by the British on May 24, 1900, during the South African, or Boer, War 
(1899-1902), which was formally ended on May 31, 1902, by the Treaty of 
Vereeniging.  500
 British relations with the South African Republic were more complicated. 
Theophilus Shepstone, Britain’s Special Commissioner in the Republic, commenced to 
annex the Republic on April 9, 1877. The Transvaal government cited the Sand River 
Convention’s guarantee of independence and dispatched envoys to Britain and the United 
States seeking rescission of the plan or mediation, respectively.  Shepstone issued a 501
proclamation of annexation on April 12, 1877, condemning the Republic’s failure as, “a 
source of strength and security to neighbouring European communities, and a point from 
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which Christianity and civilisation might spread towards Central Africa.”  502
Governmental incapacity and misrule formed the basis of Shepstone’s action, as for many 
of the annexations in India before the advent of Crown rule in 1858. Resentment 
simmered until the citizens of the former Republic revolted in December of 1880 and 
defeated the British in August of 1881. The Convention of Pretoria (1881) restored self-
government within the Republic but placed the “control of the external relations” of the 
state, “including the conclusion of treaties, and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with 
foreign powers,” entirely in the hands of the British government, a condition that was 
somewhat relaxed by Article 4 of the London Convention (1884), which allowed 
international relations between the Republic and the Orange Free State.  503
 Article 14 of the London Convention described certain rights available to all non-
native, law-abiding residents of the Republic: “full liberty, with their families, to enter, 
travel, or reside” anywhere in the Republic; “to hire or possess houses, manufactories, 
warehouses, shops, and premises;” to engage in “commerce either in person or by any 
agents;” and freedom from any taxes “other than those which are or may be imposed 
upon citizens.”  The government immediately began undermining both the British 504
paramountcy described in Article 4 and, for non-whites, the rights promised in Article 
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14.  The legislature of the Republic, the Volksraad, passed the “Law in Respect of 505
Coolies, Arabs and Other Asiatics” on June 1, 1885, aimed at the “Native Races of Asia,” 
including “so-called coolies, Arabs, Malays and Mahomedan subjects of the Turkish 
Empire.”  The law precluded citizenship, disallowed ownership of landed property, 506
required paid registration to engage in any form of commerce, and restricted where the 
affected population could reside. 
 The British government had known about the Volksraad’s plans since January, 
when the Transvaal government had inquired whether the British government would 
object. The British High Commissioner consulted with the Chief Justice of the Cape 
Colony, Sir Henry de Villiers, who confirmed that “natives,” in the Convention, even in 
its Dutch equivalent, “inboorlingen,” was “always understood to mean coloured 
aborigines of the country,” so that “Arabs, Indians, Chinese, and other Asiatics [were] not 
to be viewed as “natives,” but as “persons other than natives under Article 14.”  The 507
High Commissioner suggested amending the Convention, but the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, the Earl of Derby, replied in March of 1885 that it would be, “more correct 
for the Volksraad to legislate in the proposed sense, having received an assurance that Her 
Majesty’s Government [did] not desire to insist upon any such construction of the terms 
of the Convention as would interfere with reasonable legislation in the desired 
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direction.”  The Volksraad and the Transvaal government would take advantage of 508
Derby’s implied loophole. 
 One of the first challenges to the law came from Lewis Michell, the Joint General 
Manager of The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited. Michell wrote to the British 
High Commissioner, Hercules Robinson, on October 9, 1885, to point out that the law 
“constitute[d] a serious breach of the Convention [of London],” by forbidding the 
possession of fixed property and by an unlawful tax in the form of the registration fee to 
engage in commerce. The law “treat[ed] the parties under reference as natives,” 
indigenous Africans, even though they were actually “natives of India and British 
subjects.”  Moreover, the South Asian immigrants were “orderly, industrious and 509
respectable people… some among them… merchants of wealth and position, having 
establishments on a large scale in Mauritius, Bombay and elsewhere.” 
 Michell shared that the South Asian community was aware of the contradictions 
between law and treaty and planned to protest to the Viceroy in India and to air 
grievances in the Indian press. He also noted the Bank’s “direct interest in the matter.” 
The Bank had suffered “damage and loss… by virtue of the foregoing breach of treaty 
obligations” because it had money invested in properties, the sale of which had been 
disallowed to an “Arab” purchaser.  On October 19, Robinson received a second letter, 510
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this time from a firm of creditors representing the estate of a family bankrupted by the 
war of 1880-1881. The creditors, too, had sustained business losses because the sale of 
landed property to “Arab merchants” was disallowed. They, too, claimed that the law 
violated the Convention.  511
 The High Commissioner had already written to the State Secretary of the 
Republic on October 16, referencing the letter from Michell. Robinson ignored the 
international legal claims. He said that the Transvaal government had misunderstood the 
terms of the Colonial Secretary’s acceptance of the Volksraad’s plans. Robinson 
explained, “the proposed legislation was not to apply to Arab traders or merchants but to 
Indian or Chinese coolie immigrants,” and he requested an assurance that, “the class 
mentioned in Mr. Michell’s letter, and especially such as are British subjects, will enjoy 
the same privileges as are secured by the Convention of London to “all persons other than 
natives”.”  512
 Robinson wrote to the new Colonial Secretary, Frederick Stanley, on January 20, 
1886, to seek assistance after the South African Republic both refused his entreaties and 
proceeded to justify the law “upon the ground that such legislation was in accordance 
with the authority conveyed to the Transvaal Government in Lord Derby’s [original] 
despatch.”  Robinson argued that the law violated Article 14 of the London Convention, 513
 Letter to Hercules Robinson, October 19, 1885, TNA DO 119/21.511
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but only “in its application to Arab traders,” because “it act[ed] with great injustice upon 
an intelligent, well conducted race of men, many of whom [were] British subjects, and 
against whom the only complaint [he had] ever heard [was] that by their industry and 
frugality they [were] able to undersell the local European merchants.” The Transvaal 
government responded to this apparent impasse by declining to enforce the law, and the 
Volksraad amended the law during 1886. 
 The amended law denied voting rights to South Asians but lowered the 
registration fee for commercial licenses. It allowed South Asians to own property, but 
only in specified areas, and residential segregation remained in force. Hygiene, the 
supposed uncleanliness of South Asians, became the rationale for residential and 
commercial segregation. The British government derided this assertion privately. Ralph 
Williams, the government agent, wrote to Robinson, “outcry as to the dirty habits of the 
Indians is based on imagination, the mode of living of the Indians being quite as cleanly 
as that of any section of the inhabitants of the country,” blaming the agitation of white 
shopkeepers who feared competition.  Still, the British government accepted sanitation 514
as a legitimate domestic matter and acquiesced to the new law. 
 A pattern was set for the interactions among the governments and the peoples 
involved in these disputes. In the decade after amending the law, the Volksraad passed 
increasingly discriminatory legislation aimed at South Asian traders and merchants, 
South Asians aired grievances and petitioned for redress, and the British government 
 Ralph Williams, Her Majesty’s Agent, to Hercules Robinson, October 22, 1888, TNA DO 119/21.514
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conciliated, and the overall situation slowly deteriorated. Government offices in the 
Republic, at the state and municipal levels, engaged in arbitrary enforcement of the laws, 
creating a debilitating uncertainty among South Asian business owners, who never knew 
whether new licensing, location, or business transfer restrictions would destroy their 
livelihoods. Race-based pass and transportation laws restricted the movement of South 
Asians within the Transvaal. 
 Disputes revolved around a few issues. The Transvaal government claimed the 
primacy of domestic law and the Republic’s right to self-government, while South Asians 
and the British government argued that the international obligations defined by the 
Pretoria and London Conventions restricted legislative possibilities. The Volksraad drew 
a racial distinction between whites and non-whites, while the British government made a 
value-laden distinction between the capitalist class of merchants and traders and working-
class laborers, one that South Asian merchants accepted until 1890. The Volksraad argued 
from within the model of racial-imperial theorizing. The British government, focused on 
the future of the empire and animated by Greater British sentiments, found itself torn 
between sympathy for the racialist motives of the colonists and South Asians’ imperial-
institutionalist claims to rights as British subjects, and who often claiming the protection 
of their government under the rules of international law. 
 South Asian traders and merchants regularly submitted petitions, either directly or 
through lawyers, calling on Her Majesty’s Government to enforce the terms of the 
international agreements. They argued their cases in multiple venues, using varied 
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governmental pathways, soliciting assistance from the Bombay and Madras governments 
in India, from the Government of India in Calcutta, from the India and Colonial Offices 
in London.  Dadabhai Naoroji corresponded regularly with South Asians in the 515
Transvaal and in India, and he added his personal support to their cause, while using his 
position in London to advance their petitions through government channels.  His 516
election to Parliament in 1892 only added weight to his claims, made now not only on 
behalf of South Asians but also in the name of his British constituents. South Asians 
adopted Gandhi’s tactics from Natal, including the structure and basic claims of his 
petitions, just as colonial governments had borrowed strategies, legal language, and 
administrative practices from the United States and from one another to achieve 
segregationist ends.  517
 The 1898 resolution of a lawsuit filed by Tayob Hajee Khan Mohamed, a South 
Asian merchant, brought the contours of the debate into stark relief.  The case hinged 518
on the definitions of “residence” and “shop or merchant’s business” in the amended 1885 
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law. The law clearly restricted residential locations. The Transvaal government enforced 
the law against commercial locations by equating residences and shops. Mohamed sued, 
arguing that these were different. The British government was not sanguine about 
Mohamed’s prospects in a Transvaal court. Her Majesty’s Agent, Conyngham Greene, 
wrote to Alfred Milner, the Governor-General and High Commissioner, “however just the 
Indians’ claim may appear to be in pure law, it cannot be overlooked that recent events 
have rendered the High Court of this State so entirely dependent on the behests of the 
Government as to render any hope of a decision against the Defendant State Secretary 
extremely small.”  519
 The reaction to the ruling against Mohamed, even in Transvaal government 
quarters, was “one of astonishment.”  Justice Esser’s opinion argued that South Asians 520
were not “natives” under the Convention of London but that this did not matter because 
they were “colored” under Transvaal law, and Transvaal law maintained racial 
segregation. Further, when domestic law and international agreements clashed, domestic 
law took precedence, a principle Milner admitted the British government could not 
accept, and one that overturned customary international legal relations.  521
 The British government and the Republic had reached another impasse, but the 
lasting impact of these disputes, which shaped imperial debates about these issues after 
 Conyngham Greene to Alfred Milner, March 19, 1898, TNA DO 119/25.519
 Edmund Fraser to Alfred Milner, August 24, 1898, TNA DO 119/25.520
 Conyngham Greene to F. W. Reitz, Transvaal State Secretary, June 11, 1898, TNA DO 119/25; Edmund 521
Fraser to Alfred Milner, October 19, 1898, TNA DO 119/26.
175
the South African War, can be found in the alteration in merchants’ strategies between 
1888 and 1890. South Asian traders and merchants initially accepted the distinction 
between the capitalist and working-classes, requesting support for their rights. Ralph 
Williams, writing to H. B. Loch, the High Commissioner, on January 29, 1890, identified 
a shift in the content of their claims. They were now claiming full rights as British 
subjects for all South Asians in the Transvaal. This led the British government to re-open 
discussions about the government’s position on the matter. 
 Williams, who, in the past, had stated that the law was working as intended 
without offering his opinion on the effects of the law, took this opportunity to do so. He 
wrote that South Asians were British subjects suffering the “gravest hardships,” that they 
had arrived in the colony in an orderly fashion and rightly relied on British protection, 
that they had invested large sums of money, that the “criminal courts show very few of 
their people in its records,” that South Asians’ businesses were cleaner than white-owned 
shops, and that it was “utterly untrue that they demoralize the white population by whom 
they are surrounded.” South Asians were being “subjected to the petty tyranny of minor 
officials” every day.  Eight months later, Mr. Campbell, a lawyer for South Asian 522
traders, wrote to the Colonial Office that, “official irritation and coercion… proceeds 
apace,” asking whether the Colonial Office would permit race or color to convert British 
subjects into aliens under the law.  523
 Ralph Williams to H. B. Loch, High Commissioner, January 29, 1890, TNA DO 119/21.522
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 The petition written by five “Indian Memorialists” to the Colonial Office and the 
Queen on September 30, 1892, is worth quoting at length.  The authors wrote when the 524
Volksraad was contemplating banishing all non-white residents from the towns to make a 
“not unreasonable request for intervention” in support of their “liberties and welfare.” 
They described themselves as “Natives of the great Indian Empire, of which Your 
Gracious Majesty is the beloved Empress and their ever-watchful and loving Mother.” 
The language of familial bonds, the idea of Britain as the mother country was common in 
Greater Britain theorizing. The traders’ use of familial imagery erodes the salience of 
racial distinctions in favor of institutional-imperial unity. They recognized that they 
resided in “a land beyond British jurisdiction,” a foreign land, but they claimed “the 
continued protection of the British flag” because of a “recognized [British] Sovereignty 
or Suzerainty over the [Transvaal] State.” The traders clearly understood the legal 
distinctions surrounding the international and imperial constitutional issues that affected 
British-Transvaal relations. They immediately cited the “protection to all of Your 
Majesty’s subjects” promised in the Pretoria Convention of 1881. 
 They inverted the common “standard of civilization” trope favored by 
international and imperial legal theorists to argue that, “no civilized government has at 
any time decreed an iniquitous measure of this character to oppress and harass one 
particular section of the community on the score of a different nationality.” Their vision 
of a composite, multi-national empire became the standard of civilization to which the 
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British government should aspire. The future of the empire lay not in the colonists’ racial-
imperialism or in the Greater Britain theorists’ racial-isopolitanism but in a more 
expansive idea of the common good, if British subject-hood were to possess any 
significant value or meaning. They did not contest the Transvaal government’s right to 
apply racially oppressive laws, 
against other Asiatics or against those who are far below [South Asians] in the 
social scale, [but] they felt that such a general and indiscriminate enactment as 
they refer to—touching as it does their most cherished and precious right of free 
citizenship is, besides being a breach of a solemn engagement vouchsafed by a 
civilized government, a direct violation of the International law of nations, and an 
open and undisguised insult to a portion the community, which in point of 
intelligence and refinement is not one whit worse than the majority of the white 
residents of the South African Republic. 
 The traders claimed not just subject-hood but free citizenship, and they called the 
civilizational status of the British government into question. How could the British 
government embody civilization, if it acquiesced in the arbitrary and capricious disregard 
of its citizens’ rights? What would be the cost to British prestige, if the government 
tolerated insults to members of the imperial community, which extended beyond, in the 
eyes of the traders, Seeley’s narrow racial constitution of the national community? The 
traders, after all, were claiming a shared British nationality on the basis of language, 
laws, and interests. Race was the only remaining factor. The traders’ direct reference to 
international law spoke to accepted rights, even duties, of states to protect their subjects 
abroad. 
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 According to the international lawyer Robert Phillimore, “[t]reaties [were] the 
written portion of that Law which [bound] together the Society of States.”  States of 525
“good breeding,” like people exemplifying that quality, fulfilled their agreements. 
International law recognized the rights of a state to intervene in another state to oppose 
immoral acts, “so inconsistent with the character of a moral being as to constitute a public 
scandal.”  The “maltreatment” of British Indians was a violation of the “Comity of 526
nations” and a cause for Britain to “interfere for [subjects’] protection” given that the 
injustices were clear and perpetrated by the local government.  The legislated inequality 527
suffered by South Asians at the hands of supposedly civilized colonists should have 
spurred the British government to more forceful action.  528
 The traders noted that even “a certain portion of the English residents,” those 
focused only on accumulating wealth, “with a violent antipathy to colour, born of the 
bitterest prejudice—as undeserved as it is unworthy of true British sentiments—ha[ve] 
confused Your Memorialists with all other coloured persons.” India itself, “its civilization 
and its institutions [should have been] a standing rebuke to this race antipathy—this 
inhuman and unchristian [sic] feeling.” British inaction had been noticed in the Indian 
press and among the larger population, creating “some suspicion and distrust as regards 
the reality of British protection to their fellow countrymen.” They end the petition with 
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reference to federationist desires, unable to imagine why the potential “fusion of the 
white races” and “unification and federation of the several States” in southern Africa 
should require their “extinction as a unit of the population of this country,” especially 
when, at the same time, South Asians were laboring in Natal, serving as troops under the 
British South Africa Company, and contributing to the British East Africa Company’s 
development of eastern Africa. 
 The traders’ petition did little to change the course of events in the South African 
Republic, despite the compelling presentation. Colonial exclusion, South Asian protests, 
and imperial vacillation spread beyond the Transvaal. The situation in the Orange Free 
State had been equally oppressive during the same period, but no treaty or convention 
governed international relations between Britain and the Free State, and the British 
government allowed the Free State to legislate exclusion with minimal opposition.  The 529
Australasian colonies noticed the pattern and debates about federation in 1891, 1897, and 
1898 featured discussions about the constitutional structure best suited to exclusion.  530
 South Asians’ petitions to various governments to claim the legal protections that 
accompanied imperial subject-citizenhood for Indians in southern Africa occurred 
alongside efforts to compel the imperial recognition of South Asians’ political interests 
and the legal recognition of the Indian state starting in the mid-1880s, when the idea of a 
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colonial conference attracted interest. The Imperial Federation League, founded in 1884 
with the active involvement of John Seeley, was the organizational locus of federation-
related theorizing through the 1890s.  The League never advocated a specific structure 531
for federation or advanced any particular plan. The members, spread throughout the 
empire, held various opinions about the matter, ranging from the creation of an imperial 
council of extra-parliamentary advisors, to parliamentary representation for the colonies 
in London, to the development of a supra-parliamentary chamber in which Britain and the 
colonies would become separate and equal state members.  532
 John Kendle, studying the five conferences held between 1887 and 1911, 
highlighted the wide range of opinions among federationists, noting a lack of conflict 
between “centralists” and “autonomists,” or between “arch-imperialists” and defenders of 
colonial rights. Instead, and especially after 1900, this time was “one of flux and constant 
adaptation to changing circumstances and pressures by all those interested in imperial 
affairs and organization.”  The League, capitalizing on growing interest in collective 533
imperial defense, proposed a formal conference at the time of the Indian and Colonial 
Exhibition in August 1886, and the first Colonial Conference occurred the following year, 
at the time of Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee.  The League’s request to attend was 534
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denied, because planners wished to convene the colonial and imperial governments to 
discuss practical matters of common concern.  State representatives addressed imperial 535
defense, intra-imperial communications, and trade relations, while eschewing discussions 
about imperial-constitutional relations.  536
 South Asians living in London learned about the Conference in the newspaper, 
“called a delegate meeting of all the existing Indian Societies and organizations” in 
Britain, and formed a Committee comprising “gentlemen chosen from the different 
Presidencies and Provinces of India” as a “representative body… duly authorized” to 
petition for the right to attend. The memorialists argued that imperial defense, 
communications, trade, and emigration were “in every respect vital to the interests of the 
native non-official Community of India and [that] the voices of its direct representatives 
[were] calculated to facilitate the arrival at a practical and satisfactory result in the 
discussion these matters. They received a terse reply from the Colonial Office on May 9, 
1887, stating, “it is not intended that India should be officially represented at the 
Conference.”  The next Conference occurred a decade later during the Queen’s 537
Diamond Jubilee in 1897, when the situation for South Asians in the southern African 
colonies and Australasia had become significantly more tenuous and oppressive. South 
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Asians, by the 1890, had already become weary of the slow pace of reform and the 
repeated British dismissal of their demands for equality within the empire. 
 Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), the Secretary of State for the Colonies between 
June 1895 and September 1903, had nudged the colonies in the direction of nonracial 
immigration criteria in the late 1890s, even though he “quite sympathise[d] with the 
determination of the white inhabitants… that there [should] not be an influx of people 
alien in civilization, alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx, moreover, would 
most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labour population.”  538
Chamberlain’s “solution,” the “Natal Formula” of 1897, was partly modeled on U.S. 
legislation and substituted a dictation test in the European language of the examiner’s 
choice, which meant English-speaking South Asians could be tested in Czech and denied 
entry when they failed.  The Natal Formula became the foundation of the “White 539
Australia” immigration policy in the constitution of the federated Commonwealth of 
Australia in 1901, as well as for policy in Canada.  540
 South Asians’ voluntary service for Britain as medical personnel during the South 
African War (1899-1902) exacerbated disagreements with Chamberlain’s pro-colonial 
sympathies. The Natal government, during the War, opposed the use of native troops “and 
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especially of any Indian troops;” the British government capitulated to this demand, 
offering the milquetoast response that the colonists’ “ineradicable race prejudice [was] 
deeply to be regretted.”  George Curzon (1859-1925), the Governor-General of India 541
during the war, used South Asians’ wartime assistance to argue that they had been “badly 
treated in [Natal], and abominably in the [Transvaal]. Now that they have assisted so 
nobly in the defence of the Colony… it is impossible that these conditions can be allowed 
to continue.”  542
 Nevertheless, the British government yielded to colonial racism once again during 
negotiations of the Treaty of Vereeniging that marked the end of the War. The British 
negotiators, Lord Kitchener and Alfred Milner, allowed a clause concerning voting rights 
for non-whites to be altered in a crucial way. Originally, the clause stipulated that natives 
would not secure voting rights until the grant of responsible government. The phrasing 
implied that non-whites would receive voting rights, but the text was rewritten so that the 
“question” of voting rights would not be “decided” until self-government was introduced, 
leaving the ultimate decision to the white colonists.  Britain’s repeated surrenders to 543
colonial racism owes much to men like Chamberlain, Alfred Milner, Lord Elgin, a former 
Governor-General of India (1894-1899) and a future Colonial Secretary (1905-1908), 
John Morley, a future Secretary of State for India (1905-1910), and Lord Crewe, a future 
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Colonial Secretary (1908-1910) and a future Secretary of State for India (1910-1911, 
1911-1915), men who espoused the ideal of imperial equality in public but derided the 
idea privately.  544
After the South African War, 1902-1917 
 South Asians continued pressuring the government in India to represent Indian 
interests, and they attempted to mobilize non-governmental pressure to surmount the race 
problem. They capitalized on the discontent of men like Lord Curzon and Lord 
Lansdowne (1845-1927), the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the war and the 
former Governor-General of both India and Canada, to push for representation in the 
Colonial Conferences. Lansdowne, for example, said, “[a]mong the many misdeeds of 
the South African Republic, I do not know that any fills me with more indignation than 
its treatment of these Indians.”  The Bengal Chamber of Commerce pressured Lord 545
George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, to ask for representation in 1902.  546
The request was accepted after the beginning of the Conference, and Thomas Holderness, 
an under-secretary in the India Office, attended five of the remaining seven meetings.  547
John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, Thomas Holderness, and James Mackay, a 
 Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905-1908; The Watershed of the Empire-544
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member of the Council of India, represented India in 1907. India did not participate fully 
in 1911, but Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State, attended to address Indian immigration 
to the Dominions on June 19, 1911. 
 Crewe’s discussion of South Asian immigration was conciliatory. He described 
the social and economic aspects of the problem, sympathized with the governments and 
the people of the colonies, and allowed that they should decide their own immigration 
policies. He closed his speech, before taking questions, by asking the colonies to “show 
an accommodating and friendly spirit towards India.”  Herbert Asquith (1852-1928), 548
the Prime Minister (1908-1916), described a new attitude towards imperial unity in 1911, 
highlighting “the value of elasticity and flexibility in our Imperial organization.”  The 549
Conferences of 1902, 1907, and 1911 set precedents for the inclusion of India and for the 
discussion of issues affecting India that laid the groundwork for the participation of India 
as a regular member of the conference system starting in 1917.  Asquith’s willingness to 550
loosen the ties between London and the colonies allowed future Secretaries of State and 
Governors-General greater latitude to pursue policies for India. However, Crewe, for 
better or for worse, affirmed the nineteenth-century segregationist sensibility of John 
Robert Seeley. 
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394-412, at 399.
 “Imperial Conference, 1911,” Cd. 5745, 21-23.549
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 Nevertheless, South Asians persisted in decrying the British government’s 
willingness to sacrifice South Asians’ rights on the altar of white colonists’ racial 
intransigence. Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), a moderate leader in the Indian 
National Congress, founded the Servants of India Society in 1905 “to promote, by all 
constitutional means, the national interests of the Indian people.”  Gokhale, and the 551
Society, became deeply involved in the problem of the treatment of South Asians in the 
southern African colonies. He received petitions and exchanged letters with Gandhi and 
other interested parties, and he often mediated between Gandhi and representatives of the 
Government of India to whom Gandhi seemed intractable.  Gokhale’s expertise on the 552
subject and his diplomatic skills led to broad recognition of his expertise on the matter. 
 Gokhale argued, “[t]he root of our present troubles in the Colonies really lies in 
the fact that our status is not what it should be in our own country,” when speaking at a 
Town Hall meeting in Bombay on September 9, 1909.  In December of the same year, 553
at the annual meeting of the Congress, he elaborated on this point, starting with the 
Congress’s constitution. The Congress aimed to secure self-government in India and 
“participation for our countrymen not only in the burdens and responsibilities of the 
Empire but also in its privileges on equal terms with those other members.”  The 554
 G. K. Gokhale, “The Servants of India Society,” In G. A. Nathan (ed.), Speeches of Gopal Krishna 551
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problem of status was two-fold, both internal and external, and the struggle in the 
Transvaal was intimately connected to the struggle in India. Equality was a promise of 
the British empire, and South Asians could not accept being the subjects of [their] fellow-
subjects, the subjects of the white subjects.” He invoked Naoroji’s demand that 
Government of India represent India, “keep[ing] the interests of the people of this country 
foremost in [its] mind.”  The time for promises was past. Gokhale demanded 555
“retaliation,” urging that the Government of India end the flow of indentured labor if 
equal rights were not granted. 
 He visited the Union of South Africa in 1912 to learn about the continuing 
problem first-hand. He spoke at the Pretoria Town Hall on November 15, 1912. He had 
aroused agitation in March of 1912 during a debate in the Legislative Council, calling 
indenture “a monstrous system, iniquitous in itself, based on fraud and maintained by 
force,” going on to note that, “[w]herever the system exists, there the Indians are only 
known as coolies, whatever their position may be.”  He introduced a resolution to ban 556
recruitment in India and overseas. It was supported by all the South Asian members of the 
Council, except one, the Law Member of the Governor-General’s council, but failed 
because South Asians were outnumbered by British members. The stark divide among the 
members surprised and worried the government. 
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 Gokhale’s tone in South Africa was firm but hopeful and conciliatory. He thanked 
the Ministers of the Union government for meeting to discuss the problem, and he 
thanked South Asians’ European supporters. He acknowledged that the European 
community had “all the power,” but with that came “the responsibility for the manner in 
which the affairs of [the] land [were] administered.” He ends with an appeal reminiscent 
of the South Asian Memorialists in 1892: “You owe it to your good name, you owe it to 
your civilization, you owe it to the Empire of which you are a part, and whose flag stands 
for justice and freedom and opportunities for progress for all who live under its 
protection, that your administration should be such that you can justify it in the eyes of 
the civilized world.”  557
 Gokhale filled many roles. He had played the diplomat in South Africa, a gadfly, 
along with Gandhi, through the Servants of India Society, and a forceful petitioner and 
advocate for South Asians at home and overseas in his relations with the Government of 
India. He did not see his work come to fruition, but he continued playing these roles until 
his death in 1915. Gokhale’s resolution in the Legislative Council came relatively early in 
the tenure of the Governor-General, Lord Hardinge (1858-1944). Hardinge had made his 
career in the Foreign Office. On June 14, 1910, Wilfred Scawen Blunt wrote, about his 
appointment that it was, “probably as good a one as the Government could have made. 
He is friends with Russia and knows something of the East.”  Hardinge had served as 558
 G. K. Gokhale, “A Farewell Speech at Pretoria,” in Natesan (ed.), Speeches, 734-743, at 742.557
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ambassador to Russia (1904-1906), after which he negotiated the Anglo-Russian 
Convention (1907), which delineated spheres of influence in Persia and settled Central 
Asian relations, relieving pressure in India. John Morley supported his appointment 
because of this experience.  Hugh Tinker described Hardinge, who served in India from 559
1910 to 1916, as “the unlikely instrument of the abolition of indenture.”  He had been 560
surprised by Gokhale’s work in the Council in March of 1912. 
 One year later, during Gandhi's campaign of civil disobedience in South Africa, 
Hardinge was shocked by the brutality enacted by the South African government. He 
gave a speech in which he publicly supported South Asians’ civil disobedience and 
offered the sympathies of the Indian state and of himself, personally. His support led the 
South African government to petition for his recall, a possibility that was quietly 
discussed in London but forgone because of the potential to cause unrest in India. 
Hardinge moved the government steadily in the direction of abolition for the remainder 
of his term. The beginning of the First World War stalled discussions about the treatment 
of South Asians overseas until late in 1915, by which time the main question facing the 
government was how, not if, to end the system. 
 That process took two more years, until autumn of 1917, when “indenture had 
been ended, and declared at an end.”  The end of indenture was part of a bigger 561
 Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1995), 18-19.559
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discussion. South Asians had represented India at the Imperial War Conference in April 
of 1917. Resolution XXII of April 27, 1917, stated that, “the Conference accepts the 
principle of reciprocity of treatment between India and the Dominions,” based on “the 
Memorandum on the position of Indians in the Self-governing Dominions presented by 
the Indian representatives.”  Seeley’s vision had come to pass. The British government 562
had managed to hold the settler colonies to the empire, barely in the case of South Africa, 
but at the cost of pushing India away. 
Conclusion 
 Distinct visions of imperial citizenship collided when South Asians migrated to 
southern Africa and to other white settler colonies. The political-theoretical concept of 
responsible government was created to defuse tensions between the imperial and colonial 
governments by allowing domestic political autonomy. Colonial governments claimed 
that domestic autonomy included the right to discriminate against South Asian subjects of 
the British empire, many of whom had been indentured laborers, contrary to British law. 
South Asian petitioners in the Transvaal hoped to elicit support from the Indian and 
imperial governments for South Asians’ equal rights throughout the empire. 
 They invoked international law reasonably and properly but ultimately 
ineffectively. Their petition, and others of its type, merely circulated among the Colonial 
and India Offices and the relevant local governments. Advocates for South Asians’ rights 
 “Imperial War Conference, 1917. Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers Laid before the 562
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struggled to affect official decisions, and the South African War, followed by the need to 
integrate the Boer settlers into the empire, exacerbated the British tendency to ignore 
South Asians’ appeals. Political necessity superseded concerns about progressive reform. 
South Asians were able to secure representation and later participation in the Imperial 
conferences, which eventually led to recognition of India’s right to consultation in 
imperial foreign relations and reciprocity among the Dominions and India, which created 
India as a national state within the empire while settling racial disparity as a feature of 
imperial constitutional law. 
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Chapter 4 
South Asians and the International Relations of the British State 
 South Asians manipulated European rivalries for their own ends increasingly 
often between the mid-nineteenth century and the end of the First World War. 
International law historian Martti Koskenniemi argued that the legal settlement of the 
Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) inaugurated a “short” nineteenth century lasting until 
1914. He suggested that an international spirit animated inter-state legal practice during 
this period, a spirit institutionalized in legal journals, through multilateral diplomatic 
initiatives, and in efforts both to codify international law and to resolve inter-state 
disputes with arbitration.  International administrative unions, in particular, offered 563
greater opportunities for inter-state cooperation by addressing multilateral issues and 
codifying parts of international law. These unions also opened membership broadly to 
sovereign states, protected states, and colonies.  564
 The International Telegraph Convention, signed in Paris in May 1865, established 
the International Telegraph Union, which British India joined in 1869. The formation of 
the Indian Meteorological Department in 1875 instigated cooperation between British 
India and the International Meteorological Organization, founded in Vienna in 1873. 
British India entered the General Postal Union (1874), later the Universal Postal Union 
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(1878), in 1876. British India acceded to the relevant conventions within the decade 
following the debate about the Abyssinian expedition discussed in chapter 1, but only 
British administrators represented the Indian state in these unions. They did so to achieve 
British imperial goals, so the integration of the Indian state into these international 
administrative unions should not be mistaken for steps in the direction of Dadabhai 
Naoroji’s demand that the Government of India represent Indian interests. 
 Hannah Arendt provided a useful alternative to Koskenniemi’s laudatory 
description of international legal progress after 1871. She described the period beginning 
in the 1880s “with the scramble for Africa and the birth of the pan-movements” and 
ending after the First World War in 1919 as a short interlude between the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  This era of high imperialism, according to Arendt, involved 565
geopolitical jousting among the Powers’ far-flung imperial possessions. John Robert 
Seeley recognized shifting international, political winds in The Expansion of England, 
and appealed to Anglo unity in the early 1880s, partly to offset the rising power of 
Germany and Russia. If Britain could “hold together in a federal union countries very 
remote from each other,” he argued, it could “take rank with Russia and the United States 
in the first rank of state, measured by population and area, and in a higher rank than the 
states of the Continent.”  566
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 The unification of Germany following the victory of the separate German states 
signaled the arrival of a new Great Power, which required European revisions of balance-
of-power calculations.  The Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-1885) instrumentally 567
created the rules for the European division of Africa. It exemplified the international, 
multilateral, and legal aspects of geopolitical rivalry. Germany and France called the 
conference to guide “the scramble in Africa into pacific channels.”  Britain had long 568
controlled much of southern Africa and had invaded Egypt in 1882. British colonial 
activity in East Africa had opened the door for extensive South Asian settlement.  569
Germany and France hoped to forestall continued British expansion, and Germany, in 
particular, opposed the Anglo-world order described by Seeley.  570
 Russia attended the conference, although its interests lay in the Ottoman lands and 
in further eastward expansion in Asia, and the United States attended, but only because, 
in general terms, “the issues of trade and navigation discussed there were seen by 
Washington as relevant to American interests abroad.”  The Berlin rules mattered, but 571
political, economic, military, and diplomatic competition shaped the contours of the 
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eventual African partition.  Russia invoked pan-Slavic unity as a pretext for its 572
expanded interventions in the Ottoman empire, especially in the 1880s after the Eastern 
Crisis and Gladstone’s rise to power. Imperial competition continued to intensify, and 
South Asians took advantage of the real and perceived precariousness of Britain’s global 
status. 
 This chapter examines South Asians’ international politico-legal response to 
imperial rivalries and global geopolitical upheaval from the late nineteenth century until 
the Paris Peace Conference following the First World War. It extends the third chapter’s 
focus on the imperial-nationalizing process of devolving power to particular peoples 
within territorially delimited states, and it borrows, again from Sinha, the identification of 
the immediate pre- and post-war period between roughly 1910 and 1920 as a conjunctural 
moment, when “the different social, political, economic, and ideological contradictions at 
play” with respect to a global nationalizing process coalesced “to give [the] period its 
distinctive [international legal and institutional] shape.”  The chapter argues that South 573
Asians and the “Indian question” determined British geopolitical and foreign-policy 
considerations and the development of international law during and after the First World 
War. 
 The chapter begins by discussing the international geopolitical landscape between 
roughly 1895 and 1907. Imperial geopolitical rivalries elucidated the importance of the 
 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 121-127; John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and 572
Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000 (New York, 2008), 304-318.
 See, Sinha, “Premonitions of the Past,” 824.573
196
nascent inter-state institutional order and led to the use of inter-state diplomacy to resolve 
imperial disputes. The confluence of global events and the radicalization of South Asians’ 
political and legal thought during this period set the stage for much more aggressive 
South Asian tactics to achieve the goal of international recognition as rights-bearing 
citizen-subjects of the empire. The major portion of the chapter uses two issues—the 
effects on Anglo-American relations of South Asians’ migration to the United States and 
the international-legal ideological and political interventions of South Asians in the late 
stages of Anglo-Ottoman relations. This places Indian, imperial, and international 
constitutional debates in the early twentieth century up to 1919 into a single analytical 
field to explain both Britain’s promise of Indian self-government and the imperial and 
international recognition of the Indian state’s autonomous legal personality. 
The Imbrication of Indian, Imperial, and Global Order, 1890-1907 
 South Asians’ international legal discourse and politics had aimed, heretofore, to 
influence British imperial thought and administration in relation to the ways that the 
Government of India represented the interests of the South Asian subject-citizens of the 
Crown. The repeated denial of “British justice” both in India and throughout the empire 
led to increasingly radicalized opposition to British rule. South Asians leveraged the 
global geopolitical circumstances and British fears of relative decline to redouble their 
efforts to overturn the international legal order. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920), a 
lawyer, social reformer, and a journalist, introduced political meaning into local religious 
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festivals and celebrations of Shivaji, the Maratha, Hindu ruler, which led Aurobindo 
Ghose (1872-1950), a philosopher and spiritual reformer, to assert that Tilak “Indianised 
the [nationalist] movement and brought it to the masses.”  The British saw him as 574
reactionary and extremist, “the father of Indian unrest,” and a man “destined to become 
one of the most dangerous pioneers of disaffection” among South Asians.  575
 Tilak, and others, converted Shivaji (d. 1680), a seventeenth-century Indian ruler, 
into a Maharastrian patriot and a proto-nationalist, a defender of the Indian people and a 
warrior opposed to foreign subjugation, in Tilak’s case, the Muslim Mughal rulers. 
Reformers connected Shivaji’s putatively universalizing Hinduism, a creation of the 
eighteenth century, with the modern nationalist movement’s need to portray both 
Muslims and the British as interlopers.  These steps politicized a pre-existing socio-576
political reform movement and created an oppositional form of cultural or civilizational 
nationalism that inverted the ideology of the standard of civilization.  577
 The British perceived, rightly, increasing disaffection among South Asians but 
responded with repressive measures, including easing the prosecution of sedition in 1898. 
Act IV read, “[w]hoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible 
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representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or 
excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards Her Majesty or the Government 
established by law in British India.”  The crime originated in attempts to make others, 578
“adversely disposed towards the Sovereign or his government; or, in other words, [to] 
turn the people against their rulers.”  The British traced the origins of widespread 579
sedition, in part, to Tilak’s early work.  They later discovered in Vivekananda’s ideas, 580
the “exaggerated praise of India and condemnation of the West,” which “more than 
anything else was the cause of the ruinous folly which marked so much of the teaching 
and the action of the anarchists.”  581
 The governments in India and in Britain often over-reacted to new movements, 
displaying what C. A. Bayly termed “information panic,” where an awareness that the 
government lacked knowledge created a belief that situations must be worse, or more 
dangerous, than they seemed.  George Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925), the Governor-582
General from 1899 until 1905, met the rise of supposed political extremism by expanding 
 Walter Russell Donogh, A Treatise on the Law of Sedition and Cognate Offences in British India 578
(Calcutta, 1911), 71.
 Donogh, A Treatise on the Law of Sedition, 73.579
 “Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in England, and the Remedy,” Directorate of Intelligence, Special 580
Report No. 3, July 1919, TNA CAB 24/83/56; East India (Sedition Committee, 1918). Report of the 
Committee Appointed to Investigate Revolutionary Conspiracies in India, Cd. 9190 (1918); James 
Campbell Ker, No. 372, Confidential, Political Trouble in India, 1907-1917 (Calcutta, 1917).
 Ker, Political Trouble in India, ix.581
 C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 582
1780-1870 (Cambridge, 1996), 143, 149, 171-173; D. K. Lahiri Choudhury, “Sinews of Panic and the 
Nerves of Empire: The Imagined State’s Entanglement with Information Panic, India c. 1880-1912,” 
Modern Asian Studies, 38 (2004), 965-1002.
199
existing intelligence collection practices to create a surveillance and intelligence network 
that was coordinated through international channels.  Fear created self-doubt; some 583
among the British even argued that English-language education encouraged sedition.  A 584
general crack-down on political protest, and especially the punishment of deportation, 
reinforced extremist claims about a deficient British character that led to hollow promises 
of British justice.  585
 Henry J. S. Cotton (1845-1915), a long-time member of the Indian Civil Service 
from the fifth generation of his family to serve in India, articulated the moderate response 
while presiding, at Naoroji’s insistence, at the Twentieth Indian National Congress annual 
meeting in Bombay in 1904. He described the new, patriotic ideal, India “as a federated 
portion of the dominion of the great British Empire… on a fraternal footing with the self-
governing Colonies, each with its own local autonomy, cemented together under the aegis 
of Great Britain.”  This ideal, expressed concisely by Cotton, recapitulated Naoroji’s 586
civilizational and international legal vision of 1860s India. Cotton’s proclamation also 
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coincided, roughly, with new debates about potential imperial-economic protection 
schemes to aid India’s industrial sector, an idea related to Naoroji’s neo-mercantilist 
model of the discrete, Indian state within the empire.  587
 The political dynamic changed crucially after Lord Curzon partitioned the 
province of Bengal in 1905, a decision reversed only in 1911.  Some South Asians 588
turned away altogether from a belief in the ideal of British justice and the promises of 
British institutions. Political-nationalist ideas expanded and a separate global, 
revolutionary terrorist movement emerged.  Revolutionaries responded to the partition 589
by deciding that secessionist violence, rather than the propaganda of self-reliance or the 
boycott of British goods, was required for South Asians’ political advancement.  590
Shayam Krishnavarma founded the Indian Home Rule Society, dedicated to India’s 
independence, in London in 1905; it operated from his house in Highgate, which he 
opened to South Asian students.  Revolutionary movements dedicated to the overthrow 591
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of British rule in India existed around the world.  Naoroji set aside the call for 592
representative government, in 1906, to demand “‘Self-government’ or Swaraj like that of 
the United Kingdom or the Colonies.”  593
 The so-called extremist, nationalist activists, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra 
Pal (1858-1932), and Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928) all credited Naoroji for shifting the 
demand of the Indian National Congress from expanded participation for South Asians 
within a British-Indian government to swaraj, or self-rule. Naoroji’s leadership and 
liberal frustrations, civilizational nationalism and revolutionary terrorism, and British 
information panic and repression explain part of the change. Naoroji had become 
interested in socialism after the turn of the century, in the forms of the new British 
Labour Party and the international socialist movement, and hopeful about the political-
reformist potential of transnational, global labor alliances.  He had attended the Sixth 594
Congress of the Second International, an organization of socialist and labor parties, in 
Amsterdam in August of 1904. The Congress of 1896 had endorsed the ideal of national 
self-determination and, in 1904, passed a resolution condemning colonial expansion. 
Naoroji, maintaining his characteristic moderation, presented India’s case for self-
government within the British empire but now to the working classes of the world.  His 595
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demand for self-government, in 1906, also placed India and South Asians firmly within 
the context of the extractive exploitation of global labor, when he condemned the poor 
treatment of South Asians in southern Africa. 
 Changes in India occurred simultaneously with an imperial and international 
geopolitical transformation. Elite South Asians, businessmen and princes, developed an 
intellectual familiarity with Japanese political thought while traveling, where they were 
exposed to Japanese pan-Asianist visions of civilization and order in Japan starting in the 
1880s.  Material inter-relations deepened a few years later. The beginning of the Sino-596
Japanese War in 1894 coincided with the opening of the Yokohama Specie Bank’s main 
Indian office in Bombay, the result of growing economic relations between India and 
Japan, and, incidentally, with the beginning of the reign of Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) 
in Russia. Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound (1845-1914), Lord Minto, the future 
Governor-General of Canada (1898-1904) and of India (1905-1910), called Japan’s 
victory “the ratification of another Power in the East… capable… of solidly grasping and 
understanding the spirit of [western] civilization.”  He opined about the other Power to 597
which he referred, the Ottoman empire, that Britain had “mismanaged the Turks,” that 
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“common sense and little friendliness” would have helped the sultan and his subjects and 
provided Britain with “an immensely strong ally in the East.”  598
 The Sino-Japanese war initiated “a period of instability in the Far East that 
provided the focus of Anglo-Russian relations for the next decade.”  Lord Rosebery 599
(1847-1929), the British Prime Minister in 1894 and 1895, said, “[w]e have hitherto been 
favoured with one Eastern question… but of late a Far Eastern question has been 
superadded, which [is]… in the dim vistas of futurity, infinitely graver than even that 
question.”  Lord Curzon described Japan as, “the Britain of the Far East,” possessed of 600
the same desire to exercise, “a powerful influence over the adjoining continent” without 
being “necessarily involved in its responsibilities.”  Japan weakened China, a situation 601
exploited by Russia and Germany, while Japan’s obvious economic and military power 
eradicated Britain’s “almost undisputed ascendancy in the Far East.”  602
 The Japanese government, throughout the war, publicized its careful adherence to 
the “civilized” standards for belligerency laid down by international law and argued for 
the acceptance of Japan’s status as a Great Power and as a member of the international 
family of nations.  Minto had observed this, too, calling Japan’s “self-restraint probably 603
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after their great success the strongest card they could [have] play[ed].”  Japan’s bid for 604
international recognition succeeded among European international legal theorists.  605
Political and diplomatic acknowledgement of Japan’s status arrived with the conclusion 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, an agreement that conceded east Asia as Japan’s 
sphere of influence and provided for the use of Indian troops in the event that the mutual 
defense provisions of the agreement were invoked.  606
 The degradation in Anglo-Ottoman relations that followed the Eastern Crisis of 
after 1878 accelerated following Turkish massacres of Armenian Christians in 1894 and 
1896. Malcolm MacColl, Ameer Ali’s earlier antagonist, again wrote jeremiads against 
the barbaric Muslim, who understood nothing but force and could not be trusted to wield 
power fairly in relations with non-Muslims.  Ameer Ali warned that the “demerits of the 607
Turkish Government [had] been cleverly mixed up in the controversy about Islam, to 
discredit one by showing up the faults of the other.”  The goal of these categorical 608
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denunciations of Islam was to place Muslims “beyond the pale of civilised humanity… 
[and] Moslem States outside the jus gentium,” the law of nations.  609
 The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) sealed Japan’s 
primacy in east Asia. The victory was interpreted as a sign of the possibility for non-
Western and non-white modernity, civilization, and strength. It fostered admiration for 
Japan in both the Ottoman and British-Indian empires.  Pherozeshah Mehta 610
(1845-1915), a prominent Bombay lawyer and politician from a Parsi merchant family, 
wrote: 
All Asia [marveled] at the victories of Japan over a European power. Their effects 
were far-reaching. New possibilities seemed to spring into existence, there were 
indications of a popular demand in China, in Persia, in Egypt and in Turkey. There 
was an awakening of the Eastern world, and though to outward appearances, India 
was quiet, in the sense that there was at the moment no visible acute political 
agitation, she had not escaped the general infection.  611
The Indian government responded by attempting to fill perceived lacunae in bureaucratic 
knowledge, as with the monitoring of the increasing numbers of South Asian students in 
Japan, who were migrating to pursue scientific and manufacturing studies.  The focal 612
point for Anglo-Russian competition shifted out of east Asia after 1905. The Anglo-
Russian Convention (1907), possible after the Russian defeat, settled some British 
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geopolitical questions in Persia, but Anglo-Russian tensions never completely abated, 
merely returning to familiar ground in Persia and the Balkans in the period up to 1917.  613
 The Japanese victory over China in 1895 had not been Britain’s only challenge. It 
faced simultaneous geopolitical obstacles in the western hemisphere and in southern 
Africa. A simmering, mid-nineteenth-century boundary dispute between Britain and 
Venezuela erupted in 1895, when the Venezuelan government appealed to the United 
States for assistance opposing British territorial claims, citing the Monroe Doctrine, by 
which the U.S. government forbade European imperial intervention in the western 
hemisphere.  Global economic depression and the closing of frontiers, which ended 614
settlement opportunities, including the possibility for further westward expansion in the 
continental United States, exacerbated the Venezuelan problem.  President Grover 615
Cleveland threatened war, which provoked Canadian fears of a U.S. invasion.  The 616
German government simultaneously provided armaments and encouraged separatism in 
the Transvaal among the Dutch-descended, Boer settlers, who had solicited the active 
intervention and assistance of Germany, just as they would seek U.S. intervention during 
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the South African War, a request denied, partly, based on British suzerainty as defined by 
the London Convention of 1884.  617
 The “Great Rapprochement” between Britain and the United States followed from 
the choice to cooperate to address mutual geopolitical uncertainties, especially after 
Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901.  American policy-makers, thinking 618
about the future, chose to pursue global economic interests with an eye on Asia.  The 619
shared border with Canada meant that military entanglements with Britain could spiral 
out of control, and the United States needed dominant British sea power in the Atlantic to 
stave off European threats while pursuing Asian commercial endeavors elsewhere.  620
Roosevelt supported Britain during the South African War, fearing that damage to the 
British empire would imperil American interests and open the United States to threats 
from European powers, but he also encouraged amnesty for the Boers in the name of 
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Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking unity.  Elite cultural connections and migration-based 621
family ties to Britain eased diplomatic engagement.  622
 South Asians’ argumentation, up to the turn of the century, aimed to answer the 
Indian question. What would be the status or the place of India and South Asians within 
the British empire? The Indian question had become part of two, broader issues related to 
the ideological and legal challenges associated with the twin problems of “the yellow 
peril vs. the white peril” and “the crescent vs. the cross.”  The changed political 623
situation in India and the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 altered the 
civilizational and the geopolitical environment in which all of these related issues existed. 
The following three sections analyze the resolution of these issues between roughly the 
turn of the century and 1919. First, the migration of South Asians to the United States 
converted the imperial problem of South Asians’ racial exclusion from the Dominions 
into an Anglo-Saxon and international geopolitical matter. Second, Syed Ameer Ali 
renewed his advocacy for the religious and civilizational parity of Muslims in light of 
collapsing Anglo-Ottoman relations. Finally, Britain was forced to resolve Indian, 
imperial, and international constitutional and institutional reforms simultaneously during 
a global nationalizing moment between 1917 and 1919. 
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South Asians in the United States 
 Britain relied on the United States between 1900 and the end of the First World 
War during European and imperial geopolitical disputes, most of which involved 
concerns about either Russian stability or German encroachments on the colonial 
possessions of other European states.  American opinions about Britain’s empire in 624
India were divided.  President Theodore Roosevelt remarked to Congress in 1904 that 625
the civilizing work of the United States in the Philippines mirrored the British 
interventions in India and Egypt.  William Jennings Bryan, citing Dadabhai Naoroji in 626
1906, criticized the oppressive and extractive nature of British rule.  Only small 627
numbers of South Asians resided in the United States at the time.  Increasing numbers 628
of South Asian students and businessmen began arriving in the United States around 
1907, as did Punjabi Sikh farmers and lumber mill workers, many of whom had fled 
Canada based on rumors that the racial environment in the United States would be more 
hospitable. The number of South Asian immigrants in the United States reached almost 
1100 in 1907 and exceeded 1700 in 1908. 
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 “Hindu” immigration became a federal issue, and it would become a geopolitical 
challenge for Anglo-American relations.  American politicians and government officials 629
shared for the most part the racial assumptions of the white settler colonists discussed in 
the previous chapter. Exclusionary politics and laws in the states and municipalities along 
the United States’ west coast required the federal government to balance diplomatic 
relations with Britain and federal-state relations within the country. L. Edwin Dudley, the 
U.S. Consul in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, wrote to the U.S. State Department 
office in Washington on November 6, 1906, to request instructions for dealing with South 
Asian immigrants. He identified the problem of racial tensions between immigrants and 
the white working-class on the west coast regarding competition for jobs but refused to 
act alone because, “most of these [South Asian immigrants were] British subjects, and 
many of them [had] served in the British army.”  Dudley, in a longer letter, on 630
November 22, explained his perception of the cultural conflicts and the fears created by 
South Asian immigration. The immigrants “[did] not assimilate in any way with the local 
population,” refusing to eat local food or to mix with the population on religious grounds. 
 Members of the Vancouver City Council had expressed concerns about poor 
hygiene and illness among South Asians, and one had suggested denying the immigrants 
food and shelter as a warning to others not to follow. For the United States, according to 
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Dudley, the problem was the “very long frontier” that “without much more extensive 
protection these people could easily cross.” The small numbers of immigrants at that time 
posed no real problem, but “there [were] at least three hundred and fifty millions of these 
people, laboring for very small wages, who [could] easily be induced to cross the Pacific 
Ocean.”  631
 The British government, in autumn 1906, was focused on South Asians on the 
east coast of the United States. South Asian migrants on the west coast were almost 
exclusively laborers at the time, whereas those on the east coast included potential 
revolutionaries. Two South Asian merchants, Amar Singh and Gopal Singh, had attracted 
the attention of the British Consul-General in New York, Percy Sanderson. The men had 
arrived in the United States “to study the industrial and manufacturing situation with the 
view of freeing India from “English commercial oppression”.”  Both men were 632
associated with the swadeshi movement in India and both were proponents of home rule 
in India of the same sort found in Canada and Australia. They were also connected to 
Eugene Geary, editor of the “Gaelic American,” the press organ of Clan na Gael, an Irish 
separatist group with a significant presence in the United States. 
 Sanderson, in another letter that was forwarded to the Governor-General of India, 
Lord Hardinge, explained that Clan na Gael hoped to instigate “discontent in India, South 
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Africa, Australia and Canada,” and had developed relationships to this end with the 
Russian Consul-General in New York, with supportive press outlets, including the New 
York Herald and “Everybody’s Magazine,” and with sympathetic politicians and 
businessmen.  South Asians on the east coast were monitored also for their contacts 633
with German Societies, in light of German allegations that the British government was 
attempting drive a wedge between Germany and the United States and British concern 
that Germany would attempt to foment anti-British unrest among South Asians.  Again, 634
Lord Hardinge was kept informed of surveillance and intelligence gathering in the United 
States. 
 By December 1906, the disturbances reported by Dudley to the State Department 
were appearing in a memorandum by C. W. Bennett, the British Consul General in San 
Francisco, who argued to the British Ambassador that, “[i]f there [was] any way in which 
this influx of Hindoos [could] be stopped it would… be well to stop it as there [was] very 
little chance of their bettering their own condition,” and pressure from Californians on the 
federal government might lead to an extension of the Chinese “Exclusion Acts so as to 
operate against British East Indians.”  Dudley’s arguments mirrored those made in the 635
debates about South Asians in southern Africa. The Transvaal government had 
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complained to the British government about the porous nature of the borders between 
Natal, a British colony, and the Transvaal. Poor hygiene, illness, and an incapacity for 
assimilation were already common accusations leveled against South Asian migrants. 
 The trans-imperial, transnational, and geopolitical aspects of the problem were 
new, and the connections among South Asians, Irish separatists, German Societies, and 
the German government sparked new fears. Bennett’s attention to the potential for the 
extension of the Chinese Exclusion Acts also appeared in the attention paid by the British 
War Office to the potential for hostilities, especially in the Philippines, between the U.S. 
and Japanese militaries based on anti-Japanese sentiments on the west coast.  The 636
British government was content to manage the exclusion of South Asian migrants from 
the United States, but the U.S. government did not want to face the negative nationalist 
propaganda that would follow an extension of laws to exclude, specifically, British Indian 
subjects. 
 U.S.-British-Canadian coordination on immigration and cross-border population 
transfers was added to an agenda of ongoing negotiations about tariffs and wildlife 
protection.  U.S. immigration agents were visiting Canadian immigration offices 637
regularly in 1907.  Asiatic immigration was treated as a single issue, even though the 638
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bureaucrats involved in administration and negotiation were aware of the differing 
international legal statuses of India, China, and Japan, hence the distinction between 
treaty arrangements with Japan and the informal arrangements among the governments of 
the United States, Britain, Canada, and India.  The Colonial Office identified the issue 639
of Asiatic immigration, generally, as “the gravest and most urgent problem with which 
Imperial statesmanship [was then] confronted” and feared that any British failure to 
address the issue in a comprehensive fashion would lead to Britain’s displacement by the 
United States as the country setting the global agenda on “coloured immigration.”  640
 By the beginning of 1908, South Asians’ revolutionary activities in the United 
States had become a significant concern for the British Embassy. C. W. Bennett, now the 
Consul General in New York, wrote to the new ambassador, James Bryce, and the 
Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, on January 17, 1908, to report on the situation in New 
York. Bennett identified an American, Myron Phelps, as a financial benefactor for 
revolutionary activities, noting that Phelps, in the past, had “stirr[ed] up trouble for 
England over the Transvaal question.”  641
 Bennett derided Phelps’ knowledge of British rule in India but indicated that 
American public opinion could be swayed easily against Britain because it was “so ill 
informed that any statement, however ridiculous, [was] believed.” By February 10, The 
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New York Press was reporting that the U.S. Secret Service and local police had been 
asked by the government to cooperate with the British government’s actions to quash 
revolutionary activities in the Unites States. Even so, Ambassador James Bryce wrote to 
Grey in August of 1908 that revolutionary propaganda seemed to have had little affect on 
American public opinion and that Americans knew, from experience in the Philippines, 
“how great [were] the difficulties of satisfying any subject race.”  642
 Cooperation extended to the suppression of published, “seditious” materials, 
including “The Free Hindustan,” an anti-British magazine that had been printed in 
Vancouver “by a Socialist paper called ‘The Western Clarion’.”  It was distributed in 643
cities on the west coast and in New York, but the Post Office Inspector in Vancouver had 
been able to confiscate copies that were mailed. The British Embassy and Consulates 
worked together to counter the pro-revolutionary materials that were distributed by 
placing articles in newspapers and magazines sympathetic to British rule.  644
 U.S. immigration officials received information about a threat posed by Teja 
Singh, an executive with the Guru Nanak Mining and Trust Company of Vancouver. An 
informant reported that the mining company had been formed for the sole purpose of 
supporting revolutionary conspiracies against the British from North America. Singh, 
supposedly, was sending two plotters, Wariam and Hari Singh, to the United States 
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disguised as representatives of the company for the purpose of securing bombs and other 
explosives for shipment back to India. The Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury 
recommended involving the State Department, which could address the situation by 
invoking the neutrality laws related to the international laws of war.  645
 Local governments and non-governmental organizations continued to stoke fears. 
The Mayor of San Francisco wrote to the Department of Commerce and Labor denying 
“narrow prejudice against Hindus as a people” while asserting that the “free and 
independent people [of San Fransisco would] not tolerate the introduction of a servile 
class.” Arguing from a “progressive” perspective, the Mayor’s Office wrote that allowing 
the entry of South Asians would be akin to the introduction of “the Black from Africa 
man as a slave in the early history of the nation.” The real fear, however, was of the 
“yellow peril,” that allowing one South Asian to enter the country legally would open the 
door to “a population of about 370,000,000… enervated members of a degenerated 
race.”  646
 Cooperative measures to confront Asiatic immigration continued, and in 1911, the 
U.S. Congress published the work of its Immigration Commission, formed in 1907 to 
develop conclusions about foreign immigration into the United States and to make 
recommendations about future immigration policy. The Commission recommended the 
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continued exclusion of Chinese laborers, reliance on existing treaty arrangements to limit 
Japanese and Korean immigration, and that, “[a]n understanding should be reached with 
the British Government whereby East Indian laborers would be effectively prevented 
from coming to the United States.”  Congress used the report as the foundation for 647
comprehensive immigration legislation, which gradually built towards the complete 
exclusion of Asian immigrants. Frank Morrison, the Secretary of the American Labor 
Federation (AFL), in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives on December 
12, 1913, read into the record an AFL resolution that called for, among other demands, 
the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act provisions to all Asians.  648
 By 1914, the House of Representatives was debating “Hindu Immigration,” 
specifically. Dr. Sudhindra Bose, a lecturer at the State University of Iowa, recounted that 
he arrived in the United States as an unskilled laborer, who worked as a store clerk and a 
farm hand before entering college and earning Bachelor’s, Master’s, and Ph.D. degrees. 
Bose explained that South Asians came to the United States “because of the 
opportunities… for social uplift, intellectual betterment, and economical 
advancement.”  ’T’ishi Bhutia, an importer of jute and a resident of Brooklyn, NY, 649
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since graduating from college in the United States, spoke, on April 30, 1914, about the 
value for India when, “our young men come [to the United States] and assimilate the 
conditions of the Americans, assume the American civilization, and go back to India” 
noting that this was, “a greater salvation for us than the sending missionaries.”  650
 British fears about global seditious and revolutionary activities aimed at Indian 
independence had increased in 1910 and continued growing steadily through the end of 
the decade.  The British government tracked South Asian migrants assiduously, 651
watching as they established relationships with individuals and organizations dedicated to 
anti-imperialism and anti-militarism.  Revolutionaries in the United States were one 652
node in a global network of anti-British agitation and intrigue, which included southeast 
Asia, China, and Japan.  In late 1916, a dispute arose between the British and U.S. 653
governments related to the global reach of these movements. 
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 The British never believed that the United States was doing enough to stanch the 
revolutionary activities that were occurring on U.S. soil, and the challenges of the war 
only exacerbated that feeling. Colville Barclay, on behalf of the British Embassy in 
Washington, DC, prepared a memo submitted to the Robert Lansing, the U.S. Secretary 
of State, on September 25, 1916, and invoked the international laws of war, specifically 
the duties of neutral states to refrain from activities that aided any belligerent parties. 
Barclay called attention to “the continued toleration of Indian and German intrigues in 
the United States which constitut[ed] a grave threat to the British Empire,” activities that 
were being planned in China.  He characterized U.S. inaction as negligent and 654
inconsistent with the duty of a neutral power to stop such activities. Lansing, with the 
support of President Woodrow Wilson, responded on February 23, 1917, to deny the 
allegations, which he attributed to British frustration with the inability of either the 
imperial or the Indian governments to quash the revolutionary movements.  655
 Two decisions brought the matter to a close. The U.S. entered the war fewer than 
two months later. More importantly, Congress had passed the Immigration Act of 1917 on 
February 5. Legal strategies and constructions had traveled throughout the Anglo world, 
with the Dominions and the United States borrowing laws from one another; the U.S. Act 
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of 1917 resembled Britain’s 1905 Aliens Act.  The Act of 1917 required a literacy test, 656
aimed at poor laborers, expanded the definition of radicalism, and excluded Asiatic 
immigration by creating a novel geographical area, the “Asiatic Barred Zone.”  657
Interestingly, both the Aliens Act and the Act of 1917 carved out exceptions for asylum 
based on religious persecution, which, partly, were responses to the alleged mistreatment 
of non-Muslims within the Ottoman empire. 
South Asians and the Eastern Question up to World War I 
 Syed Ameer Ali, in 1907, castigated the “the public press of England and France” 
for perpetuating fears of “the bogey of Pan-Islamism, conjured up by fevered brains, 
which [were] responsible for much of the wild talk” in those two countries regarding the 
Ottoman empire and Muslims around the world.  Pan-Islam, though, was only one of a 658
growing number of diverse, ideological-affiliative visions of global order that cut across 
the established borders of states and empires to impinge on imperial and international 
politics and governance.  Moreover, Ameer Ali’s broad-stroke condemnation of the 659
press and public opinion was not entirely accurate. One French journal, the Revue du 
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Monde Musalman, described Ameer Ali’s and Major Syed Hassan’s vision of Islam, 
expressed during the post-lecture discussion at Valentine Chirol’s Central Asian Society 
lecture on pan-Islam, as “humane and progressive,” with a respect for “liberty [and] 
equality, and a hatred of religious zealotry and bigotry.”  660
 Ameer Ali’s early twentieth-century environment differed in two crucial ways 
from the atmosphere in which he wrote A Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings 
of Mohammed (1873). Missionary discourse and disputation had become significantly, if 
not entirely, less hostile throughout the nineteenth century. Scholars had rebutted William 
Hunter’s 1871 assertion that Muslims were bound by the tenets of Islam to rebel against 
British rule, and men with experience in India, like Theodore Beck and Theodore 
Morrison, former principals of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s college at Aligarh, and the 
orientalist scholar, Thomas W. Arnold, had magnified Ameer Ali’s sympathetic portrait of 
loyal Indian Muslims.  One scholar, in 1905, described Ameer Ali’s book, The Spirit of 661
Islam, as “probably the best achievement in the way of an apology for Mohammed that 
[was] ever likely to be composed in a European language.”  Also, official patronage had 662
elevated the status of Muslims within the empire. Ameer Ali, by 1907, had served on the 
Bengal Legislative Council and as a judge on the Bengal High Court. 
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 The Islamophobia that Ameer Ali decried and the debate in which he was 
participating, in 1907, related to the position of Muslims in India but connected much 
more closely than in the nineteenth century to the Ottoman problem and the global 
dispute between “crescent and cross.” The Ottoman leadership, during the 50 years 
preceding the First World War, found itself increasingly caught between international 
threats and domestic upheaval.  Ottoman imperial reform had failed to forestall Great-663
Power demands that the Ottomans could never quite satisfy, and for decades, the 
government faced growing nationalism among subject populations, which had been 
encouraged by foreign statesmen and governments.  The entente cordiale established 664
between Britain and France in 1904 stabilized colonial relations between those two 
countries, secured France against German expansionism in Europe, and allowed Britain 
to focus on Russia in eastern Asia and, after 1907, in the Balkans.  The perceived 665
importance of Anglo-Ottoman relations as a British bulwark against Russian 
expansionism, consequently, receded. U.S. power ensured the predominance of Britain in 
Egypt and of France in Morocco during the First and Second Moroccan Crises 
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(1905-1906, 1911).  These events and, later, the Italo-Turkish War (1911) and the 666
Balkan Wars (1912-1913) pushed the Ottoman empire into the arms of Germany.  667
 Ameer Ali returned to London in 1904, ensconced himself at the Reform Club, 
founded in the wake of the Reform Act of 1832 to provide a congenial intellectual 
gathering-place for liberals, and continued his public intellectual and organizational work 
on behalf of Indian Muslims. He and his wife, the sister of British actress Gertrude 
Kingston, spent summers in the Swiss mountains, socializing with statesmen, diplomats, 
international law professors, and businesspeople from Turkey, Egypt, Europe, and 
America.  He founded the London Muslim League in 1908, was appointed a judge on 668
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of appeal in colonial law 
cases, in 1909, founded the first mosque in London in 1910 and the British Red Crescent 
Society in 1912.  669
 Ameer Ali focused equally on the external and internal affairs of India. He 
realized that the Eastern Question had developed and continued to play out in imperial 
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possessions and buffer states, encompassing all of Asia and much of colonial Africa.  670
His recognition of this fact led him to believe in the continued need for Anglo-Ottoman 
amity.  He was also well aware of the ongoing political discord in India, which led him 671
to conclude that the demand for self-government should be placed in abeyance until the 
population possessed deeper knowledge of political issues and a greater sense of 
solidarity.  The “civilised nationalities of India [were] not behind any Western race in 672
adaptability for progress,” but security and the future progress of India was, for the time 
being, inextricably connected to British rule.  This was true, too, regarding the Indian 673
Muslim polity, which would be dispossessed of what power it possessed by Hindu-led 
self-government.  674
 In 1909, Ameer Ali lent his name to one book and one letter, both of which were 
aimed at countering rising fears of Turkish instability and pan-Islamic aggression. Arthur 
Glyn Leonard, a British soldier who had served in South Africa, Afghanistan, India, and 
the Sudan, published Islam: Her Moral and Spiritual Value as a response to “the fashion 
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in Europe to rail at and suspect the good faith and motives of the Moslem world.”  675
Ameer Ali contributed the foreword, praising Leonard for acknowledging both the debt 
of Europe to Islam and the character of Muhammad as a “true man—great not only as a 
teacher, but as a patriot and statesman; a material as well as a spiritual builder, who 
constructed a nation and an enduring faith.”  Ameer Ali also co-authored an open letter 676
with Edward Atkin and Frederic Harrison after Harrison assumed the presidency of the 
Eastern Questions Association.  The letter urged patience and called for support for 677
Turkish reformers. It recalled the diplomatic morass that British policy towards Turkish 
affairs had created over 50 years. The writers counseled that undue haste in becoming 
involved would lead to war. 
 Ameer Ali wrote directly about Anglo-Ottoman relations after 1909. His letters to 
The Times explicitly invoked the institutional and state-building activities of the Prophet, 
as well as the Prophet’s example of proper conduct in diplomacy and war. His goal was to 
spur British mediation of the slow dismantling of the Ottoman empire that began with the 
Turco-Italian War and ended after the First World War. In a series of letters to The Times 
from September until December of 1911, Ameer Ali repeatedly encouraged British 
involvement in the Turco-Italian War. He calls on the British government to re-establish 
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amity between Christians and Muslims, reminding the government of the hundreds of 
million Muslim subjects who are watching Italy’s “breach of all canons of international 
morality.”  Britain, “for the sake of her trusteeship” must “defend the law of nations,” 678
which Italy violated by initiating a war of conquest.  Invoking the standard of 679
civilization, and the Hague conferences on the law of war held in 1899 and 1907, Ameer 
Ali condemned both the “indiscriminate slaughter” of women, captives, and civilians, and 
the lassitude of the British people, writing, “were even a fraction of these acts committed 
by the Turks, there would have been a howl of indignation throughout the length and 
breadth of Great Britain.”  680
 During the Turco-Italian War, when Russia invaded northern Iran, the British 
prepared to invade the southern part of Iran. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 had 
divided Iran into Russian and British informal spheres of influence, but the Turco-Italian 
War offered a pretext for possible annexation. Ameer Ali argued that even if the British 
government could not decide foreign policy based on the sentiments of subjects, the 
Muslims were “entitled to expect that the Empire to which they belong should extend to 
people and States of their faith the same measure of justice and protection that she is 
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ready to accord to weaker Christian States.”  Here, Ameer Ali condemned the idea of 681
“might making right” by reminding the British government of its past efforts to protect 
weak states against stronger aggressors. His argument served two purposes. It claimed 
both that Muslim states were the equal of Christian states under international law and that 
Muslim subjects of the British empire were the equals of other subjects. 
 He continued, in a similar vein, when the Turco-Italian War slowly transformed 
into the Balkan Wars (1912-1912), criticizing those who advocated British support for the 
break-away Balkan provinces of the Ottoman empire. He likened their support to a “20th 
century crusade,” and wondered at the willingness to enable Russia, “the land of pogroms 
and persecutions,” to dismember the Ottoman empire.  The British Army General Staff 682
concluded, relatedly, that one reason for Turkish defeat in the wars was because “she 
relied on the professed policy and promises of the Great Powers to maintain her integrity 
and the status quo in the Balkans.”  He led the London Muslim League to make similar 683
entreaties directly to the Foreign Office to condemn both violations of international law 
leading to the war and British failures to consider Muslim public opinion in India.  684
 The Turco-Italian and the Balkan Wars transitioned into the First World War, and 
when this occurred, Ameer Ali ceased criticizing the British government. He did produce 
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an historical analysis of the institution of the Caliphate with the goal of overcoming 
theological objections to the Ottoman sultan’s claim to represent all Muslims. The more 
important objective, in line with his earlier work, seems to have been to emphasize the 
worldwide unity of the Muslim community to claim a place for Muslim public opinion in 
political debates about the post-war settlement.  The preeminent British historian of 685
Islam at the time, Thomas Arnold, also recognized the role of politics in the evolution of 
ideas about the Caliphate, as well as the tension between theology and politics and the 
ways that theological examinations of history could be politicized.  British foreign 686
policy discussions of the Caliphate displayed all of these tendencies.  Ameer Ali’s 687
public intellectual and political advocacy work in London and his intermingling with 
global intellectuals and statesmen brought him to the attention of Ottoman officials and 
carved a niche among British liberals. It is, therefore, unsurprising that his belief in the 
importance of Indian Muslim public opinion became a feature of post-war, British 
debates about the peace settlement. 
South Asians, Constitutional Reform, and International Recognition 
 Indian, imperial, and international interests intersected in 1917, in constitutional, 
legal, and institutional debates about the status of India and the future of imperial and 
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global order. The Imperial War Conference resolution recognizing India’s right to 
participate equally in the Imperial conferences and to consultation in foreign affairs set 
the tone in April. This agreement laid the groundwork for the imperial nationalizing 
moment in which reciprocity among India and Dominions could occur, an agreement that 
re-imagined each of these states as existing in an intra-imperial but international 
relationship to one another. The promise of eventual self-government for India and the 
end of the system of indenture followed these decisions in August and in the autumn, 
respectively. All of these alterations built on a legacy of South Asian liberal international 
thought and political advocacy, and all of these concessions had been impelled by Indian 
political unrest and British fear, especially fear of the global dimensions of the 
revolutionary movement. 
 The task of constitutional reform fell mainly on Edwin Samuel Montagu 
(1879-1924), the Secretary of State for India between July 1917 and March 1922, and on 
Frederic Thesiger (1868-1933), Lord Chelmsford, the Governor-General of India from 
April 1916 until April 1921. Montagu, in particular, adopted the demands and the 
language of South Asian liberals. South Asians, except for the revolutionaries and their 
sympathizers, had rallied behind the imperial government at the beginning of the First 
World War, but they made clear the expectation that the government would meet their 
demands at the war’s end. Chelmsford reiterated, in numerous communications with the 
India Office in London, his belief that conciliating public opinion required a clear 
statement of the goals of British rule in India, and he initiated the collaborative process of 
230
formulating the government’s “Goal of British Rule in India” in July 1916.  Montagu 688
had served as Under-Secretary of State for India between 1910 and 1914, so he possessed 
familiarity with the issues and the people involved, when he accepted Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George’s offer to serve as the Secretary of State on July 17, 1917.  689
 He had already suggested to Lloyd George that better representation of South 
Asians throughout the government, to include greater executive opportunities and a 
concomitant reorganization of the India Office were a matter of “the continued existence 
of the British Empire.”  He had proposed a federation of self-governing provinces and 690
princely states, largely in line with Chelmsford’s recommendation, acknowledging that 
immediate home rule was impossible.  Lloyd George, focused on the war effort, proved 691
difficult to engage, and Montagu pressed on him that the failure to move ahead with 
announcement of eventual, complete self-government would lead to disaffection in India 
and a governmental response of “repression, coercion, imprisonment — compared with 
which… the recent history of Ireland [would seem] placid and peaceful.”  692
 Montagu’s dystopian vision failed to materialize after the British government 
announced the goal of autonomy for Indians in provincial, domestic affairs and eventual 
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Indian self-government on August 20, 1917, a goal later formalized in the Government of 
India Act of 1919.  Concessions to Indian opinion continued, for example, when the 693
government released Annie Besant, a home rule advocate and political prisoner, as a 
show of good faith in October.  Montagu paired movement in the direction of self-694
government with a constant push for imperial equality between India and the Dominions, 
for South Asians to represent India at the eventual peace talks, and for the opinions of 
elite South Asian’s to inform the prime minister’s post-war planning.  695
 Satyendra Prasanno Sinha (1863-1928), the first South Asian to serve on a 
Viceroy’s Executive Council (Law Member, 1909-1914), had taken a position as 
Montagu’s assistant at the India Office in 1917, and Montagu regularly solicited the 
advice of Sultan Muhammad Shah (1877-1957), the Aga Khan III, the worldwide leader 
of the Ismaili Muslim community and a member of the Muslim League.  Sinha had 696
argued both against the idea that India might receive a League of Nations Mandate to 
control some territories conquered from Turkey by the Indian Army and in favor of 
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setting aside former German territories in East Africa for Indian colonization.  The Aga 697
Khan conducted an exploratory trip through Ottoman territory to discern local opinions 
about a possible American Mandate in Turkey, which led Montagu to endorse his 
recommendation to set aside this potential policy, if the Turks could not retain control of 
Constantinople.  698
 Montagu became increasingly strident about the imperial and international 
ramifications of India’s separate legal personality, demanding that he be allowed to 
represent the views of both the Indian government and the educated South Asian liberals 
who articulated Indian public opinion, especially regarding the peace settlement with 
Turkey, even threatening resignation from the government, if he were barred from this 
duty.  He argued, explicitly, that the success of Indian constitutional reforms depended 699
on British attention to Indian opinion, which was increasingly unified, regarding the 
peace settlement with Turkey.  He advocated forcefully for policies that would 700
demonstrate to Indian Muslims that they were full members of the imperial subject-
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citizenry.  He was a willing audience for Ameer Ali’s arguments that Persia possessed a 701
right to be admitted as a founding member of the League after Ameer Ali interweaved 
historical, civilizational, and international legal arguments on behalf of Persia in 1919, 
invoking not only a British duty to protect the weak, but also Persia’s constitutional 
advances, which had resulted in parliamentary democracy, voting rights, and minority 
protections.  Persia ultimately became a founding member of the League. Ameer Ali 702
also argued, more generally and less successfully, that Muslim states should be included 
in international life.  703
 Montagu actively adopted Naoroji’s demand that the Secretary of State for India 
represent Indian interests based on India’s equality with the imperial and Dominion 
governments. This was the result of both South Asian liberals’ intellectual and political 
labor and the revolutionary-inspired fear of Indian separatism, but South Asian liberals 
had created ideas about Indian and Muslim civilizational history and parity that were 
available for use during the conjunctural moment surrounding the First World War. 
Montagu applied these ideas, when dealing with Lloyd George and other members of the 
Cabinet, irritating his colleagues but securing concessions to Indian demands. Ameer Ali 
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and the Aga Khan both saw a connection between the success of Indian constitutional 
reforms and the Turkish peace settlement, noting that the reforms required the support of 
the entire Indian population and writing, about Montagu, that “no statesman [was] more 
alive to the dangers of the situation than the Secretary of State for India.”  704
 The successes and failures related to particular issues matter less than the 
acceptance of India into international legal society and the general openness of Western 
diplomats, within limits, to South Asian’s arguments and diplomacy. Those limits were 
ultimately geographical. That is, the imperial nationalizing moment of 1917 that saw both 
the acceptance of racial discrimination in intra-imperial immigration and the recognition 
of India’s equality with the Dominions regarding imperial foreign affairs and her right to 
reciprocity in relations had been repeated in the international nationalizing moment in 
Paris. 
Conclusion 
 South Asians’ nineteenth-century international legal thought and politics aimed 
mostly to cajole or criticize British governance. The institutionalization of international 
law proceeded up to the turn of the century as the result of European theorists work and 
of Great Power, intra-imperial politics. The transitional moment starting in the 1890s 
witnessed domestic, imperial, and international legal politics coalescing in ways that 
imbricated these notional spaces. Migration, especially the migration of South Asian 
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revolutionaries eroded the boundaries between these spaces and compelled the British to 
take steps to incorporate moderate South Asian liberal’s demand into domestic, imperial 
and international governance. Consequently, South Asians represented the state of India 
in intra-imperial negotiations about the post-war settlement and at the Paris Peace 
conference in 1919. 
 Montagu wrote to Lord Chelmsford on January 18, 1919, only four days after the 
opening of the Paris Peace Conference: 
we have gone—shall I say lightly—into a series of decisions which puts India so 
far as international affairs are concerned on a basis wholly inconsistent with the 
position of a subordinate country. Her status has soared far more rapidly than 
could have been accomplished by any of our reforms.  705
His prescience became increasingly apparent. Article 1 of the final Covenant of the 
League allowed only “[a]ny fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony” to petition 
for membership in the organization.  The imperial and Indian constitutional reforms 706
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919 only “provided for gradual expansion 
towards complete self-government” and would only receive Royal assent to become law 
in December, six months after Ganga Singh and Montagu signed the treaty.  India’s 707
League membership placed that state, theoretically, on equal international legal footing 
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with other League members, including Britain and the Dominions.  Herein lay the 708
origins of Indian “quasi-independence.” 
 Lanka Sundaram, “The International Status of India,” Journal of the Royal Institute of International 708




 South Asians used international legal discourse for the work of ideological 
disputation and to mount political challenges to the domination and subjugation that 
accompanied imperial rule. They instigated political and legal disputes in India and 
Britain, throughout the empire, and overseas, and gained promises and partial 
concessions to Indian opinions and demands that limited British options in imperial and 
international relations. In so doing, they compelled the British state to alter the ideology, 
the policies, and the practices of the state, in India and in its relations with other states 
both within and outside the empire. Britain’s power, ultimately, meant that South Asians’ 
argumentation and actions shaped the contours of global order after the First World War. 
 The traditional international-legal framework of treaties, treatises, and states 
provides little insight into South Asians’ contributions to global order and law between 
roughly 1850 and 1920. The role of international political thought and law in the causes 
and consequences of the revolt of 1857, for example, were fairly well understood among 
legal theorists and colonial administrators. The international character of these events has 
been ignored by scholars, even though relations among both peoples and states were at 
the heart of imperial conflicts both among the EIC, South Asian rulers and rebels, and the 
British Parliament and later among the South Asians, the Government of India, the 
British government, and other governments within and outside of the empire. These 
issues have been ignored by scholars, also, during the period up to 1947, including the 
years of India’s “quasi-independent membership in the League of Nations, when the state 
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was declared and recognized as an independent state but considered an anomalous 
international person that could “not be regarded as a sovereign state and a normal subject 
of international law.”  709
 The lacuna exists because of the perceived and purported normalcy of the nation-
state as the fundamental category of international life, but the recent, renewed interest in 
empire has provided a useful reminder that, for most of human history, empires and 
related forms of sub- and trans-imperial inter-polity relations had been the predominant 
political structures.  Recent scholarship, in light of this development, has refocused 710
attention on the imagined futures for imperial and international political life, imperial 
citizenship, for example, or international and transnational anti-colonialism.  This 711
dissertation focused on South Asians’ politico-legal argumentative practices, on how and 
why they articulated particular, context-dependent political claims, on the demands they 
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made, and on the responses to those demands.  It did so by approaching empire in a 712
way that emphasizes the global exchange of ideas and the active connections between 
colonizers and the colonized.  Elite, English-speaking South Asians acted as cultural 713
translators or intermediaries.  They engaged in debates as public intellectuals, and they 714
carved out spaces for themselves in the social and political communities that created 
public opinion, especially those who visited or lived in Britain.  They did so in an 715
environment shaped by the political and economic exigencies consequent to both local 
and global events. 
 Lord Dalhousie, between 1848 and 1856, annexed more territory in India than all 
previous British territorial expropriations combined.  Many South Asians and some 716
Britons identified these dispossessions as a cause of the revolt of 1857. The annexations 
were enacted, according to Dalhousie, in accordance with international law. British 
political theorists and imperial administrators attempted to define and create order among 
both states and peoples during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  They mattered 717
because Britain dominated global politics for most of this time.  The concepts of 718
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civilization and progress underlay their efforts to achieve order, and their interest in order 
related to the process of systematizing the empire.  719
 Intellectuals adapted natural-scientific practices of categorization to place 
different peoples along a hierarchical continuum. Civilizational inferiority, including the 
incapacity for reciprocity and the propensity for misrule, was instantiated in a “standard 
of civilization.”  European global political and legal thought required the exclusion of 720
“uncivilized” or “backward” peoples, including non-Christians and non-Europeans, 
generally, from the scope of international law.  Dalhousie, undoubtedly, was correct that 721
international law allowed him to annex territories in cases of misrule, if he followed 
recognized international legal standards related to treaties. His annexations based on the 
“doctrine of lapse,” when a ruler had no heir, were much less obviously justifiable, and 
his creation of the doctrine provides one example of the British use of international legal 
innovations to achieve the goal of conquest. 
 British state practice interpreted international law in ways designed to exclude 
particular peoples from international life.  Imperial ideologies and practices were 722
critical to the construction of liberalism, global order, and international law and 
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institutions.  Theorists and practitioners justified an iterative relationship between 723
theory and practice in which theorists who said that South Asian territories could be 
annexed based on Britain’s global mission on behalf of the civilized world were proved 
correct by the practice of annexation.  International law, in the early nineteenth century, 724
according to Lauren Benton, became the preferred way to explain the “legal logic of 
conquest,” which also justified the expropriation of resources, the imposition of British 
governance, and violence against putatively uncivilized states and peoples.  The result, 725
for men like Henry Rawlinson, was the complete absorption of India and her resources 
into the British empire, at the top of which sat the Queen and Parliament to command 
Britain’s international relations and legal engagements with other sovereign states. 
 The territorial annexations that preceded the revolt of 1857, the trial and exile of 
the last Mughal emperor, Muhammad Bahadur Shah Zafar, and the elimination of East 
India Company rule were conceived and justified in the language of international law. 
South Asians’ knowledge regarding Anglo-Ottoman relations expanded because of the 
Crimean War and when South Asian Muslim exiles fled to Ottoman lands following the 
revolt. The Crimean War and the American Civil War resulted in economic growth in 
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India. The use of Indian monies for British imperial and frontier wars depleted the 
government’s ability to confront local crises, such as famine.  
 Dadabhai Naoroji self-consciously occupied the role of cultural translator during 
the years he lived in Britain between 1855 and 1907. He continued a long-standing 
practice of South Asians migrating to Britain, and his presence altered the ideological 
debates about British domination of South Asian peoples because he participated actively 
in social life and freely expressed critical political opinions about British character and 
governance.  The East India Association provided a congenial home for South Asians 726
and sympathetic Britons to discuss the government’s policy related to India and to 
attempt to influence both policy and public opinion. His arguments about the foreign-ness 
of British rule shifted the register of debates about British rule in India from the domestic 
sphere into international-legal relational space. 
 His comparative sociological examinations of the Parsis placed that community 
into the same category of historically civilized peoples as Christians, offering a counter 
argument, rooted in the ideology of the British civilizing mission, to Henry Maine’s 
historical, cultural-evolutionary arguments about the development of different peoples. 
His broader engagement with the civilizational and scientific-racist commentary of James 
Crawfurd provided an early example of engagement with what would become the Asiatic 
problem. Naoroji’s international legal analyses extended his sociological work to argue 
that the civilized peoples of Asia, such as the Parsis, were due the international legal 
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rights that had been extended, historically, to the peoples of South Asia. He envisioned 
the representative state of India existing in an imperial commonwealth as an equal part of 
the British empire. 
 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, and Maulvi Chiragh Ali produced analyses 
focused on the community of South Asian Muslims and the needs of that community after 
the dispossession of the last Mughal king. Ahmad Khan believed in the developmental 
promises and potential of British rule while seeking space for the participation of South 
Asians in governance. His explications of Muslim history emphasized the foreign nature 
of British rule to explain the relationship between local or indigenous knowledge and 
good government. His Quranic exegesis distinguished and reconciled the historical 
commands for religious practice and the possibilities of modern scientific knowledge. 
 Ahmad Khan’s historicism laid a foundation for the work of Ameer Ali and 
Chiragh Ali, both of whom used revisionist historical analysis to narrate Islamic and 
Islamicate history as a civilizing, international legal narrative. Both men countered 
negative portrayals of Islam and the Prophet, common in Christian-Muslim religious 
disputation, by emphasizing the imperial-expansionary, civilizing mission of Islam and 
the national sensibility of the early Muslim community. They described this community 
as a commonwealth with civil and political rights engaging in international relations with 
non-Muslim communities with respect for reciprocity and fidelity to agreements. Their 
commentary aimed to re-create South Asian Muslims as partners in the empire and 
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members of the international family of nations, and, explicitly in Chiragh Ali’s case, to 
argue that the Ottoman empire should be regarded in the same way. 
 South Asians’ international, legal-political achievements fell short of the 
expansive, rights-driven rhetorical imaginaries constructed by all four men. South Asian 
migration globalized colonial disputes.  It altered the global legal context because South 727
Asians carried with them the civilizational difference upon which colonial rule was 
predicated.  It converted domestic debates and disputes into intra-imperial and 728
international questions arising from the conflict of political theories and of laws.  South 729
Asians’ experience in southern Africa, rooted in the indentured labor system, and in the 
other white, settler colonies revolved around ideas about nationality, national character, 
race, and imperial citizenship.  South Asians called on the local, imperial, and Indian 730
governments to support their rights as British subject-citizens in the face of 
discriminatory legislation. 
 English-speaking, and writing, traders in the South African Republic petitioned 
governments using arguments based on international law. Their rights claims, described 
in explicit international legal language, conjured the civilized Indian polity, imagined by 
Naoroji, of subject-citizens within an imperial commonwealth and represented by the 
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Indian state. The Imperial Conference of 1917 conferred recognition of India’s separate 
statehood within the empire, but the imperial government refused to enforce long-
standing policies regarding non-discrimination in the interest of imperial unity among the 
white Dominions, which allowed racial bigotry to be written into imperial constitutional 
law. Separate states and unequal peoples became the law of empire. 
 This pattern was re-created in Indian constitutional and international law 
following the First World War. The Indian reforms promised only eventual self-
government, unlike the Dominions’ responsible government, even though imperial 
constitutional law regarded India and the Dominions as separate and equal states within 
the empire. The reformed constitutional system of dyarchy devolved power to the 
provincial governments but divided responsibilities between appointed British governors, 
who retained autocratic control over law and policing, and a council of elected South 
Asian legislators. The system also reserved foreign affairs’ responsibilities for the central, 
British-run government. 
 Edwin Montagu accepted South Asian liberals’ demand that the Government of 
India represent Indian interests. Sixty years after the revolt, in 1917, Satyendra Prasanno 
Sinha became the assistant to Edwin Samuel Montagu, the Secretary of State for India. 
He and the Maharaja Ganga Singh served with Montagu on the Imperial War Cabinet in 
1917 and at the Imperial Conferences in 1917, when Sinha negotiated the resolution that 
recognized India’s right to a voice in imperial foreign policy and relations, and in 1918. 
Sixty years after the transition to direct British rule, in 1918, Sinha assisted Montagu to 
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prepare for the Parliamentary debates about Indian constitutional reform and the post-war 
peace conference. He became Lord Sinha, the first South Asian in the House of Lords, in 
February 1919, and was named Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India, a ministerial 
position formerly held by Montagu (1910-1914). 
 South Asians negotiated as diplomats representing India at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Ganga Singh and Montagu signed the Treaty of Versailles in Paris on June 
28, 1919, on behalf of the state of India. He and Sinha, acting as South Asian diplomats, 
had negotiated for India in Paris. They had debated and decided, with their diplomatic 
counterparts from 26 other countries, the details of both the postwar settlement and the 
creation of a new, international organization designed to keep the peace and to encourage 
international engagement and cooperation. Colonial India’s founding membership in the 
League conveyed international legal recognition. The state of India became a founding 
member of the League of Nations and the International Labor organization and obtained 
international legal recognition. Nevertheless, dyarchy characterized the eventual structure 
of the League. The imperial nationalizing moment that introduced racial prejudice into 
imperial constitutional law reappeared in global form in Paris. 
 The League was granted no power to intervene in the internal affairs of member 
states, so the legislated racial inequality that answered the Indian question in the 
Dominions and the international, Asiatic question was left unchallenged. Ameer Ali had 
continued his advocacy for the Ottoman empire and the global Muslim community in the 
wake of the war, and Montagu had been a vocal proponent for listening to South Asian 
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Muslims’ concerns, but the Ottoman empire was, nonetheless, partitioned into spheres of 
Great-Power influence. Persia became a founding member, but Muslim states were 
obviously under-represented. European powers were the only permanent members of the 
League Council, an executive body directing the work of the Assembly, and the 
mandatory powers were almost all white, European states, except for Japanese trusteeship 
over former German island-colonies in the Pacific Ocean. 
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International India in the Inter-War Years: An Epilogue 
 The difference between India’s international legal statehood and its imperial 
subjugation shaped the ideological arguments and the institutional practices associated 
with empire and international law and relations up to the creation of the United Nations 
in 1945 and South Asian independence in 1947.  Europeans could no longer claim a 731
moral or developmental high ground following the industrialized slaughter of the First 
World War, which upended what had appeared to be settled definitions of civilization and 
savagery.  In 1919, formal diplomacy in Paris aimed to restore, secure, and maintain 732
peaceful order. The putative promise of self-determination for all peoples as the basis for 
lasting peace seemed to recognize the existence of the global nationalizing moment and 
raised hopes for domestic autonomy among colonial populations.  733
 South Asians, excepting the revolutionaries demanding complete and immediate 
independence, initially viewed the League with a sense of great hope and possibility.  734
B.G. Tilak, for example, believed that India could be a “powerful steward of the League 
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of Nations in the East.”  The failure, in Paris and in colonial capitals, to deliver on the 735
promise of local political autonomy led to unrest in Egypt, China, Korea, and India. 
Concomitant disillusionment led Tilak, before his death in August 1920, and other 
immediate-autonomy advocates to turn away from the League.  736
 The Government of India had responded to local disaffection with the Rowlatt 
Act, formally the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, which was drafted by the 
Indian police based on documents compiled by James Campbell Ker, a member of the 
Indian Civil Service and the assistant to the Director of Criminal Intelligence.  Edwin 737
Montagu reluctantly approved the Act, which became law on March 10, 1919, and 
allowed the government to restrict press freedom and to conduct warrantless arrests, 
detentions without trials, and secret trials without juries.  Widespread protests followed, 738
and the Indian army opened fire on a crowd of unarmed demonstrators at Jallianwala 
Bagh in Amritsar on April 13, 1919. The legal repression and military massacre occurred 
while Indian troops remained overseas after fighting in east Africa, in the Middle East 
and Persia, and in Europe, while Sinha and Ganga Singh negotiated the peace in Paris, 
and while the Indian government finalized the details of constitutional reforms promising 
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eventual self-government. Repression, in this context, strengthened the belief that the 
reforms were hollow and that the League represented the internationalization of imperial 
oppression rather than any sort of “new” world order. 
 The ideal of self-determination had raised hopes in Turkey, too. A petition by one 
group of Turkish religious leaders, businessmen, educators, politicians, newspapers, and 
civic organizations appealed to the Indian Muslim community to intervene with the 
British government to secure independent Turkish membership in the League.  The 739
petitioners recognized India’s League membership and called on Indian Muslims as 
citizens of the British empire to advocate for Turkish legal personality. This pan-Islamic 
appeal to preserve the caliphate in the name of the Muslim nation served instrumental, 
statist goals. It was an example of inter-imperial rather than anti-imperial politics. British 
and French efforts to annex Ottoman imperial territory, especially Constantinople, 
ultimately instigated new fighting, what would later be called the Turkish war of 
independence (1919-1922), which only ended in 1923 with the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne. 
 The British government recognized the interconnected nature of domestic, 
imperial, and international disaffections. The Inter-Departmental Committee on Eastern 
Unrest, between 1922 and 1927, brought together representatives of the India Office, the 
Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, and the War Office to develop strategies to counter 
the ideologies, the individuals, and the organizations that, according to the British 
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government, were fomenting revolutionary disorder.  The Committee identified 740
“intense nationalism” as the “fundamental cause” of emancipatory movements that aimed 
to eliminate “any form of control by Europeans.”  Varied nationalisms in the space from 741
north Africa through South Asia intersected with five “external agencies” that affected 
intra-imperial separatism: pan-Islamism, bolshevism, Indian revolutionary thought and 
practice, the League of Oppressed Nations, and the geopolitical machinations of rival 
European powers.  742
 Fear on the part of the governments of Britain and India, especially regarding 
revolutionary anti-colonialism and transnational or non-state sources of legitimacy and 
authority, created a recurring pattern that coupled political concessions and repression, 
which endured until 1947.  These governments, during the interwar period, sought to 743
counteract the international relations of multiple nationalisms. Politicians and 
administrators misinterpreted the goals of the Khilafat movement (1919-1924) opposing 
the dismemberment of Turkey, the non-cooperation movement (1920-1922) decrying 
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governmental repression in India, and the Hindu-Muslim cooperation in India that 
accompanied both, seeing all three as separatist threats equal to revolutionary 
activities.  This occurred even though self-government within the empire remained the 744
stated goal of both South Asian moderates and the nationalists demanding immediate 
autonomy up to 1929, when the Indian National Congress demanded independence. 
Moderates were willing to work through the existing British-Indian government to 
exercise India’s membership in the League and the ILO, while the autonomists believed 
that self-government was necessary, if Indian interests were to be represented in Geneva. 
 Revolutionary anti-colonialism has received renewed scholarly attention 
recently.  Scholars have revived also the study of the international, civilizational, and 745
regional histories of South Asian anti-colonialism.  The diplomatic work of the 746
moderates who participated in India’s work at the League and the ILO has received little 
consideration, even though they understood the difficulties surrounding India’s position. 
V. Shiva Ram and Brij Mohan Sharma wrote, 
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“[i]t is surely a curious phenomenon that a country should have the right to direct, 
conjointly with others, the common affairs of 54 countries, without the right to 
govern herself. Looked at from this point of view, India is a political curiosity 
inside the League.”  747
Moderate, imperial internationalists supported the League’s work, and many of 
independent India’s and Pakistan’s most respected diplomats served first on Indian 
delegations at the League and at the ILO.  748
 Debates about the purpose, the goals, and the international legal character of the 
League continued through the interwar years. Hersch Lauterpacht described the League 
of Nations as “an attempt at some kind of international government,” undertaken by “the 
overwhelming majority of states,” but allowed, in 1925, that the character of the League 
remained indeterminate, “possibly supranational, or, perhaps, international.”  Harold 749
Laski called the League “juristically a super-state.”  Jehangir C. Coyajee (1875-1943), a 750
member of India’s Council of State, the upper chamber of India’s Imperial Legislative 
Council after 1919, and a member of India’s League delegations in 1931 and 1932, 
opined that the League was more than machinery for coordinating inter-relations among 
states but nothing like a world polity. Its value lay in the cooperative, sociable spirit it 
 V. Shiva Ram and Brij Mohan Sharma, India & the League of Nations (Lucknow, 1932), 139.747
 Vineet Thakur, “Liberal, Liminal and Lost: India’s First Diplomats and the Narrative of Foreign Policy,” 748
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 45 (2017), 232-258; Patricia Clavin, Securing the World 
Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946, (Oxford, 2013); Dennis Kux, The United 
States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Oxford, 2001).
 Lauterpacht, “Westlake and Present Day International Law,” 307; on Lauterpacht, see, Koskenniemi, 749
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 353-412.
 Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925), 580.750
254
inculcated among states and peoples.  Other South Asians also emphasized that the 751
organization’s potential inhered in the opportunities it provided for “close personal and 
human contact.”  Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872-1953), a Gujarati Shi’a Muslim who 752
graduated Cambridge before being called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn and joining the 
Indian Civil Service, had assessed India’s work in the First Assembly of the League in 
1920 and emphasized the value of voicing Indian interests on the international stage, even 
if the delegates had not been selected by an autonomous Indian government.  The 753
representation of Indian interests mattered more to Yusuf Ali than whether the Indian 
delegates were “representative.” 
 The British-Indian government was supportive of India’s membership and pushed 
for international autonomy when possible. E. S. Montagu continued pressing the imperial 
Cabinet to recognize India’s foreign policy positions. He had, during the peace 
conference, argued that,“[w]hatever be the views of the British Government… I must 
claim that I am entitled to put forward the views of India… .”  He circumvented the 754
Cabinet regarding the method of communication between the Government of India and 
League, directing the League to correspond with India directly, through the Secretary of 
 J. C. Coyajee, India and the League of Nations (Madras, 1932), 7-11.751
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State’s office, rather than through the British Cabinet.  Later, F. W. Duke, of the India 755
Office, responded to a reprimand from the Cabinet for corresponding directly with 
Geneva, stating on October 20, 1920, “[i]n view of the fact that India herself is a Member 
of the League its position is analogous to that of the other overseas British members 
whose Governments communicate directly with the League Secretariat.”  The 756
Dominion governments, in fact, corresponded with the League through the Cabinet 
Office, but the Cabinet eventually capitulated to India Office intransigence and allowed 
direct communication between India and Geneva.  A frustrated Lloyd George finally 757
responded that Montagu’s attitude “struck me as being not so much that of a member of 
the British Cabinet, but of a successor on the thrown (sic) of Aurangzeb!”  758
 The India Office conceded that India was more limited in its possible actions than 
the Dominions, but it supported South Asians’ efforts both to participate in international 
affairs and to represent Indian interests, even when this created intra-imperial strife.  759
The Indian delegation, albeit unsuccessfully, nominated and advocated for Syed Ameer 
Ali’s election as a judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, convincing the 
British and Dominion governments to support his candidacy as “an admirable 
 “Method of Communication with Government of India,” July 5, 1919, LNA, R 1455/138.755
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representative not merely of India but of Muhammadan jurisprudence.”  William Meyer 760
and Louis Kershaw, of the India Office, successfully pushed India’s claim to recognition 
as one of the eight countries of Chief Industrial Importance and a seat on the Governing 
Council of the International Labor Organization in 1922.  761
 Montagu and the Indian government also supported V. S. Srinivasa Sastri’s 
forceful criticism of South Africa’s domestic, discriminatory treatment of South Asians in 
1921.  Sastri’s condemnation was followed in 1922 by the Maharaja of Nawanagar’s 762
exhortation to the South African delegation to serve the interests of the empire and the 
League by ameliorating the condition of the Indian minority living in South Africa.  763
South Africa’s pique led to the issue being raised at the Imperial Conference of 1923 and 
the imperial directive to forego discussing intra-imperial problems in international 
fora.  However, India was named to the ILO’s Permanent Commission on Emigration, 764
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which provided another forum for the more circumscribed discussion of discrimination 
against South Asian migrant laborers and international reciprocity.  765
 The work of India in Geneva was aided by the High Commissioner for India, a 
post created by the India Act of 1919 to represent the Government of India in London, 
especially regarding economic policy.  William Meyer (1860-1922), an Indian Civil 766
Servant and the principal delegate for India during the first two sessions of the League, 
held the post from 1920 until his death, at which time he was replaced by his deputy, J.W. 
Bhore (1878-1960), also an Indian Civil servant and the former diwan, or prime minister, 
of the Indian princely state of Cochin. Bhore held the post temporarily until the 
appointment of the first permanent South Asian High Commissioner, Dadiba M. Dalal 
(1870-1941), a Parsi diplomat and a former member of the Council of India, whose 
appointment was greeted by “The Spectator” as “fresh proof of the British Government's 
wish to conciliate Indian opinion” and “that the process of “Indianizing” the Services in 
India [was] no empty phrase.”  767
 Atul Chandra Chatterjee (1874-1955), an Indian Civil servant, succeeded Dalal in 
1925 and held the position until 1931. Chatterjee developed an exceptionally close 
relationship with both the League and the ILO. He represented India at the International 
Labor Conference in Washington in 1919 and in Geneva in 1921 and from 1924 to 1933, 
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and he served on the ILO’s Governing Board from 1926 to 1933, as president in 1927. 
His brother, Amulya Chandra Chatterjee (1879-1935), worked for the Information and 
Political Sections of the League from July 1929 until his death in an automobile accident 
in February 1935.  Atul Chatterjee took an active role in recommending South Asians 768
both for employment in the League Secretariat and to participate in the League’s 
“temporary collaborator” program, which allowed individuals to visit Geneva during an 
Assembly session to learn about the League’s work and to meet session participants. 
 He recommended J.J. Dalal (b. 1898) for a regular position in the League 
Secretariat in 1926.  Dalal had studied at Harrow and Oxford, served as an artilleryman 769
in the First World War, and worked for Chatterjee in the High Commissioner’s Office. He 
resigned in 1940, after a difficult career in the Legal and Minorities Sections to re-enlist 
in the army. Chatterjee also arranged, for example, for J.M. Sen, who had already 
published a book on the League, to attend the 1932 League session as a temporary 
member of the information section.  The Indian legislature consistently monitored the 770
number of Indian employees of the League and the ILO, especially because India paid 
among the highest annual contributions to the League.  V. Shiva Ram and Brij Mohan 771
Sharma, both of whom were professors at Indian colleges and who wrote India & the 
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League of Nations (1932), also worked in Geneva.  Sharma acted as an Indian 772
correspondent, a public educator or diplomatist, for the League from Lucknow, attached 
to the League’s main Indian office in Delhi, between 1933 and 1946. Ram, who had 
earned a Ph.D. at Harvard before conducting international law research at Cambridge, 
served in the Political Section for one year in 1936 and 1937. 
 P.P. Pillai, who had earned his Ph.D. in economics at the London School of 
Economics, worked in the Economic and Financial Section of the League between 
January 1925 and October 1927, when he moved to the International Labor Organization 
to open its office in India in 1928.  Pillai submitted detailed monthly reports on labor, 773
social, and economic issues in India to ILO headquarters in Geneva.  The ILO provided 774
a more congenial home than the League for South Asians.  One of the chief complaints 775
directed at the League was that it focused overwhelmingly on European concerns.  776
Indian politicians complained that delegates were appointed by the government and that 
India’s financial assessment was too high given the League’s focus on Europe and the 
small number of South Asians serving in the Secretariat. 
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 The constitutional structure of the two organizations differed in crucial ways. The 
political considerations of the permanent members of the League Council ultimately 
controlled the direction of the organization, and India had been denied a Council seat. 
The ILO had been designed to incorporate non-European perspectives on international 
labor issues, and decisions were taken using a tripartite structure in which each member 
state was represented by three delegates, one representing each of three constituencies, 
government, employers, and workers. This allowed workers’ representatives—like, for 
example, Narayan Malhar Joshi (1879-1955), a founder, with Lala Lajpat Rai, of the All 
India Trade Union Congress in 1921, founder of the All India Trade Union Federation in 
1931, and India’s labor delegate to the ILO in 1919 and five more times between 1920 
and 1930—to criticize and to vote against the Indian government. 
 Joshi’s repeated efforts led the ILO to allocate money for the creation of the ILO’s 
Indian office led by Pillai.  Joshi regularly decried the exceptions to labor laws 777
requested by the Government of India on the basis of climate or underdevelopment and 
argued that Indian workers’ rights should equal the rights of European workers.  Joshi 778
also pushed the ILO to convene an Asiatic Labor Conference among India, Japan, and 
China.  He convinced Atul Chandra Chatterjee that the conference could advance labor 779
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rights and education. Chatterjee suggested expanding the participants to include the large 
Indian princely states and major colonies, including the Dutch East Indies, Ceylon, Indo-
China, and Malaya, an idea supported by the Secretary of State for India, William 
Wedgwood Benn.  Harold Butler accepted Pillai's recommendation against pursuing the 780
conference at the time because of the uneasy political situation in India.  A split 781
between radicals and moderates in the All India Trade Union Congress in 1931 stalled 
conference planning, as did Japanese imperial aggression in the mid-1930s.  782
 Vijay Prashad described the Third World as a political project, not a place, in The 
Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World.  Prashad explored the unifying 783
effects of ideas about anti-colonialism, peace, and development among formerly 
colonized peoples and the attempts of Third World leaders to create the ideological and 
institutional basis for peaceful, global coexistence. The historical roots of the Third World 
stretched back to the 1927 Conference of the League Against Imperialism, attended by 
Nehru, among others. The Conference met in Brussels, a city transformed and made 
modern between 1865 and 1909 by wealth derived from Belgium’s brutal, colonial 
system of slavery in the Congo. The choice of location for a meeting opposing 
imperialism, partly funded and organized by members of the Communist International 
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was no accident; neither was the inclusion of “League” in the new institution’s name, 
which was a direct criticism of the mandates system at the League of Nations. Prashad’s 
work, like much recent scholarship, adds depth and breadth to knowledge about the 
international and transnational aspects of anti-imperial thought and organization, but the 
interwar activities of the League of Nations and the ILO were important fora for South 
Asians, ones that warrant more study to fill lacunae regarding South Asians’ pre-
independence diplomatic practice and their contributions to the development of 
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